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LOCATION OF EGYPT 
CHAPTER - I 
]?R©-SIJBZ CAJTJILL ROUTES lEETWE m THB EAST AJJD THE WEST 
I . geographical Location ana Strategic Importance of Egypt 
an4 t ^ Ifft^puB 9f SaajB 
Egypt, a country of ancient oirllissation, i s situated on the 
vforti*-eastern corner of the African continent. Geographically 
the country f a l l s between the la t i tude 21° 47'Hto 52° 6' N, i t s 
longitudinal extent i s 25®E to 35® 33* B on the globe. On the north 
Egypt i s bounded by the Utediterraaean Sea, on the east by the 
Red Sea and i t s two branches ^ the Gulf of Aqaba and the Gulf of 
Suez. ISgjpt has po l i t i ca l boundaries on the north east with 
I s rae l , on the south with the Republic of Sudan, and on the west 
with Mbya. The greatest distance from ^^orth to south i s about 
674 miles and from east to wast i t i s 770 miles, giving the country 
a roughly square shape. 
The eastern part of Egjrpt, lying between the Red Sea and 
the Mediterranean Sea called the Isthmus of Suez^is a land of 
immense geographical importance. The nature of^IsthMUs i s very 
simple. The Isthmus was formed by th" accumulation of deposit 
from the receding seas, and brought by the Nile and the winds. I t i s 
parimarily marshy in the north, sandy in the central plains and 
1. The Middle East and Horth Africa. 1973-741 (London, Europa 
PublicationJ^p. 701. ^ 
c 
rocky between the Bitter ciakes and Suez in the ;Jouth. 
There is geological and biological evidence that at the end 
of the Tertiary Era the Red Sea and^Mediterrenean Sea were joined. 
Tlie marine fauna south of the little Bitter Lake, and sea shells 
tvam Suez and the Moqattaa Hills at Cairo, confinaed the existence 
at an early period of a gulf and a salt water strait over all the 
area now known as the Delta and the Isthmts. Through the ages 
it has served Egypt as a natural barrier against numerous invasions. 
It is ge lerally believed that Bgy^t is a country where the 
first Neolithic revolution took place which resulted in the 
developfflent of the trade and trade routes. Since then Egypt has 
been one of main centres of commercial activity in West Asian region 
and ^aditinally the natural thoroughfare for pilgrims, armies 
and merchants. For centuries Egypt remained the connecting link 
4 
between the two spheres of the world; As a result Egypt influeno cl 
the conmercial activities of the ancient, mediaeval and modern 
period. Egypt has attained an important position in cort»«ercial 
history because of its grography. 
2. W.F, Longgood., The Suez Story t Key to the Middle East (Hew 
York, 195Upr"H^ 
3 . Andre S i eg f r i ed , , Suez and Panama., ( t r ans . H.H.and Doris 
Heiaming). (London 1940}, p , 24. 
4 . II.J, Sohonfield, The Suez Ganal i n World Af f a i r s . , (New 
York,1957) p . 5 . 
FAUtTS SSS J i^FT VALLEyS 
A PI?1NC\PAC flE<eMT VAUCftN95 
i^L.Ak.BS ^ '^ ' 
LDST/)MP, AFP/CA~ nss>Pi/S 
THE RIFT VALLEYS OF EAST AFRICA 
o 
I t s geograpliy, both as to the ^l»al set t ing and as to local 
physical ftliaracteristiC8» explains the s t ra tegic value of the 
5 Egypt in- oontOTiporary world. Among the local physical features 
the most important i s ths Istlsmis of Suez. Egypt i s an area which 
i s s t ra tegica l ly situated at the cross roads of the three continents 
of Asia, Europe and Africa* In t h i s way i t comraands the strategic 
approaches of these continents. Indeed the lathmus of Suez has beer 
the main channel for the trade between the East and the West, The 
pointing finger of the Gulf of Suez towards the Mediterranean and 
the narrow 75-mile length of the Isthmus invited the ear l ie r traders 
g 
and empire builders to cut a channel throiigh i t . That i s why 
every major empire in the history of the old world has ei ther been 
toilched by th i s axe&f in whole or i n part or has cast covetous 
7 
eyes oh i t . 
Secondly, the geographical set t ing of Africa made Egypt a 
passage for trade in those days. The physical landscape of the 
whole of Africa i s compact. The existence of^  gigantic r i f t valley 
from Zambezi River i n Bast Africa to Syria in West Asia, the presenc 
of faul ts and volcanos along the r i f t valley, the vast extentof in-
hospitable Sahara desert and the presence of the north-west coastal 
mountains, are also considered to be hurdles which led the people to 
think of Egypt cJ^ne as a route , For a long period and almost unt i l 
5. H.L. Hoskin, The Middle Easti Problem Area in World 
Po l i t i c s . lTewTork;i557), p t^! 
6. Rene Elvin,'The story of Suez Canal, geographical Magazine 
(London), Vol. X, Ho.5 March 194-0, p.302. 
7. G.Lenczoswski, The Middle East i n t l» World Affairs (Hew 
Yorit, 1956, p.42 
8. F. Mxey, ^African Landscape i Qeographical Review. (Hew Yorv^ 
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the end of the nineteenth oentury the continent of Aftica has been 
Q 
referred to as the *Dark Continent* , Uot much WBJB known of 
Africa to the explorers, sa i lors and traders of the ancient and 
medieTal period. 
Thirdly, the re l ief features of West Asia theraselTes aiade the 
people adopt routes through Bgypt. Ihese re l ie f factors have thus 
made Elgypt a passage betireen the Bast and the West. The northern 
mountainous bel t covering Turkey and Iran and the southern zone 
made up of plains and dissected plateaus compelled the traders 
and merchants to think of Egypt aa a^ yieasy passage. The northern 
bel t consists of the Pontus mountains and Taurus mountains and 
in between l i e s the Anatolian plateau. In Iran along the southern 
shore of the Caspain Sea i s the K^lburz mountain range and to the 
south i s the Zagros mountain. In Eastern Iran, a very complex 
pat tern of mountain ranges, usually described as the eastern 
Iranian Highlands are found. Surrounded by these mountains and 
highlandEjfls the Central J?lateau of Iran with a height of 500 meters. 
The only other passage in t h i s geographical s i tuat ion was provided 
through the Tl^is<»Suphrate8 lowlandj but i t was not so useful as 
tbs Suez route was. 
In the southwestern regi(m of West Asiay Red Sea Hills are the 
ma;J<a: uplai^ areas i n eastern Egypt. The Nile Delta forms the 
9. I». Duddley Stamp, African Study in Tropical DeveloigiBnt. 
(london, 1955), p . 6. 
u 
major lowlands area* To the east and west of tlas Hile are l a i ^ 
sand t r a c t s . In the south eastern corner of the AraMan Peninsula 
and along the Red Sea Coast the uplands and raountalns are found. 
She presence of the >#rld*s largest sand sea called Rub a l Khali 
in the central Arabia checked the hiaaan moyement* In the Levant 
area highlands are found in proximity to the coast, with a gradual 
decline in al t i tude towards the in te r io r such as Mt, Lebanon. M 
The presence of the north south fault ZOSB of trie Dead Sea lowland 
(300 meters below Sea level) forms another characterist ic feature 
of the area. A b i rd ' s eye view of the re l i e f features of the 
whole V4st Asia reveals that they presented a considerable barrier 
to the human movement, thus compelling t raders and armies to pass 
through Sgypt and the Gulf region. 
^^* Trade of Sorooean Powers with the Bast upto the Begjlihing 
( i ) Anoient and Mediaeval grade Routes i There i s an 
abundant evidence that long before the days of recorded history 
men moved over considerable distances to secure raw materials 
and exchaisge goods* As c iv i l iza t ion developed and human needs 
increased, the network of interchange grew more complex. In the 
l a t e r stages th is conrplex nature of interchange of materials and 
movement of man gradually changed into organised form of comner-
c ia l trade and trade routes . 
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The three continents of Africa* Asia and Burope were connected 
by jBea and land routes or by partial sea routes and partial land 
routes. Europe was connected with Asia on land through Russia 
and Turlcey. It was oonnected with Korth Africa and eastern 
Mediterranean countries by various sea routes. As a matter of fact, 
the whole Mediterraneeui Sea is a lake surrounded by pouthern Europe, 
the Asia Minor,awL the Levant and the Horth Aflrican Coast. In 
the ctncient times the Phoenicians traded in the ^ole Mediterranean 
and established their centers in ^ orth Africa and southern Europe, 
In the sante way the Roman Empire covered the whole area and the 
Mediterranean Sea became a Roman laloe. Later the Arabs conquered the 
areas on the eastern Mediterranean, In the saiae way they conquered 
the Whole of viorthern Africa and Spain. Further later the Turks 
conquered most of the areas from the Arabs, In the later medieval 
period the city states in and around Italy also traded throughout 
the Mediterranean and beyond. In this way during five major periods 
of history which sometimes overlap before the advent of modern times 
the Mediterranean was covered by different trade centers and empires. 
The Mediterranean trade was adversely affected by the opening of the 
route to India via the Cape of (^ood Hope towards the end of the 
fifteenth century. 
North Africa was itself covered lay many caravan routes. It 
was connected with West Asia and beyond with the east through 
the sea routes and the caravan routes which connect many places 
of Egypt with the cities of West Asia, Central Asia and South Asia. 
They proceeded upto eastern China and Mongolia, The 'pure* sea 
route with the east was discovered by Vasoo de Gama In 1498 round 
the Cape of Good Hope, Before that the sea routes were always 
Intervened by land routes as the Mediterranean-Red Sea route was 
Aoutt, 
Intervened by a part of Egypt and, the Mediterranean -Persian Gulf^ 
was Intervened by a part of the Fertile Crescent . 
2. Trade Routes of Modem gimes % At the end of the 
fifteenth century, the old European trading system based on the 
Mediterranean^ began to break down and the sea board of Western 
Europe became the main base of economic activity. There is scarcely 
any period in the history of Western Europe when trade played so 
central a rol^^ frcaa the end of the fifteenth century to the 
middle of/eighteenth century. Some historians call this the early 
capitalist age or age of merchant capitalism, «Mle others term it d.s 
the mercantile or merchantlllst e«a • 
JO, See for the description of specific routes. Peter Beaumount 
et al. The Mddle East* A Grographlcal Study. (London, 1976), p.7. 
This has been Illustrated in the map enclosed here. Por further 
details regarding the routes seei A.E, McKilllam , The Highway of 
the World. (London, 1927), p.87-89; J.Bernaanl, »Trade and Finance 
in the Middle ages 900-1500*, in Carlo M.Clpolla (ed). The Fontana 
Bconqnlc History of Europe. (Kew Delhi, 1975), p.279| F.H.Itturani, 
Ara^i Seafearing, (London, 1951), pp,36-38. 
The reason why the end of the fifteenth oentury witnessed the 
11 development of the maritime discovery was mainly economic , The 
demand of the Indian spices, and still more precious spices of the 
Par East in the West was almost insatiable. The trad© between 
India and Egrope in these cocmoditieB had been for/senturies in tKe 
hands of the Arabs who used to trade then through specific routes. 
For many centuries these routes remained undistUYbed, but the 
conquest of Constantinople by the Ottoman Turks in 1453 and later 
the conquest of Arab areas algBady lying in the Mediterranean -
Red Sea route and the Persian Qulf route blocked them to the east. 
The question nat\irally arose whether the commodities could be 
obtained by sane other routes. The incentive to find new route 
to India which would not pass through the Turkish territory was 
therefore strong because spices were essential articles for 
European food, and much of the prosperity of the cities of north-
12 
western Europe depended on this trade , 
First Portugal and Spain since the later part of the 
fifteenth century and then Holland, Prance and England in the 
sixteenth to eithteenth centuries began to exploit their 
11. G. French (Tr.), European Trade 1500-1750, The Fontana 
Economic History of Burope. in Carlo M.Oipolla (Ed). 
(Hew Delhi, 1974-), P.4-26. 
12. S i r Perc iva l Gr i f f i t h , Bnnire i n t o CommonWfea^ Lth. 
(London 1969), pp. 
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fayourable geographical position,[uslag the devolopment In ship 
ccmstruotlon and In naTlgational techniques. 
(i) The Sea Route. 
(a) The Blaoovery ef the Caoe Route : !I!he credit of 
finding a new way to India via the Cape of Good Hope goes to the 
Portuguese, Ihej were anxious to find the road to India and to 
malce themselTes independent of the Mediterranean and Arab traders. 
Seo. 
The disoevery of the^ roUte to India took a long period and may 
be divided into various sta^s. In the last stage the task of 
completing the discovery of the 3ea route to India wsie entrusted 
to Tasoo de Ctama. On July 18, 1497f. Tasoo de Gama» with four 
vessels and 160 sen., sailed from Portugal and reached the Cape 
of Good Hope on Hoveraber 18, H 9 7 . After rounding the Cape he 
passed through the strait that separates the Island of Madagascar fr( 
from the maiiHand. He obtained useful information from the 
f&ur Christian c<»maanders who had arrivedjkt Melinda from India. 
The benevolent king of Melinda also provided him with an able 
pilot who faithfully conducted him across the Indian Ocean to 
Calicut, where the fleet of Tasoo de Gama anchored on May 22,14.98 , 
13. J.ir.L. Baker, A Htstory of Qeographical Macoverv and 
Szploration. (London 1945), pp. 64-70. 
l u 
She adven-tnirous voyage led tsy Yasco de Oama^  opened a new 
chapter In the history of European commerce. Since then the 
European comraerce began to dlveryto the Cape route. Soon a 
struggle for trade supremacy started asiong the west European 
oountrlest l . e , , England, Spala» France and Holland, viOilch led 
to protracted imrs. An ent i re ly new element I . e . , the sea was 
Introduced In the Indian lllstory. The Par East f e l t yery soon the 
Influence of the ff^st. The other European sa i lors Is iedla te ly 
followed the trade route i i^oh the Portuguese had discovered. 
Trading companies were chartered hy European nations and trade 
gradually became International In character, 
(^) The Portuguese and Spanish Ascendency : After the 
discovery of the Cape route to India, a large maritime trade was 
soon bui l t up between Portugal and India* The r ea l founder of 
Portuguese empire in the east \vas Alfonso de Albuquerque, who 
was appointed Oovemor in 1|509. He captured a l l the strategic 
points in the Indian Ocean and I t s arms, (Persian Gulf and the 
Red Sea, In 1306 Albuquerque had captured the Hormuz S t ra i t 
which cconmanded the Persian Q^ ulf route to Europe, In 1310 he 
controlled Qoa as the centre of Portuguese power. He next 
attaoted and subdued Malacca, which was the key to the trade routes 
of the archipelago of the East Indies and the Chinese Sea, Later 
t l» Portuguese expanded the i r trade and control upto China, In 
1380 the crowns of Portugal and fijJ^ta were united in the person of 
Philip II, Ecom 1580 to 1640 Portugal ramained imaer Spanish 
dominion. But Spain was interested in the newly discoTered silver 
mines of Mexico and F«ru. So she did not pay much attention to 
eastern trade, 2pom 1595 onwards the power of Portugal hegan 
to decline. Under the Spanish rule Portugal lost a large part 
of her overseas territories. But from 1500 to 1595 almost a century 
14 the King of Portugal had the entire monopoly of the eastern trade. 
(c) Period of Dutch Control j It was in the lasjb year 
of the sixtciaath century that the Dutch turned their attention to the 
trade of the East. In 1602 the Dutch routed the Portuguese and opened 
for themselves the trade route to the Moluccas and the Spice islands, 
and declared : • The commerce of the Moluccas* iUnbcyna and Bantam should 
belong to the Compai^ and that no other nation in the world should 
have least part^. • In 1619 the Dutch traders e»ta"blijshed themselves 
as the chief trading power in Jawa and their capital at Batavia. Ey 
the middle of the seventeenth century the Dutch colonized the Cape of 
Good Hope. In the year 1663 th^ established fUll fledged trade with 
the people of the Malabar Coast and took Canonore and Cochin 
from the Portuguese. In 1666 the Dutch monopolised 
14. David Macpherson I The History of European Commerce with Indit 
(London 1812)» pp. 10-38. 
15. C.J. Hamilton, The Trade Relations between Biigland and Infltaf 
1600-I8q6 (Calcutta, 1919) p. 13. 
1, 
the spice t r ^ e and capinrred the Macassar, Bantam and Jacarta. 
Fi>r about one and a half centuries the Dutch enjoyed the monopoly 
oTer the Cape route and remained an unrivalled power In the Bast 
Indies . 
(d) Period of Bri t ish Oontrol t Ihe Bri t ish ware another 
r i s ing power after the decline of the Portuguese and "began to 
play an important role in the commercial world. The East India 
Company was estahlished in 1600 for t h i s purpose. In the year 
1615 the Portuguese were Isadly ifefeated hy the Bri t ish mar 
Surat. The year of t h i s victory marked the ins t i tu t ion of the 
Bri t ish factory at Surat, In due course of time they established 
trade in many parts of tfie Indian Ooean and in the South Pacific 
area. The increasing in teres t of the Brit ish in the Indian 
Ooean led to wars with Portugal and Holland, who received a 
setback on account of the Bri t ish might. By 1781 the East 
India Company reduced Dutch Influence in the Indian Ocean and 
the Par East and mcaiopollzed the Cape of Good Hope, In the 
meantime the Prenoh w€4f acquiring a foothold i n the eastern 
t rade. They obtained privileges in India and Bast Indies, But 
they were soon driven out by the Bri t ish traders, as Britain 
by that time had become the stronger power in the Indian Ocean. 
16. Macpherson t Ho.H, pp.41-69. 
o 
The Introduction of eteata navigation at the beginning 
of the nineteenth century witnessed a new phase of Sast India 
Company. As a resul t the Bri t i sh established themselves ae the 
strongest sea power In the east , centered upon India, ancL buil t 
up a ser ies of bases between Great Britain, St . Helena, Cape 
Town, India and China. To these were added Ceylon, Maurlttas 
azid Singapore early in the nineteenth century. Hong Kong in 
1841 and North Borneo in about I848. At las t ,o f a l l the 
European nations only Bri tain remained the most dominsnt power 
in the eas t . 
(11) The Laifl Routes t I t I s well known that Europe has 
been maintaining contact with the east through the Middle Saust 
and regarded land communication as desirable no matter how slow 
i t might be. Two obvious routes for such a communication presented 
17 themselvesi the Persian Gulf route and Red Sea route ' . During 
the nineteenth century West Asia beoani^ one of the important 
regions for European diplomacy. The r iva l ry among the European 
powers, the beginning of the Eastern Question and the decline 
of the Ottoman Mpire were main po l i t i ca l factors for the 
develojanent of the land routes through the central ly located region 
between the S^ uat and the West. In one respect, th i s area was 
the only route for the European nations specially the Mediterra-
neantowersy to obtain po l i t i ca l ascendency in South Sast Asia-
17. Hblden Furber, The Overland route to Indian In the 
Seventeenth and Mghteenth Centuries'. Journal of 
Indian History. (Trlvandrum), Vol. XXIX,Part I I , 
S.H0.86, August 1951, pp. 120-125. 
1^ . 
Ihat i s flftiy during the aineteeirth centm^- West Asia played 
aa in^ortant role in the po l i t i ca l history of the European 
nations* 
is, 
(a) Peraian Q*^}^f ^^ Q^ t^? » ^^^ route Whiohialso called 
tho direct route started from London and passed via Marseilles, 
5yre (or Sidon), Aleppo, Basrat aambroon and Surat played an 
important part in the his tory of the Eritisfe East India Coinpany. 
Indications of more frequent resort to comriinication through 
Persia are found in the Sompany records about 1625. By that 
tiaie the estahlishoent of a solid foothold at the Port of Samb-
roon ga"ve the Bri t ish an opportunity for establishing connection 
with Aleppo. The 1640's r^eis characterised by the increasing 
use of Basra - Aleppo route, fhe practice of sending l e t t e r s 
and po l i t i ca l news through direct route s teadi ly lnc3?eased in 
the l a t e r half of the seventeenth century. Regular comnunication 
between the laiortheril' ^ Persian CJulf and London via Constanti-
nople and Yienna established during the 1760* s JB*-was so 
well organised that th is route was more than once described as 
the 'usual route of Coretantinople*. 
After the introduction of steam navigation efforts were 
madelby the Gk>versffiient of Bombay to determine the practical 
value of the direct route, the Rome Grovernmant was also gra-
dually real is ing the po l i t i ca l and s trategic significance of 
the di rect route. In 1830 Capt. P.R, Chesney, after detailed 
o 
survey of direct route and overland route through Egypt reoommended 
in his report, the development of the direct route on political 
grouais. He believed that the Euphrates route would gi"we more 
rapid intercourse with Persia, both from England and India. 
Capt. J.H.R, Campbell, the Charge d. Affairs of the Persian 
mission also preferred the direct route. He wrote that the 
direct route would give the prospeots of establishing political 
influence, which may at some further period serve as a counter-
poise to any design entertained by Russia towards Baghdad. 
The direct route to IMia via the northern Persian (Julf 
was in constant use and has never been entirely superseded by 
other land route to Europe, Till the opening of the Suez Canal 
the direct route, though not highly regarded, remained in regular 
and constant use as the moat dependable of all channels for 
18 
overland communication with the East • 
(b) Red Sea Route i Ihls route acquired popularity 
after the dramatic campaign of Napoleon in Egypt, who wanted to 
open a new route to India. After this event the British turned 
their attention to the Sea routes. Before that the British govern-
ment was anxious to utilisse the overland route through Egypt only 
for mail and passenger service and not for commercial purposes. 
18. H.I.Hoskin, British Routes to India. (London 1966), 
pp. ^20-23^ 

l b 
Thomos Waghorn, a former Iteitish anay officer pro-ved that i t 
was possible to establish an overland route across Egypt. Beginning 
i n 1829 faghom made several journeys between England and India, 
t ravel l ing by land bet?reen Alexandria and Suez. Waghorn, vidio had 
dedicated hineelf to find ' the high road to India^ ini t ia ted in 
1835 a regular medX delivery service. The intermediate stations 
beti^en &3gland and Bombay were Maltat jllexand±ia» Suez and Aden. 
In 1838 the l ^ i t i s h Q-overnment obtained privileges for mail 
service via th i s route from Mohammad All. Finally in 1839 Britain 
19 occupied Aden and controlled the Egyptian route . 
I I I . Early Schemea for the Canal. 
(1) Ancient Scheme » The oanal question vrtiich became a 
prominent issue of European diplomacy in the nineteenth oeirtury 
20 had varied antecedents , Singf Sebestris, a famous Pharaoh of 
the tewelfth dynasty was the f i r s t to address himself to th i s 
question and ordered to dig a canal in 2000 B.C. This canal was 
linked to the Pelusic branch of the Nile, with the Bitter Iiakes, 
whence another oanal was dug to connect i t with Red Sea. However, 
ike i t gradually s i l t ed up before the beginning of7 seventeenth century 
21 n 
B,C. . The next attempt was made by Pharaoh Necho (6(^593 B.C.), 
19. Ibid, pp. 1-216, see also John Marlow, The Making of the 
.ctufl^  r!ftTiiH:;>, (London 1964), pp. 4-27. 
20. Hoskin , Ho. 186, p. 29 
2a. Blvin , No. 6, pp. 302-303. 
1 . 
who reopened i t , but hie soon f i l l e d i t up on the maming of an 
22 
oracle t h a t the canal might aid an invader , In 521 B,C.Darius 
Hystaepes of Pe rs ia who had conquered Egypt, ordered the digging 
23 
of the Canal. His i n s c r i p t i o n said '^  : 
I am a Persians with the power of Pers ia , I conquered 
Ifeypt. I ordered t h i s canal t o be dug from the r i v e r 
cal led P l r i r a (the Hile) which flows in Egypt to Sea, 
which comes out of Pe r s i a (the Red Sea) . I h i s canal 
was afterwards dug as I had commanded . . . . 
In 286 B.C. Ptolemy Philadelphus recondit ioned the Pharoah's 
Canal which remained navigable by the beginning of the Chr i s t i an 
e r a . He had the idea of cu t t ing a d i r e c t canal through the 
Isthmus. Bit the project was abandtaaed due t o misconception tha t 
the l eve l of the Red Sea was higher than t h a t of the Mediterraneai 
Sea -• a not ion tha t pe r s i s t ed down t o the e a r l y par t of the 
24 
nineteenth century. In Roman t imes, Emperor Trajen in A.D. 98 
res to red the Pharoah*s canal under the name of Trajan Canal. 
With the Arab conquest of Egypt t h i s canal entered the l a s t 
phas* of i t s h i s t o ry . In A.D. 641-642 Tra jan ' s Canal was reopened 
on the order of Caliph Ctaiar, Abu J a a f a r - a l Mansoor, the second 
22, W, Robert Moore ,»The Spotl ight Swing to Suez ' , Geographi-
c a l Maitazine (London) Vol. C, January 1952,P. 115; see 
a lso Sir John B. Glubb, Br i t a in and tthe Arabs. (London 
1959), P.26-
25. Schonfield, Ho.4, p .4 ; See also MaJ". Gen. Glen E, 
Bdgerton, An Engineers view of the Suez Canal, Geographies 
Ma/^azine (London) Vol. CXI, No. i ; f5 .135 
24. Elvin, Ho.6, p.303j see a lso Schonfield,No.4.P.4. 
Ablmald 0«3.1ph f i l led the Oaaal In A.D; 776 ae ft ^ottistiTe step 
ftgai&tt the rel>elli0ttB e i t iee of «•©«« •a* Medliift. After that no 
new attempt was mate t i l l the hegiimlBg of the atnetee&th eentozy ''. 
fhle short hlstlsy of the Canal rsreals that eren in aaelcBt and 
medieral tines the need of a eanal through this region, lAietheir 
dlreet or Indirect, aeross the Zstlmas ivas not l e s s important, 
traders> politielans and omptrors had, team time to time»reeoiiimended 
for the eonstruetion of the Canal* So i t ean he said that the 
geo-political signifieanoe of Egsrpt has heen realised fros the 
Texy heginning of the histoxar. 
(2) g?!^ lP» t9I l i t < f^M. to JMfly IMltfffffflf^ th ^mltyjHr * 
After centuries of negleet* the Sues Canal prejaot was again 
rerlTed, in the modum period. In the saeond half of the fifteenth 
eentuxy two event s of hist or leal importttaoe took plaee» which increase 
the need of a eanal aeross the ZsthDms. She eonquest of Ceaatan** 
tinople "W the furks in 1493 and their eenquest of Arab eountries 
in the latter oentuxy hlooked the overland route through Egypt 
and West Asia. Saeondly, the diseorerar of the Cape route in 1498 
led to the downfall of the X^aittrraneen •oiHoareial powers, i . e . , 
Teniee, &«aea and Xranee and the r ise of the powers on the Atlantis 
seahoard . 
23, ElTin, N0.6, p.304| See also, &luhh. No. 22, p.27| Marlowe, 
Ho.1f, p.2* 
26. Xonggood, Ho.2, p.4 f see also Siegfried,Ho.5, p.49. 
IJ 
It was during this asasiag period that the Mediterranean 
powers tried to reopen the old route. With this aim the Venetians 
the 
at the beginning of/sixteenth eentury proposed to dig a canal 
across the IsthmuSf hat the scheme was tamed down \i^ the Ottoioan 
Itaiplre as it did not want its monopoly of the Red Sea navigation 
distorhed tsf the Soropeana. In the last quarter of the same 
century the Turks conceived of the Idea of a canal to facilitate 
the passage of the Turkish fleet into the R»* Sea. The idea was 
dropped due to the lack of technical expertise. After that various 
projects were mooted, bat no proposal proceeded farther than the 
27 
stage of reporting and diseassion . 
After Britain had dominated the Cape route Erance was compelled 
to give attention to Bgypt. A canal through Egypt would have been 
more advantageous to France than to Britain because of distance. 
In the last decade of the eighteenth century the scheme of cutting 
the canal across the Isthmus became a major issue for the Srench 
authorities. The first serious and practical step toimrds the sch«ne 
was taken ly Hapoleon Bonaparte, who in 1797 wrote to Telleyrand, 
the French prime Minister, *The time is not far distant when we shall 
feel that in order to destr<^ Sagland, it is necessary for us to 
28 possees l^ gypt . Hnally In July 179Q» Bonaparte with a large army 
27. Elvin, Ho.6, p.304-1 see also, Bassein Mooni8,*Lest We Forget: 
A Record flrom Mstory, * in The Sues Canal t Facte 
and Docaments (nid. Cairo) p.l'ST 
28. Schonfleld, No.4, p.10. 
cu 
and a party of engineers and technicians iiiTaded Sg^^t and occupied 
i t , 3B was instructed by the Directory to expel the Brit ish frcm 
a l l their po sess ion in the ©ast wherever they might be, tn part i -
cular, to destroy a l l their trading stat ions on the Red Sea, to 
out a canal through the Isthisus of the Sues and to take a l l 
the 
necessary steps to ensure the free and eacclusive use of^Red Sea 
29 by French vesse ls . Hapolean's engineer J.M.Lepre concluded the 
survey of the Isthmus and reported that the water of the Red Sea 
was 32» and 6 " higher than the water of the Mediterranean Sea - an 
t m old misconseption which persisted further for almost half a 
30 
century . He was in favour of reopening the old route of the canal 
with s lu ices at both the end. He opposed the oonstruotion of a sea 
to sea oanal. Bit the plan ended in ma.o)s.e because of Napolean*s 
defeat by the Brit ish and Turkish forces . 
Upto the third decade of the nineteenth century various^ were 
put forward by private individuals. But they were mostly based 
32 
on lepere's report and i n favour of jSluiee canal . 
29. Marlowe, Ho.19,p. 27, see also George B.Kirk, A short 
History of the Middle East (London, 1948), p.73 
30. A.T. Wilson, gheSueg Canal i l t s Past.Present and Future. 
(Oxford,1933; p.7 
31. Hoskin, Ho. 18, p-293 
32. Ibid. 
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In the fourtli decade of the nineteenth century the canal 
project locaaed large vylth the European powers. In 1850 Capt. 
P.R, Chesney was sent l?y the Brit ieh OoTerauBnt with the Instruc-
t ion to Burrey the IsthmuB and prepare a report on the practica-
b i l i t y of the ship canal, Chesney examined the Istlssue and 
cajne to the conclusion that difference In level of two seas w^ 
negligible and that the canal was possible, Rit his report made 
m> Impression on the aovernment c l rc le i At th i s stage a Frenchman 
Monsieur Prosper Bafantln came on the scene. In 1833 with a 
party of technicians and surveyors he arrived at Alexandria. He 
had two plans In his mind. One was the excavation of the canal 
and the other was the construction of a Hlle barrage. His plans 
were not taken notice of because of Br i t a in ' s constant opoosltion^ . 
In 1834 Mohammad All, the powerful Viceroy of E^rpt was hlinsell 
very much anxious to cut a canal across the Isthmus, His engineers 
Llnant Bey, A Frenchman, and R.H. Galloway, a British oiational 
made a detailed survey of the Isthmus. Mnant Bey proposed to 
construct the lnter»ooeanlc canal, ^i^le R.H, Galloimy proposed 
t 
the construction of Vallway, The lajter believed that the railway 
scheme could be executed a^ a cost far below that of the canal. 
33. Marlowe, Ho. 19, p.43j See alo Wilson, Ho.30, p .7 , 
Hoskln, Ho.18, p.294. 
2. 
But Mohammad All very quickly dropped the Idea having learned 
a 
that such^pro^ect would inly jeopardize his position in Egypt. 
Hothing was done later with regard to either a canal or railway 
until 1841'^ 
In the f i f th decade of the nineteenth century the project 
for a canal at tracted larger at tent ion. In 1841 Arthur Anderson 
IJIanaging Director of the Peninsular and Oriental Ccmpany, studied 
the oanal question. He wrote to Palmerston, thenForeign Secretary 
t h a t ' ^ J 
•The whole of the po l i t i c a l and commercial intercourse with 
the Vast t e r r i t o r i e s of the east would of necessity f a l l 
into the channel, and the distance hetween them and Great 
Britain for a l l porposes would be reduced to many thousands 
of miles*' 
In 1846 Bnfantin foimed an international organisation named 
•Societe d» Etudes du ^anal de Suez. ' , Among i t s members there 
were three prominent engineers - Stephenson from Britain, Paulin 
Talabot fran^ance, and Negrelli from Austria. In 1847 three 
tesans of engineers headed separately by lalabot , Stephenson and 
Negrelli arrived in Egypt for preliminary survey, StephensAn's 
team investigated the Gulf of Suez, Negrelli*s team , the Bay of 
Pelusium and Talabot's team, / in te r ior of^Istlraus. After completing 
the fresh technical survey Talabot drew up the plan in 1847, which 
34. H,L,Hoslcin, She Suez Canal in the Time of f a r ' , Foreign 
Affairs (New York), Yol. 14, 1935, p.93. 
35. Bri t ish and Foreign State Papers. Vol. 55, p.96 
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wa3 not much advanced over the e a r l i e r plan by Lep^re. Talabot 
tbSea. 
in his report conlcuded that the sea^canal was not possible 
owing to the difficulty of building a port on the beach at Pelu-
Bium On this basis he proposed to construct an indirect canal. 
The society was unable to proceed further because England,Prance 
and Austria were e ach trying to gain Mm ascendency over the 
other in securing Egypt as their sphere of influence. In 1949 
Mohammad Ali died* His successor Abbas Pasha was more Anglophile 
36 than Prancophilo-' , 
(3) ,firit^a]t^ Qpftosj.ti<?3^ ^ d ci(?^i?ey ^op9sa3., f9T fiaAl>ira.T 1 
Napoleon's organised military expedition to Egypty^ 1f98 with the 
ultimate aia of crippling the British influence in India awakened 
the British interest in Egypt. It was obvious that the affairs 
of this strategically situated country would no more be a matter 
of unconcern to the Government of Btitain. The strategic ani 
political importance of Egypt and her position as commercial gate* 
way between the East and The West had been recognized. ^' 
56. Lord Kinross, Between Two Seasi The Creation of the Suez 
Canal (London, 1968), pp.45-53. 
37. Lenczowski, Ho.7, p.4. See also Amadi Maity, The Problem 
of the Suez Canal (Calcutta 1956) p. 2 
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The Napoleonic Inyaslon of Egypt was a matter of great 
concern for Turkey wbich reacted sharply. Britain was also 
taken completely \^ surprise at the Napolecmic success in 
Egypt and, fearing for her Indian Empire, toecace alert. It 
declared that * The possession of Egypt ly any independent power 
would he a fatal circumstance to the Interest of this cowlitry'' . 
the 
After that/British and the IPurkish acmies fought side "by side 
against Napoleon, and the Peace of imiins in 1802 teanninated 
the Krenoh territorial amhition in Egypt* Since then it hecame 
a cardinal point in the British imperial policy to safeguard 
the direct approaches to India ly prerwtiting political domination 
of Egypt T3y any European power. It came to regard the effective 
maintenance of Ottoman suzerainty over Egypt as the hest 
guarantee of the continued security of its communications. The 
British ohjections to the Canal Bcheme must he seen in illation to 
this general policy . 
^rom the British point of view it hecane ohvious now that 
such a Mtnal would create a physical harriefl? against the march of 
Turkish armies into Egypt ;it would encourgagp and sustain Egyptian inde-
pendence of Constantinople and therefore it would defeat the basic aim 
of the British policy towards Egypt. Lord Palmerston believed that the 
38. Maity, No. 37, p.3 
39. H.I, HoBkin, * British Policy in Altica 1873-1877' , 
Geographical Review , (New York 1942), Vol.XXXII, see alsc 
Fames Bland, Prince Ahmad of Egarpt. (london 1939)» P.1 . 
2. 
peace of Europe and the safety of the British people unquestitaxably 
lay in opposing the project of the Suez Cimal, He declared that 
the Suez Canal project was iaipracticable and impossible. He also 
said that the cutting of the canal would sooner or later lead 
to the occupation of Egypt, MBIBBX Mohammad Ali also feared that 
the cutting of the Suez Canal would ultimately lead to the occu^ 
pation of Bgypt by one or more European powers. He ws.s also 
afraid of the British opposition* Therefore he refused to accept 
any of the canal sch«aes. 
In order to prevent the route from falling wholly into 
the hands of the rivals, the British Crovemment adopted after 
19^2 a definite line of action. As a counterpoise of the Suez 
Canal project Palmerston advocated a railway project from 
Alexandria to Cairo, which he concluded, would not alter the 
geopolitical status of Egypt in the least, and hence would produce 
no international coaqpications. In 18^7 Palmerston instructed 
Murrey, the British Consiil General in Egypt : 
Lose no opportunity of enforcing on the Pasha and his 
ministers the costliness, if not the impracticability, 
of such a project, and you should point out that the 
persons who press upon the Pasha such a chimerical 
scheme, do so evidently for the purpose of diverting 
Mo, Marlowe, No. 19, p. 35, see also, Hoskin No. 18, pp.296-197. 
h^, Hoskin, No. 18, pp. 297-299. 
2 b 
him from the railway which would be perfectly 
practicable and comparatively cheap. 
In Ma-y ^Qh7 the Soeiete d* Stv.des du Canal de Suez 
conducted the survey of the Isthmus and declared that the Suez 
canal project was tedmicaD-ly feasible and practically possible, 
r^ urray informed Palmerston that the canal was probably a practical 
proposition and it had been favourably received by the Egyptian 
Government, Palmers ton replied on May 29, I8U7 that »In the opinion 
of Her Majesty's Govemmait the commercial advantages to be derived 
from the canll would be attained at nmch less cost by a railway'. 
He added that the Austrain interests .m the canal v/ere commercial 
but the French interests v/ere political in that 'it would place 
them as a military and naval power in the Mediterranean much 
nearer to India than the Bnglish would be' , In July Murray 
informed Palmerston that the idea of the canal was dropped and 
railway was being urged as a 'practicable substitute* ^, The 
British aagunients that the canal would be impracticable and 
economically unsound were quite anomalous and politically motivated. 
It was known at that time and became clearer later that Palmerv^ton 
k2, cited in Marlowe No. 19, p.53 
^3. Cited in Hoskin No, 18, pp. 298-299. 
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was opposing the scheme on an unsound political gro\ind. Be 
tiTought that after the completion of the canal the French would 
dominate it and would use it agairast Britain, Thus according to 
h-ftn this situation was grave and would weaken the dominant position 
of Britain in the Indian ^ ean. One can even go to the extent 
of saying that railway scheme of the British Government was a 
project to divert the mind of Mohammad Ali from the nore attractive 
scheme of the canal* 
The railway project was attaclced 1^ France and Austria. They 
were on the wh le in favour of the oanal although Austria was not 
prepared to join Prance in forming a united front against England, 
in 1847 Barrot, the French Consul General in ^ ypt, told Mohamraad 
Ali that if Egypt should one day hecome a great route e^tw^ een 
Europe and India, it would be "better that it should be open by 
means of a canal to the :- ship^ of all European nations who would 
naturally control it, than by the construction of a railway which 
would make the passage through Egypt the monopoly of aigland. 
Mohaoraad Ali was thus, on the one hand, under the pressure of 
Britain to build a rail road and, on the other, was under the 
pressure of Prance arai Austria to build a canal. The result was 
that hfl[!cBpt on putting off talcing a decision for fear of afitcigo-
nizing either side, He had not yet reached a decision when he 
died in 1849 and was succeeded by his eldest son Ibrahim who died 
a few months later. After that Abbas Pasha, the nephew of JJohammad 
44 Ali became the Viceroy of Egypt . 
44. Kinross, Ho.56, pp.34-53. 
9. 
Abbas soon came under the Bri t ish influence. During the 
six years of his ru le , l i t t l e was heard of the Canal. Mohafflmad 
Al i ' s French Advisers were a l l replaced ty Englishmen. The 
temporary disappearance of the French influence in Egypt made 
possible the re v i ra l of the pet railway project pf 1IJIK» Brit im 
which at tracted Abbas Pasha, In July 1851 a contract was signed 
by the Egyptian govemaent with Stephenson for the construction 
of a railway between Cairo and Alexandria which was completed 
in 1854- when Abbas died. I t appeared that the Brit ish had won 
the ground, as that they had both the i r railroad and the Cape 
route, fhe Bri t ish advantage of oolistructing the railway was, 
however soon counterbalanced by a Frenchman Ferdinand de IJessep 
AC 
who played a historic role in piercing the Isthmus '^, 
45. Wilson, 8^ 0.30, pp. 9.11 
CHAPTER - I I 
Kl€K SHE cmcmSlOS 70 THE OfSStm 0? SHE CmALt 
&SO.P0!LIfICAL AHPCCHMERCIAL CCSISII^ ERATI^ S 
I . Urdimmd d> lasaapg and Hla I n f w t in tht Oaal s 
The death of Abhaa Pasha on Saptemhtr ^5$ 1d^ and the accession 
of Uohasanad Said ae the rioeroy of Egjrpt waa the landmark dLa the 
hiatosy of the ^ e s Canal. With the aecesaion of Said Pasha the 
Xrcneh influence at Cairo again roTired which had died out, during 
Ahhas Pasha^regime. After that a definite Srraieh projeet for the 
oonstructirai of the canal across the Istteus was hrought into 
1 
prominence \ff i t s author ferdinand de Z>esseps* 
Lesseps was well fitted to he the founder of such an enter-
prise. Bom at Tersailles on HoTember 191 13051 he came of a family 
of diplomats. His father Mathew de Itesseps had been the politieal 
agent during Hapoleon Bonaparte's expedition to Egypt and had 
helped Mohammad Ali in his r i se to power» I t fact i ^ o h Mohammad 
i l i always remembered with gratitude. In th is wey his fath«t was 
largely responsible in establishing the tradition of l^ench 
Sjrmpatly and flriendship for Egypt which his sen so ably capitalised 
later . 
1, H.X.Buskin, British Routes to India , (tendon, 1966) pp. 
302-305. 
2. Rene Elvin, • The Story of the Suez Canal*, Seographieap. 
Kagasine. (London), Vol.10, No.5, 1940,pp.305-306 
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At %h9 «g* of twantr Ltsaaps «n-l«red th« diplomatie ••ryio« 
and ymm petted ia Iiiebem. In 1832 h% was assigned to Alexandria 
as 7ioe-<SoBsul» where he remained until 18571 becoming BuccessAilly 
Ccmsal and C<8isiil Gsnaral. In Egjrpt he was receired with friendship 
and intiaa«i3r as the isemozy of his father was s t i l l fresh at the Cavort 
of HohasBnad i l i . Soring his stagr in Bgypt he hecame the close friend 
of Hohnsmad ^ i d t the youngest son of Hohanasad Ali* Hohaamad Said 
heeame deeply attached to Xessepsy who took him for rides in the desert, 
taught him fencing, and imhued him with Hrench ideas and euttnre. 
Lesseps through this medium oWiously gained ascendency over Said which 
vnahled him to ehange one of the great trade roifctes of the world • 
I t was in 1832 that lesseps f irst became interested in this 
project. On his way to Alexandria as Tice-Consul, he read lepre's 
report on the proposed Canal linking the Mediterranean Sea with 
the Red Sea. I t immediately set his mind aflamed and the idea nerer 
lef6 him until he transformed i t into reality. After that he watched 
with great interest the early efforts of Ohesniy and a hit later 
of lai^hom. In 1834, Lesseps discussed in detail with Linant Biy 
transiethmiaa eanal. 7he same year Prosper Snfantln reqjuested 
liesseps to bring pressure on Mohammad Ali for the concession. The 
projeet was in this manner remained eonstantly before him, which 
Airther kindled liesseps' interest in the Oanal . 
3. J .Marlowe, f he yak^g of the Sufj O^ taa;^ . (Xondoa, 1964), 
pp. 62«*7t see a lso . L.Kinross.^tween Two Seaai C»<Mitifl« 
of the sues Canal, (london, 1968}, p. 55. 
4. H.J.Sehenfleld. The Sues Canal in World Affairs. (Hew York, 1953 
p.5. 
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In 1849 IieBseps resigned flrcHn the diplcmatlc service and 
r e t i r e d . Throughout the years of re t i rement and l e i s u r e , he 
Icept a close contact with Enfantin and the iBeml)erB of the study-
group, inves t iga ted and studied the hook and survey repor t 
regarding the Isthmus prepared e a r l i e r by the engineers of 
5 
various countr ies , 
In 1852 Lesseps outl ined h i s scheme i n a f a i r l y tangible form 
and a copy of i t was forwarded to h i s fr iend S,W, Ruyssenaers, 
then Dutch Consul-general i n Egypt, i n which he add d» 
I confess t h a t my scheme i s s t i l l a mere dream and 
I do not shut my eyes t o the fac t t h a t so long as 
I alone believe i t to be poss ib le , i t i s v i r t u a l l y 
i i i^oss ible , 
Ruyssenaers rep l i ed tha t Abbas was not i n t e r e s t ed and tha t the 
time was not r ipe to pursue the mat ter , l e s seps then approached 
the Turkish government i n Constant inople, but received the answer 
t h a t he should address himself t o Abbas . 
Two years l a t e r the s i t u a t i o n r a d i c a l l y changed. Abbas 
Pasha was murdered on September 15, 1854 and Mohammad Said 
became the Viceroy of Egypt, The news of Said»s accession as 
viceroy of Egypt reached him a t h i s home town in Prance. Lesseps 
determiaed to p r o f i t by t h i s sudden tu rn of the wheel of for tune. 
Be at once sent a note of congratulat ions t o Mohainmad Said and 
expressed h i s des i re t o v i s i t Egypt, Being a ca ree r diplomat 
he knew how to draf t l e t t e r s . He said nothing about h is desire 
to obtain a concession for a t ransis thmian canal , Iiosseps 
received a warm i n v i t a t i o n i n r ep ly , ^ l o s t no time i n replying, 
5. Ib id . 
6. Berdinand de Lesseps, The Sueg Canal i letters and docu-
ments Desoriptive of the Rise and Progress in 1854,1856, 
(London, 1876; ^trans ir,D, Amrors;, pjt-
7. Kinross, No.3, P.59. 
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and fixed the "begliming of Hoteraber for his meeting at Alexandria^ 
LessepB had written to one of his friends t 
»During my retirement I had studied completely every-
thing pertaining to the Suez Canal. X was thus 
perfectly familiar with the Isthmus, and had even 
heen persuaded myself that to cut through i t was 
quite a pract ical proposition. She idea fead captured 
ay imagination when X f i r s t read the memor«^um 
written by X^pf r e , mh& was the chief engineer in 
General Bonaparte's expeditioiu So once more I took 
up my old work, fully convinced that I afeould obtain 
the concession.* 
On IToTember 7, 1854» Iiesaeps landed at llexandria on his 
10 l i f e ' s great adventure, where he was received warmly . 
(2) Acquisition of Conoession by Lesseps i P. de lesseps 
obtained the conoession of the canal in 18^4 without facing any 
diff icul ty from Mohamrnad Said, a friend of his youth and now 
the viceroy of Bfflrpt. He had prepared the material regarding 
the technical as well as the financial aspects of the Suez 
scheme. He went to Bg3rpt with great enthusiasm and confidence 
8. Lesseps, Ho.6, p.3 
9. Andre Siegfried, Sueg and Panama, (trans, H.H, and Doris 
He ming), (tondon, 1940), p,63. 
10. Marlowe, No. 3, p.73. 
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and 
of success in his xBlsslon, as he was a man of aotloa,X ^  diplomat 
by insti|ct and training. 
On lfo''^niT^3r 7» 18541 de Lespps arriyed at Alexandria where 
he was received on behilf of the Ticeroy hy his old frienti 
Rtiyssenaere and Hafouz Pasha» Minister of Marine. Qe was acco-
mmodated in one of the Tioeroy*s spacious and luxurious rlllas 
on the hank of the Hahumoudieh Canal, and was presented with a 
staff of servants. Ihe vioeroy Mohammad Said treated him as a 
close personal frien^* He was welcomed with great affection 
12 
and cordiality. . 
Each morning Lesseps ivent to the Tlceiioy*s palace and 
discussed with him many topics, hut did not say a word about the 
Suez Canal, a subjet he did not want to broach until he was 
quite sure of his ground and the scheme was sufficiently matured 
so that the prince could adopt it as his own, Lesseps was very 
cautioiis because once Mohammad Said had told Ruyssenaers that 
if he ever became viceroy of Egypt he would follow the exaraple 
of his father, Mohazmaad Ali, who had declined to have anything 
to do with the cutting of a canal across the Isthmus because of 
the difficulties with England. Shis was not an encouraging 
11. A.I.WilBon, Ihe Suez Canal. Its Past. Present and Future 
(oxford, 1933), p.12. 
12. Lesseps, Ho.6, pp-2-5, See also Kinross,No.3 p.60, 
Schonfield, Ho,49, p.23. 
3^ . 
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precedent, bat still Lesseps was confident of his success. "^  
Leseeps discussed tbe subject with Zulficar Pasikat one of 
the staunch pillars of the viceregal household, an old acquit-
tance of Lesseps. Zulficar Pasha fully recognised the importance 
of Lesseps scheme for Bg3rpt az^ x^omised that he would prepare 
the ground|for laTourable hearing 
Soon Mohammad Said invited Lesseps to accompany him on his 
forthcoming visit to Cairo. In his pocket Lesseps had the plan 
for the concession, for he felt that this would be an excellent 
occasion to propose it and an opportunity to get a syn^athetic 
hearing of the viceroy himself. During the early part of the 
visit Lesseps said nothing about his scheme, cautiously awaiting 
the right moment. The mfflaent arrived on lovember 15, 1854 when 
Mohammad Said was in a very good humour, Lesseps broached the 
subject of the Suez Canal, He propounded his scheme without 
entering into details, laying stress on the main facts and 
arguments set forth in his minutes, which he could have repeated 
tT<m end to end, Ife dealt with the ancient history of the canal 
13. Lesseps, No.6, p,7, see also Hoskin, No,1 p.5033, 
Kinross, No.3» p .60 . 
14. Lesseps, No.6, p . 8 . See a l so P .Crab i tes , Ihe Spojktion 
of Suez (Loalon, 1940),pp 16-17. ^ 
15. Lesseps, No.6, pp 7-1 If see also f.P.Loaggood, The Suez 
Story t Key to the Middle East (New York), p. 19. 
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and pointed out Hapoleon*s e f f o r t s of p ierc ing the Isthmus. He 
quoted h i s remarK *It i s a grantl works and though. I cannot 
execute now, the day may come when the Turkish ffoTenaent w i l l 
16 glory i n accomplishing i t ' , Leasops suggested tha t i f 
Egjrpt was t o be converted i n t o the highway of coimneroe by the 
opening of the Suez Canal, i t would tend t o preserve the 
0tt<8nan Empire because i t would force the powers t o suAtain 
17 Turkey as the guarantor of i t s n e u t r a l i t y . 
Lesseps b r i e f l y summarised the survey report of M.Paulin 
Talabot, Stephenson and Hegrel l i and more recent ly by Mnant 
Bey and Gall ice Bey and Mougel Bey, i n Mohammad A l i ' s serv ice . 
All had agreed^^UQder modern engineering condi t ions , the canal 
could be constructed , He fur ther pointed out tha t a l thoui^ 
the 
the cdst of the cons t ruct ion oJC^canal W^B to be very high, i t 
would be p ro f i t ab le and would reduce by more than l a l f the 
dis tance between India and the p r i n c i p a l count r ies of Europe 
18. 
and America. Lesseps fur ther argued t h a t the name of the 
prince who opened the grea t canal would be blessed tram age^^age 
by the most remote genera t ions . Set t ing the acheiae i n a 
De 
16. Iiesseps, iro.6, p .13 
17. Ib id , p.16 
18. The distaiKse between Ind ia and Aaierica would ^ reduced 
by l e s s than hal f the distanoo ins tead of more than 
ha l f the d is tance as claimed by Lesseps. 
3o 
religious perspective, Iiesseps stressed its advantages to 
the pilgrims to Mecca and to the Masliras throughout the world t 
He calculated that six niillion tons of European and imorican 
cargo 
8hipping{ amially passed round the Cape of Good Hope, He stressed 
that if only one half of the goods passed through the canal, 
there would be an annual saving of hundred and fifty million 
19 francs in the international commerce, . 
In the end Lesseps differentiated between the Isthmus of 
Panama and that of Suez, 9G explained that the Isthmusof Panama 
was of mountainous nature which presented insuperable difficul-
ties in the construction of a continuous ship canal, whereas^ on 
could 
the Isthpis of Suez a continuous ship canal/be excavated with 
much loss difficulty and cost due to its easy geographical 
terrain, Moharimad Said listened with interest to hie explanation 
and argument, Leaseps begged him to be good eno igh to conmunicate 
to him if he had any doubts, Mohanmiad Said brought forward 
several objections witii considerable intelligence, to which 
Lesseps replied in a satisfactory manner. Finally Mohammad Said 
said, » lam convinced, I accept your plan. We will talk about the 
means of its execution during the rest of the journey. Consider 
20 the matter settled. You may rely on me, • 
19. Ibid. 
20. Quoted in Ibid, p,13. 
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After that Mohammad^Jd called upon his generals and asked 
for "their Opinions on the proposals of his frient Lesseps, All 
the generals raised their hands to their foreheads in a sign of 
assent . 
They reached Cairo on November 23, 1854« The next day 
Mohammad Said had advised Iiesseps to lose no time in calling 
on Mr. Bruce, the agent and Consul -General for Sngland, to 
inform him that he has. decided to get a canal excavated across 
the IsthmuE of Suez. Lesseps duly met Mr, Bruce, and the inter-
view lasted two hours, Bruce clearly told him that if the under-
taJcing was to he a purely com ercial enterprise, removed from 
all governmental participation, there would be no ob^ectioi from 
22 
London. 
On 25 Aovaaber, the viceroy called a l l the higher Egyptian 
officials and foreign Consuls to the Citadel and formally 
announced the ja-oject to them. He said that Lesseps was comnl-
ssioned to form a compeuiy of cap i t a l i s t s of a l l nations to whom 
21, Lesseps, No.6, pp. l2-t7j See also, Kinross, No.3, 
pp.61-65; Crabites, No.H. pp. 13-19. 
22, Crabite, No.H, p.24} see also, Lesseps, No.6,p.27 
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he wbttld concede the r igi i t of carrying on the en t e rp r i s e , 
Lesseps then proceeded t o explain the project i n d e t a i l . He 
laboured the point t ha t a l l nations would he a l l o ^ d t o share 
i n i t . His statement seemed t o embarass the B r i t i s h Counsia-
General. IHurning towards the imsrican Counsul-Generalf Mohammad 
Said sa id , •Well, Moiwieur de Leon, we ore going to compete with 
the Ia*hmus of Panama, and s h a l l have finished before your.» 
Monsieur de Leoa r ep l i ed i n a good s p i r i t and applauded Mohammad 
23 Said*8 dec is ion . 
Short ly a f t e r t h i s audience, on KoTember 30, 1354 BCohammad 
Said awarded the prel iminary concession t o Ferdinand de Lesseps, 
The terms of the concession provided tha t Lesseps should form and 
d i r ec t a company which would be known as * La Can^altine Uniter-
s e l l e du Canal Maritime de Suee», for the purpose of constructing 
a sea to »Mi i^anal across the IsthEius. I t s president 'as t o 
be named by the Egyptian Grovermaent preferably from among the 
shareholders most concerned i n the e n t e r p r i s e . The term of the 
coiice3f?ion would be 99 years from t l ^ day of the opening of the 
Canal for navigat ion, a f t e r which i t would r e v e r t , on payment 
of an agreed indemnity, t o the Sgyptian Oovemment. The company 
would construct the cana]^at i t s own cost and would be granted 
23. Crab i t e s , Ho.14, pp.24-25; see a l so , Lesseps, No.6,p.28. 
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such public land as i t required for the purpose, together 
with tax f tee pr iTi lege of working mines and quar r i es , and 
of liaporting machinery and mater ia l requi red . The p ro f i t s 
were to be divided i n the proport ion of 15 percent to the 
Egyptian (Jovernment, 10 percent to the foundeirs and "^5 percent 
t o the shareholders . Transi t due; would be agreed upon 
between ths Company and tho Egyptian Governraont and would be 
the same for a l l na t ions . She viceroy promised his support 
and t h a t of h i s government o f f i c i a l s for the execution 
and completion of the work. An impoj^euit clause was tha t the 
concession would have to be ratified/by the Ottoisaan Sultan 
24 before the work could begin. 
The above ooncesnlon provided a sol id ground t o Iiesseps 
for the execution of the canal , aoi the g rea t projec t l^gan 
t o emerge xrom the realm of pure specula t ion to r e a l i t y . 
24. Crab l te , Ho. 14-,pp.25-26} see a l s o , Kinross, No.3, pp. 
64-65J Hoskln, No.1, p . 20; Seigfr led, lfo.9 
pp.65~66. 
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(3) P o l i t i c a l Difficu:^tlea In S ta r t ing the Work t The cong-
ee esion granted t o Lesseps required r a t i f i c a t i o n by the Sultan 
and here the r e a l difficulties arose, Since the time of Mohammad 
Ali Prance hai enjoyed considerable oommer i a l p r iv i leges and 
p o l i t i c a l influence i n Egypt, B r i t a in , on the other hand, though 
i t had some impolrbant commercial i n t e r e s t s i n Egypt, did not 
enjoy such p o i s i t i o n . But a t Constantinople the pos i t ions of thes 
two foreign powers were the reverse of vihat they were i n Eg3rpt, 
Here the B r i t i s h influence was paramount, e spec i a l l y a f te r the 
beginning of th» Russo-Turkish c r i s i s of 1853,which hadL led t o the 
Crimean f a r . The r e s u l t was t h a t Su l t an ' s approval for the conce-
ss ion required B r i t a i n ' s good wiH t»#ards the p ro jec t . As things 
stood then, B r i t a i n c e r t a i n l y was not i n favour of the Suez Canal 
p ro jec t . The B r i t i s h Government,headed by Palmerston for fear of 
thfifPrench pretensions i n Egypt and dnxious for the safe ty of comnu 
n ica t ions with the B r i t i s h Indian Empire, s e t i t s e l f t o oppose 
25 the const ruct ion of the Canal by every means i n i t s power . In 
Palmerston 's opinion 'Turkey i s as good an occupier of the road 
'26 t o India as an act ive Arabian >8overiegn would be ,demonstrates 
the B r i t i s h po l icy . To gave ^^ e a s t e rn domination, Br i t a in 
25, Oearfee^lenczowskl, fhe M^^ dd^ ? E^et ^ for^d j ^ f t i r s 
:, 1962) ,P.439| see also,**^eader Bullard, (New Tork
B r i t a i n and the Middle Eas t . (London , 1951),pp^31.42 
Middle East P o l i t i c a l and Iconomical Survey. (London, 1948) 
p .76 . 
26. Gteorge E.Klrk. 4 Short History ot thjp Mj^ ddle East , 
(London 1948), p .76 . 
o 
<2f 
— 0: 5 
r: <> ^ '^  
\ 
o 
tog 
6 
a: 
:5 
Of 
<OM 
^ 
\ 
\ 
y> 
Vfm « 
U0«d a l l i t s iafluenea in C^^Btantlnople to pr«y«nt the Sultan 
from giving his approral to the oonGeBsioii. This British opposi-
27 
tion led to the delaj of more than a decade in rati£Leation . 
The l^itish opposition to the Cansl soheme ean also be 
tinderstood in the context of the Sastem Question. Hapoleon had 
conquered Egjrpt in 1798* Hohansnad iOJL*s son had conquered southaxn 
parts of the Ottcooan Ikpire hut Britain had stopped him. The Czar 
had said 1844 > * We have a sick man on our hands. It would he a 
gr«^# icisfortune if we we were net to provide beforehand for 
the oontingencor of his diath . 
Russia and Jsustria were attempting to expand their esrpire 
towards the south at the expense of the Ottoman finpire. These 
trends and events were upsetting the balance of power in Europe* 
which was feared very much tgr Britain. Thus the British (Jovem -
ment was compelled to adopt a definite policQr towards the Middle 
Eastern af:^irs. It took counter measures against Sranoe and 
Russia. Britain started taking more interest in the Middle 
East especially in Egypt. It be^oDe an axioan of the British 
foreign policy to maintain the independence and integrity of 
27. Ii«iC20WBki, Ho. 25, pp. 31-32 
28. w.B. Usher, The Middle East. (London, 1965),p. 157. 
the Ott<aaan Ssaplxe in order to prevent the growing poivr of Russia 
and also to protect tlie imperial l i f e l ine irom the Frenoh enoroach-
29 
ment. 
As soon as the news of the award of the concession reached 
in Europe hectic diplomatic activities started, Mohammad Said*8 
decision was so sudden thatinterested governments could not get 
an opportunity to express their opinion. In January 1855 the 
British Government informed Mohspmad Said through its Consul-
General in Cairo Frederick Bruce, that it regarded the scheme with 
disfavour and considered it as inexpedient and iBspracticahle^ 
Palmerston was then the British Prime Minister who declared the 
scheme as the French plot designed (a) to colonize Egypt; (b) to 
enable the Egyptian viceroy to become independent of the Ottoman 
(Suzerainty; and (c) to enable the French to threaten the British 
interests in India by their ability to send troops to India via the 
30 
Canal while barring the use of the same route to the British , 
The real power at Constantinople was the British Ambassador, 
Lord Stratford de Red cliffe who had achieved almost the ascendency 
over the Ottoman Government. At the instigation of Redcldffe, 
Rashid Pasha, the Grand Vazier, sent a confidential despatch to 
29. Lenczowski, Ho.25, p.4-, see also, Political and Strategic 
Interest of U.K. ,(Iionaon 1940)»PP« 116-117 
30. Marlowe, Ho.3»pp.82-84-,see also Schonfield, No,4,p.24; 
Kinross,No.3fp.69, Hoskin,No.1,p.308. 
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MohaoBBad Said in uhlch he pointed out that the rcdlroad would be 
much less expensi-ve than the Canalt and that the latter enterprise 
would be unadmissible . Zherefore, he concluded that the Canal 
project should be abandoned. Such predominant British influence 
at Constantinople was partly due to the Ottoman belief that tki 
Britain was in favour of maintaining effectiTS Ottoaan suzerainty 
oyer Egypt, and that Trance was in favour of its relaxation. 
Secondly, during the Crimean War Ottoman Itepire was very largely 
dependent on British support due to Its naval supremacy. Because 
of these facts Sublime Porte did not want to offend Britain by 
31 
agreeing to the plan , 
The aboTB diplomatic activities indicate the powerful British 
influence at Constantlnoplr. The British aovernment had succeeded 
in convincing the Turldsh Government regarding the economic soundnes 
of the railroad andy(imprac tic ability of the Canal scheme. But 
the fact appears to be that the Canal across the Istimua was more 
useful, though costly for the commercial world than the railroad. 
In fact the British objections were unsound and selfish. The 
survey reportsof the Isthmus from time to time^ done by many engin-
eers. Including the British ones, had mentioned ,that the scheme 
was a practicable proposition amdXteohnically feasible. So one can 
say that the British objections were motivated by political 
considerations. Britain did not want to open a new routejbo the 
31. Longgood, No.1$,p.26} see also, Marlowe, Ho.3,pp.82-84 
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e a s t , because i t thought t h a t the new route would proTide a scdpe 
for the Jrenoh and act as a c a t a l y s t i n the d i s in t eg ra t ion of th€ 
OttcHnsin anp i re . 
Fraaice n a t u r a l l y was delighted with the scheme, but withe Id 
i t s o f f i c i a l support as both i t s e l f and Englad were a l l i e d with 
Turksy i n the Crimean f a r . I t s r e l a t i o n with Br i t a in were cordial , 
therefore i t be l iered t h a t i t s o f f i c i a l support t o the scheme 
might jeopardise i t s r e l a t i o n with the l a t t e r . Ihe passive a t t i -
tude of Prance towards the scheme and B r i t a i n ' s k o s t i l e a t t i t ude 
towards the canal proved t o be the main hurdle i n the way of 
32 Su l t an ' s approval • 
Mohammad Said r ea l i zed the f u l l force of the Br i t i sh opposi-
t i o n and decided to send Lesseps t o Constantinople before the 
B r i t i s h opposi t ion could take concrete s&Ape. At Constantinople 
Lesseps found the Orand Tazier qui te favourable i n h is project , 
but he refused to support the scheme i n any o f f i c i a l capacity 
due t o the fea r of the B r i t i s h Ambassador, French Charge d* Affai] 
M.Benedetti personal ly supported Lesseps in h is e f fo r t s as much 
as pos s ib l e . She Austrian represen ta t ive o f f i c i a l l y supported 
Lesseps and promised him t h a t he would do a l l i n h is power t o 
oounerbalance Redc i i f f e ' s i n f luence^ ' . 
32. Schonfield, Ho.4, P ,25, see also Lesseps No.6,•*^.78, 
Hoslcin, No,4, pp 308-309 
33. Lesseps, Ho,62, pp. 83 and 87. 
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on 27 February 18551 Rede cl i ff o gave a raemoraadian to tbB 
Grraol Tazler in vMoh he stated that the scheme was based on 
u l te r io r motives hosti le to the Bri t ish in te res t s . Sa said that 
a deep and wide canal interposed between Syria and Bgypt, studded 
with for t i f ica t ions , would be a mil i tary defence line which, with 
the desert in front of i t , would render the march for a furklsh 
army very d i f f icu l t , Purther if the land was to be conceded to 
the French company, a French 0olony or French territcary would be 
interposed between TurIrey and Egypt and any attempt of TurldLBh 
troops to cross that l ine would be held to be an invasion of 
Prance, Ifert day Iiesse >s wrote a l e t t e r to Redecliffe in which he 
stated the effectiveness and benefit of h is scheme for Britain 
and pointed out the importance of canal for Britain during a cr is is , 
i f i t took place in the Bast, He reminded Redecliffe that Bgypt 
was the shortest and most direct route from England to her e x t e r n 
possessions and that t h i s route must always remain open to Britain. 
However, lesseps failed i n persuading the Bri t ish ambassador, and 
f inal ly when i t became clear that the Sublime Porte would not 
app3:ove the Canal project , he returned to Cairo. ^ Iftad failed 
34, but was not defeated ^ 
Lesseps on his r e tu rn t o Bgypt, came t o Icnow Raehid Pasha 's 
view againt the Canal. In a personal l e t t e r t o Mohaznmad Said^ 
34. Hoslcin, No. 1,pp.309-510| see a l so Marlowe, No.3,p.85; 
Ijesseps, Ho.6,pp,90-93t Wilson, No.11,p.17. 
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Rashid had written that thB former was throwing hiaaelf into the 
arms of France whose SoneriiBent had no more stability than its 
agent. He threatened by saying that IttiAle France oould do nothing 
either for or ggaiast Said, Bngland could do him a great doal of 
harm. He add d that the Sultan was very angry and the only way to 
appease him was to have nothing more to do with the canal scheme. 
This letter had the very opposite effect on Mohammad Said. He got 
irritated and ccnmcented that Rashid Pasha was only a comedian and 
a peK^ fidious and corrupt intriguer. He said that Rashid coiad not 
be able to exploit him as he exploited his father, and that he 
would not be his dupe. He replied to him that he was neither a 
Frenchman nor an Sogliehman. He was and would remain an Egyptian 
Turk, As for the Sultan he said that he trusted that instead of 
depriving him of his good graaea, he would aipport him against 
his enemies, ^o were also his. Mohammad Said observed that all 
the people in Constantinople were ingreat fear and mortal terror of 
Redecliffe and the Bnglish, He eusserted that the enterprise 
depended on no single power but a general coopany composed of 
people from all countries, Mohammad Said*5 bold reply gave a firm 
hand to^nedetti, who came out in more open and active support 
for Lesseps and demanded the sanction of the concession WhilB 
the Sgyptian Govenaaent was in favour of the Canal scheme and 
55, Marlowe, Ho,3t p.89, see also, Kinross, No.3,pp.75-76, 
Hoskin, No.1, p. 311. 
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wanted to execute it, the furldsh Goverwient adopted a dual 
paicy. On the one hand, it realized the importance of the canal, 
and on the other, it denounced the scheme only out of fear of 
the British Government. 
la the ukaanwhile Lord Glareadoa, the British foreign Secretary 
36 
informed Redecliffe that * 
» Her MajestyVs Croveriaaent coneider t ha t t h i s canal 
would be use less even i f i t were possible^^sxecute 
i t , and the eonoession demanded by M.IJesBeps i s 
highly objectionable for p o l i t i c a l reasons and they 
recommend thjr; Porte not to grant i t on the ground 
t h a t t h i s i s iiot a moment for bringing BO large a 
prefect i n to the money market * 
Lord Cowley, the B r i t i s h Ambassador a t Pa r i s protes ted on 
June 4, 1855 against Benedit te^s support of the Canal t o the 
French (J4vernm«nt, Count fa lewski , the then French Foreign 
Minis ter , immediately condemned Benedetti»s demand, fife suggested 
t h a t both B r i t a i n and France ins t ruc ted t h e i r represen ta t ives 
not to i n t e r f e r e fur ther i n the matter and leave i t e n t i r e l y 
t o the Sultan and the viceroy. Cowley t ransmit ted falewski* s sug-
ges t ion to Foreign Office and rep l ied t o Walewski t h a t h i s 
suggestion did not apply equal ly to both givenaaents , and i n arespec 
t o the means of t r anspor t through ^ y p t , the B r i t i s h GovernBent 
was much more concerned din the f i na l so lu t ion than the French 
Government^'• 
36. B r i t i s h Foreign State Papers . Vol.55, 1854, p.978 
In, lfo.1, p .311; see a 
Papers, Vol. 55, 1955 
37. Hoski ITo.l lso B r i t i s h Foreign State 
_ _ __ ^ P.687T 
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Britain was not ready to remain neutral on the Canal 
question. Lord Clarendon, in a long despatch to Cowlej^tunned up 
the ^ o l e of the Brit ish objection. I t was the f i r s t concrete 
statement of the Bri t ish Policy, Clarendon stated that the 
objections of the Bri t ish SoTernment to t h i s scheme of the Canal 
i»ere threefold i 
F i r s t s The schecffi was physically impossible, accept at a 
cost which must put out of a l l question of i t s being profitable 
as a coismercial speculation, and urtiich must therefore pro'ro, that 
i f undertaken i t could be undertaken only for politlc&l r« asons. 
Secoroi : This scheme would greatly delay, i f not ent irely 
prevent the completion of a railway communication between Cairo 
BM Suez and would thus be extremely injurious to the Brittel 
in teres ts with reference to India. All that the Bri t ish Governeme: 
wanted in Bgypt was an easy and rapid road to India, They wanted 
no ascendency and no t e r r i t o r i a l acquisition! they only wanted a 
thoroughfare, free and usmolestM, and the continuation of the 
railway v/ould give them that rapid thoroughfare as long as ]^ypt 
remained a dependency of the Ottoman Bmpijre. 
Third I The scheme, the Government consider, wa^^ founded 
upon an tagonis t i c policy on the part of Prance with regard to 
E ^ p t , wdiich they hoped and believed would affect the friendly 
.vJ 
r e l a t i o n s of the two oountr ies i . e . , B r i t a i n and Pj-ance-f^ 
In reply to Clarendon's objections Walewski said t ha t h i s 
ffoTenaaent had no i n t e n t i o n t o adopt an antagonis t ic pol icy . So 
far as the oanal scheme was concerned h i s government had no 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and would oppose i t without h e s i t a t i o n . To show 
his goodwill he announced h i s support for the rai lway. This 
created such a good iiapression i n London t h a t tba B r i t i s h Grovern-
a iit also figreod to l e t the matter cj:opiip4. Both the G-overnments 
agroed tha t nothing would be done about tue canal project a t a l l 
for the time being. At t h i s s tage the oanal quest ion, as a p o l i -
t i c a l i ssue temporari ly entered a quiscent s t a t e , This 'gentlemen' 
agreement* for the tiir» being stopped the diplomatic t ens ion ' , 
YiOYJBV&r, 
TjiiB compromise coiad n o t ( l a s t long because both the Govern-
ments were apposing the views of each other behind the scenes. The 
delay i n the Su l t an ' s consent caused Lesseps t o determine upon a 
new ac t ion , 39 decided to prosecute h i s scheme i n Pa r i s and London, 
With h i s departure from Egypt the centre of controvers#y shifted 
from Constantinople and Cairo t o Pa r i s and London, In the meanwhile 
on Apri l 30, 1855 Linant and Moguel sulaaitted t h e i r report on the 
pi ac- t icabi l i ty of the Canal, fhe i r repor t helped Lesseps in con-
vincing those who opposed the scheme with the contention tha t i t 
38. B r i t i s h ayi Foreign State Papers. Toi:J5,^55,pp.823-a26| 
see a l s o , Hoskin, Ho.1, p.312, Kinross. No.3,pp.79-80 
39. Kinross, Ho.3, p . S 1 . 
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was tec imica l ly Impossible, I t proTlded liesseps v?lth a be t t e r 
i n t e roa t l ona l platform I n pu t t ing M s scheme before the mero-iantile 
Aft 
c lass of Europe . In London lesseps met with Clarendon asd Palmers 
*on. Both of them, howeirer^ expressed t h e i r opposition to t h i s 
scheme. Palmerston franldy explained tha t the opening of a new 
route would c e r t a i n l y distizcb t t e conroercial aai maritlire re la t ions 
of Great B r i t a i n with the East , I t would also provide a passage 
t o the ships of aJLl nations which u l t imate ly would lead to the 
41 loss of advantages which the B r i t i s h possessed^ . 
Lesseps' v i s i t to England paid nothing i n dividends as he 
fa i l ed i n o f f se t t ing the B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l opposi t ion. Upon 
h is r e t u r n to Pa r i s i n August, Iiesseps took a d i f fe ren t step 
regarding the f e a s i b i l i t y of the maritime canal , both from eingineer-
ing and propoganda points; of view. He formed the In te rna t iona l 
Sc ien t i f i c CoramiSBion to get the advice of t echn ica l ly competent 
men regarding the cana l . 5h£ f i r s t meeting of ;^he Cotnmtsslon was 
held i n P a r i s , isfeich,after a b r i e f and sympathetic considerat ion 
of the problem, selected a sub-committee of five stenbers to 
ca r ry out a nevj and thorough survey of the Isthmus, After a 
thorough servey the sub-comraittee submitted a highly favourable 
4-O.Beaty, No,21 ,pp,124-125| see a l so Mnross , ffo.3.p.77 
41 , Lesseps, Ho,6, p ,150. 
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repor t^ t o Viceroy, Soon a f t e r the Connnlssion'B repor t on 
January 5»185^t Uohammad Said Issiied a second conoesslon^^ to 
IieasepB which provided a f t i l l s t a t u t e of the Sues CanalJ , There 
are Bcase i n t e r e s t i n g di f ferences between the f i r s t and second 
concession, vMch are noted here . 
(a) In the Second oenoession the ccsmpany was ccHomitted to 
the d i rec t route along the approximate l ine set out by the 
In t e rna t iona l Sc ien t i f i c Commission, while in the f i r s t concesslo 
the choice of route had been l e f t open. 
(b) In the second concession i t was provided t h a t the 
company would i t s e l f f ix the canal duea upto a maximum of 10 
francs per ton , while i n the f i r s tboncess ion i t had been provided 
t h a t the dues be fixed with agreement between the Egyptial 
G^overnment and the Oozopany. 
(c) The f i r s t concession had been for a period of 99 years 
without provis ion for renewal. The i^cond concession was a lso 
for 99 years but with a provis ion for renewal subject to an 
increased ' take* by the Egyptian aovernment. 
(d)The second concession provided tha t Iiesseps should be 
the President for 10 years from the time the Canal was opened, 
42. For d e t a i l s see Appendix B. 
43 . Per d e t a i l s see Appendix C 
44. Schonfield, Fo.4, p.30t See a l so Beaty, No.21, 
PP.155-138, see a l so Marlowe,No.3, pp. 95-96 
t 
while the f i r s t concession provided t h a t the President should he 
nominated by the Egyptian Government, 
(e) The f i r s t concession made proTision for f o r t i f i c a t i o n 
t o he created by the i^ypt ian (Jovemment a t t h e i r own expense. 
45 the second concession made no mention of the fortif ication^"^. 
After the i ssue of the second conces ion and the Comniissions 
r epo r t , Iiesseps s t a r t ed a well managed and almost world-wide 
propoganda cai^aign i n support of the Canal project with the 
object of o f f se t t ing the B r i t i s h opposi t ion. The scheme was well 
received by the coramer i a l c lasses of B r i t a i n . Two important 
commercial companies of England supported the proposal . The 
East India C(»apany and the Peninsular and Orienta l Company 
expressed t h a t the junct ion of the Mediterranean and the Red Seas 
would accelera te not only t h commerce of England but of the 
whole world. This was a very encouraging opinion expressed by 
the B r i t i s h CompanieB thesmelves. Iiesspps t r i e d to a sce r t a in 
the public opinion by s t ress ing the value of human progress 
46 
and i n t e r n a t i o n a l f r iendship^ . He issued regular journal 
i n severa l languages. In the meanwhile, delegates from a l l over 
Europe were assembledl i n Pa r i s for the Peace Conference at the 
end of the CrinKan War. Lesseps determined to une the conference 
45 . Beaty, lfo.21, P.144, see a lso I\larlowe,lfo.3, pp.97-98 
46. Kinross, Ho.5, pp.94-95. 
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^ a forum. He approached the Eteperor Kapoleon H I and the 
The 
assembled delegatesTy^Austrain Minister clearly told Lesseps that 
nothing Was to be expected from his GOTrenfisent as long as the 
Bri t ish ramiined hos t i l e . iT^rkish Minister Ali Pasha strongly 
opposed i t , and refued to discuss i t i n the Conference. Ultimately 
Lesseps failed in persuading the assembled delegates and there 
47 
was no reference to the Canal in the Peace Treaty . I t seems 
that Britain was taking advantage of her naral supremacy in 
the Mediterranean. No other nation was powerful enough to 
counter the Bri t ish objections and neutralize i t s hostile 
a t t i tude , though behind the curtain France and Austria were 
c r i t i c iz ing the Bri t ish a t t i tude . I t was obvious that no 
scheme could have been successful without the formal cooseat 
of the Bri t ish aoveriuaent. 
At th i s stage Lesseps adopted a new approach. He went on 
saying tha t the Bn^eror aM the French Government were taking 
in teres t in the scheme. Cowley protested against Lesseps pro-
paganda to Ufalewski who assured him that 'So long as the scheme 
was opposed by Ber Majesty's Government, they did not wish to 
comeinto discussion or col l is ion with Her Majesty's Government 
43 
on such matters . 
47. Kinross, No.3, pp.94-95 
48. Marlowe, No.5, pp.111-112. 
In April 1857 leaseps again want to England armed with 
maps, plans and discr ipt ive l i t e r a t u r e . ^ addressed a series 
of meetings arranged by the Chamber of Commerce. Thes«^meetings 
heA at tracted a good deal of in teres t and a certain amount of 
support, both in press and elseiriwre. Resolutions were drawn 
UTj in favour of the Canal scheme by the various commercial 
Organisations which led to the discussion in the House of 
49 Commons "^^ 
On July 7t 1857» for the f i r s t time in the House of Co nons 
the ;^ez Canal question waB raised• In reply to a question 
raised by Henry Berkelly, Palmerston answered with the usual 
vlolenoe5° , 
Her Majesty's CtoTernment wil l cer tainly not use i t s 
influence with the Sultan to persuade him to permit 
the coruBtruction of t h i s Oanai>beoaxi8e, ever the l a s t 
f i f teen years Her Majesty's ffov^mment has used such 
influence as i t has a t Constantinople to prey«nt the 
execution of th i s project . I t i s an undertaldLng which, 
I belie^9«, SB regards i t s commercial character may be 
deemed to raitk among the many bubble schemes that from 
time to tiSM have been nalned off upon gnilible capita-
l i s t s . I believe tha t i t i s physically impracticable 
except B(k an expense which would be far too great to 
warrant the expectation of any r e t u r n s . . . . >.» I an' 
surprised that H.de Lessens can believe that , as a 
resul t of a tour t hcou^ the provincial c i t i e s of 
England, be can obtain.Bnglish money for the promotion 
of the^soheme which is/Svery way adverse to Brit ish 
in teres ts . . . . ^ Bat no doubt, i t i s not necessary for 
the enterprise to be successful to enable M. de Lesseps 
and the other prcmoters to achieve their ends' 
49. Siegfried, Ho.9,p. 67, see also, Beaty, No.21,pp152.154 
50. Hansctrd Parliamentary Itebates, 3rd. series Vol.CXIiyi, 
pp.1045-1044 
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Palnerstones Foreign pol icy had two aimai to preirent the 
establishment of Russia on the Bospoms and of Prance on the Nile . 
T ¥ ^UU »ey?» P^ I^ff^ ff and The M<^ rfl-.fl^ nti;^ ft •'^^•»"'^1 sapported 
Palaerston* s views and po l i cy . The sajae year on Ju ly 17|1857 
Paloers ton attacked the Suez Canal echeme i n more v io lent mood 
51 
and said"^ j 
» I th ink I aJB not fa r wrong i n describing i t as one 
of those schemes which are scsnetimes put forward t o 
deceive Baglish o a p a t i l l s t s i n to pa r t ing with t h e i r 
moneyi and which i n the end leaves the c a p i t a l i s t s 
poorer as a r e s u l t of having made others r i c h e r . ' 
He believed t h a t i t would quickly s i l t up and s a i l i n g vessels 
coiild never VLBB i t and t h a t the railway was quicker and more 
useful . Grladstone warned l a l o e r s t o n and oaid t ha t there was 
not a statesman i n Eur pe who did not denounce the pol icy of 
t h i s opposit ion as unwarrantable and s e l f i s h . On the technical 
aspect of the Caiial Palmerston received support fr<»i Robert 
S t e i ^ n s o n , who concluded t h a t the scheme wa s p r a c t i c a l l y 
impossible and would not even touch the grand commerce of the 
•K« 52 
world which foilowedi route round the Cape . 
I t became evident i n 1857 tha t the Canal would make no 
headway as long as the French Ctoverament maintained passive 
diplomatic a t t i t u d e i n Egypt and B r i t a i n held sway at Constanti-
nople-
51. Cited i n Marlowe, Ho.3, p .14 . 
52. Cited in , -Hoskin,Ho.1, pp 345-346; see a l so , Kinross, 
H . 3 , p .107. o 
Meanwhile, an unexpected evmt took place which prored 
PalmerBton*8 polit leal objection as selfish and unsowid and 
showed that the Suee Canal route was quicker and safer. The 
Indian Mutiny had started and the British Goyemment was forced 
to send troops to India through Sgypt, This step was exploited 
iQr the Opposition press which condeoamed Balmerston, Clarendon and 
53 Hed^iffe and their negative policies and views . Lesseps 
foreraist at last proved true that at the time of emergency this 
route would be more effective and benefi'iial for the British 
Crovemm«Dit than any other. The latter govemm«at h&& also 
realized i t but was s t i l l opposing i t on polit ical grounds» 
probably mainly because of the rigid attitude of Palmerstem. 
% the end of 1857 Palmerston*s Government f e l l . The 
new Govemmait came to power under Lord Derty. This incident 
coincided with the death of Rashid Pttsha and also the rwnoval 
of Redediffe from Constantinople. The new Government did not 
show any change in the British policy. On January 1, 1858 
the foreign office warned the Porte that i f the Sultan gave his 
consent to the eomeession* the British Government would no longer 
be responsible for the maintenance of the integrity of the Ott<»&an 
Bnpire. This was the most direct threat of the British Govern-
ment to Porte. The new Poreign Secretary, Lord Malmesluiy, 
53. Schonfield, No.4, p.33| eee also , Kinross, No,3»p.108. 
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la rvtwm to this thr«at, r«e«iTed a writtan a ssuxane« from th« 
Sultan that tha ferii9 would never give its consent until H^r 
Majesty's CkrremiBent expressed their willingness to approve of 
Ob March 26, 1858 the M.f. BertQr Griffith hrought up the 
Snez Canal faestion in the House of CeniBoas. He asked that wtoAt-
crer the engineering problem might he he could not understand 
whiK the soho&e was regarded against the country's interests. 
Disraeli repeated the sane eld argoment . igain on June 1, 1858 
a full dress dehate took place in the House of ConoDons. Tarious 
Opposition Bwnbers of the House eondeemed the ^ oremnent polioar 
and supported the @anal. Robert Stephenson still laaintained 
that the Canal was 'physically impossible* and that if built 
would be a'stinking ditch •• Gladstone asserted that the Canal 
offered decided advantage to Grreat Britain. He suggested 
that the Canal be controlled through the country's naral power 
and its strategic bases be occupied. In the end, Sisraeli 
said that there was no reason to suppose that the Turkish 
Goremment needed any presmire from the British Goremnent to 
induce then to oppose the scheme. 5 ^ House took Disraeli's adrtoe 
56 
and the opposition motion was defeated \^ 290 Totes to 62 . 
54. Hansard Parliamentanr Debates. 3rd, SarAes,Vol.CXLIX,p,849 
55. Kinross, No.3» p. 107 
56- Hmsard Barliaaentarr Debates. 3rd. series, ToLCXIYI, 
pp. 1385-1591. 
(4-) goraa t ioa of the Oompany and P o l i t i c a l Inmllcatiom 
T i l l 1358, the Suee Calial quest ion was only at tlae d iscussion 
leTslbetween the powers among whom M i t a i n was i n a dominant 
posi t ion* I t aeeaaed t h a t the B r i t i s h (Jovernnent had succeeded 
i n preTBttfeiag the canal quest ion from deTSloping i n t o a p r a c t i c a l 
p ropos i t ion . So high was the B r i t i s h pressure on Mohantnad Sedd 
t h a t he was aear ly prepared t o gi-rc up the whole canal question 
for the sake of h i s own safe ty and peace. The en i l ess delay 
discouraged him and oonsequently he l o s t i n t e r e s t i n the Canal. 
LessepI propaganda and e f f o r t s had f a i l ed i n l i f t i n g the weight 
of B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l opposi t ion, though the merc-ant i le and 
public opinion was i n favour of the canal . France and other 
powe»8 were also not taking much I n t e r e s t i n the Canal due to 
the fea r of B r i t a i n . Four years had passed since the f i r s t 
oonoesslon and near ly th ree years had passed a f t e r the second 
concession a l s o . I t now seemed to Lesseps t ha t the longer he 
57 
waited, the more d i f f i c u l t i e s would accumulate . 
i e s seps r ea l i s ed the s i t u a t i o n and decided tha t he would 
go ahead with the work on the canal without waiting e i t h e r for 
the Sultanb firman or for any more pos i t i ve support of the 
French Gto-vemment. He decided to form the con^any which, i n 
the end, the Porte and everyone would have t o recognise and accept 
57. Kinross, Bo.3, pp. 97-99 
58- Marlowe, Ifo.3, pp. 120-129. 
At the end of August, 1858 he went to Paris where he 
opened a ^omll office and proceeded to form the company. She 
capital of the Company was fixed at 200 million £rancs divided 
each 
into 4-00,000 shaies of 500 franc^ '. Each share carried a guiwintee 
interest throughout the period of the oanal's construction. Now 
he has to raise the iitltial capital of 200 million francs. He 
first decided to draw all finances from his old friend Baron de 
Rothschild of the big banking house in Paris. Rotlischild offered 
hira to raise the capital at a coxiKiasion of 5 percent. Lesseps 
59 
rejected this a M decided to go direct to the public . Perhaps 
Lesseps thought that by doing sojhe *ould be able to neutralize 
the British opposition and having done so he would be able to 
proceed ftirther without any obstacles. 
On November 5« Lesseps opened his subscription list, on 
50th November it was closed. To maks the company truly luiiversal, 
investors were invited from all the nations to participate in 
the enterprise. Sha es were divided in such a manner that no 
single country could achieve a dominant position, The issue 
was not a complete success. Prance and Egypt responded well 
as they becggae the largest shareholders. There was no appllcatione 
for shares from "Bngland, United States, Austria and Russia. 
59, Kinross, Ho,3, pp.115-117, see also, Wiison,No.11,p.22. 
GL' 
She foUoffiBg table shoirs th9 number of shares pttrohased by tbe 
60 
nationals of different countries . 
France 207,111 
Belgttim 324 
Deaaark 7 
Ifaples 97 
The Ottenan Aspire including the 
p rsonal subscription of the qg c-l« 
viceroy of Egjrpt ^ '"^  ' 
Spain 4-f046 
Reme 54 
Lov Countries 2,631 
Portugal 5 
Prussia 15 
Tunis 1,714 
Piedmont 1,355 
Switserland 460 
!!!usoany 176 
Share held in reserve for the an\m- 35,506 
oription of i n s t r i a , Qreat Britain, 
Russia and the United States of Jlsierlca 
%noe i t was to the Ticeroy that Le^eps now had to turn 
for unsabscribed shares. Before the formation of the company, 
Mohammad Said promised to Leiweps that he would cover a l l the 
foreign unsubscribed shares. Lesseps on th is assuranc^ook up the 
remaining shares on behalf of Tieeroy and thus go^ the 
Company z^egistered. Ihere was wide-spread crit icism in England 
60, Beaty, Ho.21, p.184| see also, Wilson, Ho.11,p.22. 
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about tht subseriptioa. fh» landon (Srlob9 wrote on Horembtr 30, 
1858^^ I 
fh^ erineipal lascribcrs «r« hotel vmlters, i^o 
had seen deceired Igr the papers thiQr have read, 
and petty gr6G«zy enployeee ivho hare heea hegailded 
Igr puffs. 7he priesthood has been TletimlBed and 
3>000 day labour era hare bem indueed to pool 
their earinge to boy theee eharea • • •. The whole 
thing id a flagrant r^ bbeoey gotten up to despoil 
the simple people who haTe allowed themselves tp 
become dupes* 
After the elosing of the subscription l i s t , an AdministratiTe 
Couneil for the Company vma formed, Srinee JarcMe Hapoleon was 
named as Protector, and lesseps himself was named Srssident of the 
the Company, further^ there were four Honoraxy Bresidents and 
three Tiee-?resid«:its. The thirty two members of the Administrative 
Couneil included Ruyssenaers. There was a Tecfanioal Advisory 
Counoil also consisting of eight perscms and a legal Advisory 
Couneil consisting of nine persons, a l l frrnioh* Mougel Biy 
ivas appointed as Chief ^igineer of the Company. ^ Bee«nber 20, 
62 1338, the organisation of the Company was complete « 
However, the suecessfoi launching of the Canal Ccmspaay 
failed to make any material change in the polit ical opposition 
to the project, while i t gave Lesseps the advantage of a strong 
61. Cited in Crabite, No.14, P.60| see also Kinross, No.3> P*113 
62. Hoskin, ITo.l, pp. 353-354. 
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organisation and a large working OGQ)italt i t also provided fuel 
to his enemies for a new a»ans of attack. I t was under such 
circumstances as these that Lesseps took another bold stept and 
created problems. ^ Informed Mohajnmad Said about the formation 
of the company and requested to authorize him for the com ence-
ment of work on the Canal. % argued that the work on Cairo-
Alexandria railway had started before the firman was issued, 
ae also informed the Grand Viaier that in order to avoid any 
oonfusion^o the Forte, the Company would proceed only with 
preparatory work pending the issue of the Sultan's Firman. He 
also drew the at tention of Aall Pasha to Dis rae l i ' s speech of 
June 1, 1857 in the Canmons that the Britain Government would 
not i t s e l f oppcMse the schei^ and that tbe whole matter depende^ i^  on 
the 3?urki8h Govenanent '^ , 
Mohammad Said's posit ion ;as very awkward. On the one hand, 
he had accepted the formation of the CoiiQ>any and* on the other^ 
64 he hesitated to give permission for the preparatory work 7 
t re In March 1859/representatives of the Company off icial ly 
took possession of the properties given according to the 
concession. In spite of po l i t i ca l complications and inimical 
a t t i tude of the Bri t ish Government, Lesseps on April 25,1859 
65. Hoskin, No.1, pp.555-354 
64. Kin OSS, Ho. 3 , p.118. 
G t.j 
in the presence of the Company's employees, inaugurated the 
cpastruction. Thus in this way the work started from the northern 
65 terminal where Port Said now stands 
As the news reached that the work had started, a storm of 
opposition rose both in Constantinople axi& England. British 
diplo-iatio activities increased with greater force at Constanti-
nople. The foreign office protested against the starting of the 
work and this protest was strongly seconded by Austria (Prance 
and Austria were by this time at war), ijs/result of these 
representations, Porte warned Mohammad Said against the conse-
quences of the start if the work an. the Canal and instructed him 
to iiamediately stop it until a Pirman was obtained. On June 1, 
1859 the foreign Minister of Sgy^t, Sharif Pasha officially 
directed Lesseps to cease the operation he had begun on the lathmus. 
Lesseps protested agednst Sharif Pasha's order and argued that 
while the Sultan's Pirmaa was necessary for the operation of the 
66 
oanalf it was not necessary for its construction . Lesseps 
argUB^nt was not fair, because when Mohammad Said had awarded 
the concession to hiokt was clearly mentioned in it that Ottoman 
consent was necessary before the work could begin. However, 
despite this ruling Desseps started the work which was obviously 
illegal. 
At Constantinope off icial opinion, supported by Britidn 
65. Marlowe, Wo.3 p.124j see aXBo Hoskin, No.1, p.353 
66. Kinross, Ho.3,P.t25| see also Hoskin Ko.1, pp-355-357 
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t p the 
was hosti le wtfjmmt the Canal. They were thinking about^deposi-
t ion of Mohajnmacl Said If he did not stop the work. Within few 
weeks Mohajmnad Said withdrew the ]^]rptlan Labour tefJte though 
not In t o t a l and le f t Lessesps in a desprate condition. Meanwhile 
a new si tuat ion developed. In France shareholders were growing 
res t less and the value of Company's shares was fal l ing in the 
market. At th i s c r i t i c a l rsornent, I«esseps on August 6, 1859, 
addressed a l e t t e r to Iteperor Ifapoleon, in \7hich he asked for 
diplomatic pressure for the demand of firman at Constantinople, 
67 
But nothlgg li^ s doMeved , , 
The Work on the CaOsuL ims still continuing. Mohammad Said 
had replied that those i^o were engaged in the work were Europeans 
and that he had no control over them. So this the British 
Government strongly protested that the oolony irtiich developed 
in the fady Tumilat, woiad be a double danger. Plratly, it would 
detach Sgypt from Turkey, and, seconclly, it would be a permanent 
barrier in the way of the British access to India. Cto September 14, 
1859, the Oraai Yarier , under the British jsTost^ are, informed 
Mohammad Said that the building of a Canal was a matter within 
the jurisdiction of the Saltan, vbx> regarded the act of concession 
null and void. On October 4, 1359 a Consular meeting was held in 
which a resolution was passed to the effect that? (1) all the work, 
even the preparatory work^of the Canal should be suspended, and 
67Kinross, iro.3,P.123j aee also, Marlowe,!fo.5,pp. 131-132. 
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(2) labour should be removed by the respec t ive governments,This 
r e s o l u t i o n wcus unanimously approved by the diplomatic corps arai 
was communicated to t h e i r respect ive gOveriments.The French 
Ambassador M- Sabat ier not only f a i l ed to r a i s e any question 
during the meeting, but a lso c r i t i c i s e d the act ion by Iiesseps and 
68 
said t h a t I n h is opinion the compnay had no l e g a l existence . 
I t seemed tha t the Canal would not come in to existence as 
p o l i t i c a l opinion i n those days was against i t , Iiesseps once 
again approached the l^evor. F ina l ly on October 23, 1859 the 
EmperoY gave audience t o Lesseps, The conversation was as follows 
*How i t i s M,De Lesseps, the every one seems to be against your 
en te rp r i se .* Lesseps r e p l i e d , ' s i n c e , i t i s because every one 
bel ieves t h a t Tour Majesty does not wish t o support u s ' . 
The Emperor r ep l i ed , 'Don't worry about t h a t , you can count upon 
my support and p ro tec t ion . The B r i t i s h opposit ion i s unimportant. 
69 I t i s a qua i l , vne must tr im our s a i l s to i t ' , 
The French Barperor's change of hear t was afturning pAlnt in 
the h i s to ry of the Suez Canal^ After t h i s a diplomatic r i v a l r y 
began between France and B r i t a i n , Austr ia also (which a t tha t 
time had concluded peace with France) s t a r t ed supporting the Canal 
p ro jec t and promised diplomatic aid a t the Por te , Russia too 
joined France and Austr ia , 
68, Hoskin, H0.I, pp.^357-353,see also Wilson.No.H ,pp.23-24 
69. Kinross, No.3f p.132, see also Schonfield,No.4,p.81, 
Hoskin, Ho.l , P.357. 
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This Budden change in the French policy can probably be explained 
by the following facts t 
(a) French capi ta l was being invested in the Company; 
(b) She Bri t ish had proved their weakness through the i r 
fail^ae to stori the the Canal* s construction vriW.oh 
Lesseps started without getting the Ottomen approval^ and 
(c) The Russian and the Austrain Governments slso came for-
ward and started supporting the scheme through the i r 
diplomatic agents. 
Soon after Iteperor's interview Count Walewski requested 
Cowley for the relaxation of the Bri t ish opposition at Constan-
70 t inople. Russel, the F(a?eign Secretary of Britain, replied t 
Bter Majesty's (Jovernraent regret that they cannot yield 
i"tt this matter to the SQTeraaent of Prance . . . as 
the i r objections to th i s scheme remain unshaken . . . . . 
The opposition hi ther to given to the scheme by Eer 
Majesty's &*vernraent will not be relaxed. 
At th i s rebuff Walewski declared that i f Britain vrould not cease 
her opposition at Constantinople, the French would exert pressure 
on the Porte, since a large part of the Canal Coa?)any»8 capital 
71 
was French . 
The sudden shift in the French policy created a coinmotion. Now 
the Sultan's position became very c r i t i c a l . I t woe not pooDil:^ 
70. Cited in Marlowe, Ifo.Jf p.45 
71. Hoskin, lfo.1, pp.558-359, see also Kinross,ITo.5,pp. 134-1 #5. 
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I t Was not possible for Mm to continue iiis negative pol icy as 
both F ance and. Br i teda had become open antagonists of each other. 
France was demanding for r a t i f i c a t i o n of the Concession which 
B r i t a i n was opposing. On Januray 24,1860, Foreign Office warned 
the Porte t h a t Great B r i t a i n would rev ise i t s f r iendly pol icy 
tow€ird8 i t i n case work on the waterway i s continued, The main 
opposit ion of Br i t a in t o the en te rpr i se was due t o the fear tha t 
Prance would bee one the master of Egypt as well as the route ot 
IndiaJ^ 
Meanwhile Mohammad Said who had already consented to buy 
the unsubscribed shares of the C<aapa3^ but had l a t e r wavered in 
h i s decis ion, u l t imate ly accepted to buy them, Bulwar protested 
against Mohamnad S a i i ' s act and said t h a t hs had no l ega l author i ty 
to employ the Egyptian money for the Canal and demanded tha t he 
shoiad be deposed by the Por te . On August 23, I860 i n the House of 
Commons Mr. Danby Seymour pointed out t ha t the Pasha of Rgypt 
had enabled the Suez Canal Company t o be cons t i tu ted by talcing 
73 Up shares t o the aftount of 95 mi l l i on f rancs , Palmerston answeredi 
Company i s , as I have often said, one of the g rea te s t 
and most remarlcable at tempts a t delusion tha t had been 
prac t i sed i n modem t imes. I t i a a complete f a l l acy 
from beginning t o e M . 
72. Hoskin, No,1, p ,358,see also Kinross No.3, p.136. 
73 . Hansard, Parliamentary DebAtes, 3rd, s e r i e s , Tol.CLX 
p.1724. 
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"•egaxding the progress of thevork on the Cahal, he commentedi^ 
The progress of the work i n Egypt, however, has 
been such as to show t h a t , i f not impract icable , 
i t w i l l require an expenditure of money, time 
and labour qui te beyond the reach of any rp iva te 
company. 
The Sultaif now convinced tha t the pribject would be prof i tab le 
was ready to approve the p ro j ec t , but before i t s r a t i f i c a t i o n 
he wanted a j o in t agreement between maritime powers d i r e c t l y 
concerned with the Canal on three basic questions : 
1) The Canal would i n no way endanger or perjudiwe the 
Ottoman E&tpirei 
2) I t safelfuards the Emperor's r i g h t of soveriegni ty over 
Egypt, and arranges for the Cana l ' s defence; and 
5) I t guarantees against the effect on the Bnpire of any 
con^^lict brtireen the powers which might i n future , a r i se 
75 from the Canal . 
B r i t a in on the ground of i t s previous arguments refused t o 
give any guarantee on the p ro j ec t . According to the second act of 
concession and the agreement of Ju ly 20, 1856, the Viceroy was 
bound to supply the forced labour (Cor'vea) for the construct ion 
of the Canal, So on the demani of Lesseps,despi te Sultanas instructoi 
74. Ibid 
75. Kinross, No.5, p.HI,see also Wilson,No.11,p,25. 
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Mohanniad Said agreed t o supply the Corvee and ln£3 -sted tha t there 
must be nx) refereno* to I t i n press or at shareholders ' meetings. 
A f i r s t contingent of about 2500 men was suppl ied, which was l a t e r 
ra i sed to 12000 men. The employment of forced labo\ir did not reicain 
secre t and gave B r i t a i n a new ground for objection to the construc-
t i o n . In May 1862 i t was asser ted i n the House of Conmons tha t 
the s lavery of jimerica was not wac wot so bad as t h a t of the forced 
76 labour t h a t was being employed on the Canal. . I t was maintained 
t h a t the labourers were raad^ to serve without pay for long periods 
of time and tha t a huge number of them were being employed on the 
77 
Canal . In sp i te of a l l the c r i t i c i sms and objections,Pfohanmad 
Said,on the demand of the Company and Iiesseps, continued to supply 
the forced labour. I t appears t h a t the B r i t i s h Government had 
t a c i t l y a cepted the p r a c t i c a b i l i t y of the Canal and compromised 
with Lesseps arguments. However, i t decided to a t t ack the Canal 
p ro jec t i n a new way. I t s t a r t e d opposing the employii»nt of the 
forced labour. Perhaps the B r i t i s h gillveria&ent r ea l i zed tha t i f 
i t succeeded i n withdrawing the forced labour, work oft the Canal 
would u l t imate ly come t o s t a n d s t i l l , Lesseps a t l a s t succeeded 
i n his view tha t once work s t a r t e d every bftd^ would accept i t . 
Col, CLXYI, pp. 1821-1824. and Tol.CI.XX,pp, 
1723-1724. 
77. Hansard Parliamentary Pebates, 3rd, s e r i e s , Tol.OLXTIII, 
p . 148 and Vol.GLXIX,pp.577-578 and To.CLXX,p.1720j 
Vol.CI.XX*,p.1824 
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Towards the end of 1862, the British Ambassador at Constanti-
nople Bulwar visited Egypt with the object of seeing the progress 
of the work on the Canal, He was suprised to see the progress and 
sent a dispatch to Russel, his Foreign Secretary,that Port* Said, 
Timsah and Si^ p would become French towns. He further stated that 
the new lans called into cultivation would become French territory 
jd I 
79 
78 
and be governe by the French auti iori ty , Bulwar c l a r i f i ed to 
Mohammad Said: 
B r i t i s h (Joveracient had no wish e i t h e r t o govern in 
Egypt or t o have any exclusive or g rea t ly prepondera-
t i ng influence i n i t , , , we could never permit any 
other foreign power e i t h e r forcibl5^ or to possess 
i t s e l f of Egypt or i n d i r e c t l y to acquire a g rea t ly 
perponderating influence over i t . 
The sudden death of Mohammad Said on January 18,1863 and 
accession of his nephew lEBoaail proved a setback t o lesseps 
because Ismai l was an Anglophile, though he had assured, ' I am 
more a c a n a l i s t than %ns ieu r de Iieppeps, but I approach i t i n a 
' 80 pos i t ive s p i r i t . , Ismail Boon began to play dual r o l e . Soon 
a f t e r the accession, he sa id to the B r i t i s h Ambassador tha t the 
system of the Corvee would d e f i n i t e l y be abolished throughout 
the Country, To the French Ambassador he said t h a t the abo l i t ion 
of Corvee would be inappl icable t o the Isthmus, He wanted t o 
please everyone in t h i s way. 
78. Marlowe, No.3,_p. 174. 
79. British and Foreign State Papers. Vol.56,1862,p.564 
80, Kinross,Ho.3,p,162, see also Schonfield,No.4,p.39. 
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Soon Isnail w«Bt to Censtantinoplo for his ixnrestltiare. 
At Constantinopla lie discussed th« Canal question with the British 
the 
and/l^eneh iBhassadors. fo the British inl^assador he said, 
*Cex*taialy the Sues Canal i s a great misfortune for Egypt and 
t 
for sQTself^  • He Aarther said, * I am not strong enough to 
stand alone against l!rance • To the liranch isihassadir he said, 
* I am persuaded that France alone has a policy entirely sympathetic 
to Egypt. X shall devote a l l my energies to the realisation of 
the work of the Canal^ , After his retsm from Constantinople , 
Ismail signed two eosTention* with the Sues Canal Company. According 
to the Urst conrcntion he agreed that the Egyptian OoTemment would 
construct the sweet water eanal from BaS'-el-Wadi to Cairo along the 
gjlfmg the Canal. Hy the second convention Ismail agreed to Mohasmad 
Said*s obligation of share holding and i t s payment in instalments. 
These two conventions had had two important hearings. Firstly, i t 
regulatised the status of the Sues Canal Company. Secondly, i t 
made Ismail the single largest shareholder. ^ had 44 percent 
shares . 
The British diplomatic circles adapted a new line of actiooi, 
after the ccmyentions were signed ly Ismail. In *'uly,1363, the Porte, 
81. Kinross, Ho.3t ^ .t63. 
82. Ihid. 
83. Ihid, p. 164. 
84. British and Foreign State gkpiiy«i, Yol. 5 4 ,1863,p.981. 
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at the inst igation of the Foreign Office ,addr6Bsed a note to the 
7ioerQ7 that he was no longer to permit forced labour on the Canal 
irnda? any eircumstances. The lands a l imated to the Company ty 
Said were to be reporchased XfS" Ismail and distributed among 
Egyptian subjects* I t also said that the Canal, i f completed 
would be used only tuy merchants resse l s and not lny warships. In 
case the eoitpai^ did not accept these conditions i t was to be dissolved 
85 
and i t s shareholders eompmisated lor the Egyptian Goyemment •^, 
Lesseps protested against these conditions and said that i t 
would mean a denial of the Company *s r ights and would amottnt to the 
termination of the Canal Company. Ismail threatened Lesseps that 
i f he did not accept the proposal he would withdraw a l l the labour 
from the Isthmus. Lesseps decided that without having a pressure 
a t Constantinople, he could not go ahead. He wrote to the Empress 
for an audience with the Steperor. The opportunity arrived on 
Januaiy 9> 1864. In an audience with the Biaperor he explained 
the probloDs and requested for his intervention a t Constantinople. 
The Emperor agreed to take action and immediately instructed his 
foreign Minister Srouyn de Lhiqrs to take the matter of the Canal 
in hand. Sinally in March an Imperial Arbitration Commission 
(I^ench) was formed and Thouv«ival ims appointed as i t s Bresident. 
On June 19» 1864, the Commission submitted i t s recommendation to 
Drouyn de Lhuys. Once again the conversation between the Emperor 
85. Hbskin, No.1, p.361. 
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and Lesseps had proved f m i t f u l . Empress Eugene again at t h i s 
canal 35 
momeirt acted as • guardian angel* of the Suez/Company . 
The recommendations of the Arh i t ra t ion Commission na tu ra l ly 
were not accepted hy Br i t a in , B r i t a i n as a counter measure proposed 
for a mixed Commission, Both the Yioeroy of Egypt and the Company 
accepted t e Arb i t ra l Award given "by the French Commission, After 
t h i s the Porte proposed the d ra f t ing of a convention to he agreed 
between viceroy and the Company in terms of the award, as a basis 
for the grant ing of the Su l t an ' s Firman, Here another trouble arose 
because Huber Pasha, the Foreign Minister of Egypt,at the instance 
of B r i t a i n adopted a l ine against the Canal, Lesseps drafted a 
convention on the l ine of the Arb i t r a l Award, vihloh the viceroy 
r e j ec t ed , Huber Pasha draf ted an e n t i r e l y d i f fe ren t convention 
and i n favour of the a ^ i t i s h government, which Lesseps refued to 
a-cept . The dispute took a year and f i n a l l y on Pebruray 22,1866 
with the approval of both France and Br i t a in , a f i n a l convention 
was signed between the Viceroy and the Cpmpany, by which a l l out-
standing questions p a r t i c u l a r l y with regard to the compensation and 
t e r r i t o r i a l r i g h t s were s e t t l e d , F i n a l l y on March 19,1866,Sultan 
issued h i s Firman ' . After the issuance of the in^jerial Firman,i l the 
86, Marlowe, ]To,3, pp, 192-209,see a lso Hoskin,No.1 ,pp.361,362. 
87. Marlowe,No.3,pp.218-229,see also Beaty,lTo,20,p.246. 
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p o l i t i c a l complications against the Canal were cleared and work 
coirtinued t i l l the completion of the Canal. 
^» Completion of the Canal and I t s Inauguration : The cons-
t r a c t i o n work, vdiich s t r a t e d i n April 1859,continued i n spi te of 
p o l i t i c a l and economic c r i s i s but never wholly stopped. Three 
main s tages had to be covered during the conatructioii : 
(a) Cutt ing through the Shallufa Ridge between the Suess 
and the B i t t e r Lakes and f i l l i n g the B i t t e r lakes with 
the water from the Red Sea; 
(b) Digging a navigable canal through Lake Jfenssala and the 
Crisr ridge t o Lake Timsah and f i l l i n g Lake Timsah with 
the water from the Mediterranean; axiA f i n a l l y 
(c) 3oiiiiJ3g lake Timsah and the B i t t e r Lakes by cu t t ing 
go 
through the Serapeum ridge. 
At the outset, there were two essential requisites for the 
construction of the Maritime Canal itself. The first requisite 
was a port at the Mediterranean terminal of the maritime Canal in 
order to secure a base for the operation and a landing place for 
the supply of the material. 
Secondly the provision of a regular and copious supply of 
fresh water in the Isthmus by digging a canal from the Nile valley 
to the Isthmus, 
88. Marlowe, No.3, p.165. 
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While the building of an artificial port V7as the most 
difficult task as there was no natural inlet, the digging of a 
Xresh water canal was the easiest matter. The conctruction 
work started on two froats siiaultaneously/ (a) the digging of 
the sweet water canal from the end of the Zaga Zig Canal at 
the head of the Wadi 5?umilat to Lake Tims ah and thence south-
wards to Sue2$ and 
(h) the construction of ^northern terminal port and digging 
Vr\e 
of a serTice canal upto Lake Timsah, to enable^sear-borne supplied 
39 for work on the southern half of the Canal , 
The construction of sweet water oanal was quite easy 
and w ^ mostly completed by means of Corvee (forced labour). It 
was completed from Ras-el-wadi to Lake Timsah^ in February 1862, 
and frcan Lake Timsah to Sue a in December 1863. Uhe extension 
of the sweet water oanal to port Said was completed before the 
90 
opening of the Maritime Canal in 1869 • 
During the preparatory stage the work was more or less 
oonfined to the northern part of the Isthmus, 2fhe first 
structure at Port Said was temporary, being gradually replaced 
by more permanent work as the project advanced, ly the end 
of 1863 the harbour of Port Said was in a good working order. 
89. KLvin, No,2, pp.306-.307 
90. Marlowe, No.3, p.166 
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The abo l i t i on of tlae forced labour 1:^  Ismail Pasha proved a b l e s s i 
t o the Conqpany. Modern engineering methods were adopted and 
mechanical appliances were i n s t a l l e d a l l along the Isthmus. After 
Efflperor Nepoleon's Arb i t ra t ion , every where work was pTished 
r ap id ly and proceeded smoothly a t high pressure towards i t s f i na l 
s t a g e . On March 18, 1869 i n the presence of Eliedive, Ismai l , the 
Prince and Princess of Wales, and a b r i l l i a n t company of Egyptian 
notables and foreign v i s i t o r s , the waters of the Mediterranean 
were l e t i n t o the B i t t e r Lake. F ina l ly on August 15,1869,truly a 
memorable d a t e , the waters of the Red Sea met and mingled with the 
waters of the Mediterranean Sea. When the canal was completed, 
i t had a length of 100 miles and varied i n width between 150 feet 
and 350 fee t a t the surface. I t had a depth of 26 feet and a 
91 
width at the bottom of 72 feet"^ . 
fhe Suez Canal was opened on Ifoveml»r 17,1869 and the 
meeting of the two seas was celebrated with extravagant pro-
gramme of inaugural ceremonies. Inv i t a t ions were issued M 
on most generous scale by the Khedive and i n addit ion thousands 
of v i s i t o r s poured i n from a l l p a r t s of the world t o witness 
the mmaentous ce l eb ra t i ons . Khedive Ismail Pasha acted as 
host a t a grantL recept ion . Among the d is t inguished guests were 
Empress Eugene of Fj.ance, the Emperor of Austr ia , the 
91 . Siegfried, Ho.9,p.74. see also Wilson,No.11, pp.32-35, 
Hoskin No.1, pp.365-368. 
f. 
the Crown Prinoe of Prussia, tho Crovm Prinor: cf Ifcjtherlands, 
Prince ffllliam of Sesse and ntxnj other jiotableo axwi national 
92 
representatiPBD^ , 
Oa November 17, 1369* the ^ocess ion headed by the French B 
Imperial la tch Aigle, with delighted Scapress Soginie on board 
le f t Port Said and entered the Canal at eight >• oloolc in 
the morning. At 4 p*in. the ships were anchored in Lake ITiiiBsah, 
oppoaitd Isnai l ia t inhere the Zledive offred his guests a 
sumptuous feast . On Hovember 19, the journey was resumed 
between Lake Timsah and the Bit ter Lalee. Finally on November 20, 
the 
1869 at half past eleven in the morning/(Emperlal Aigle entered 
93 the Red Sea . 
9?. Wilson, Ifo.11, p.39| see also Selgfried,IIo.9»p.T5. 
95. Blvln, No.2, pp.304-310. 
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BRITISH POIiICIBS im fSB OCCUPATION OF BGXPf 
I . The Impag-fe of the Suez Canal on the Cape Route afld the 
B r i t i s h Pftlicy a f t e r the Opening of the Canal t 
fhe B r i t i s h doverxsosnt, wftilch has been opposing the construc-
t i o n of the Suea Canal ftom the very beginning, had t o change i t s 
a t t i t u d e and p o l i c i e s a f t e r i t s opening. I t r ea l i zed tha t the 
Canal had changed the geopo l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n between Western 
Europe and the Indian Ooean and Paci f ic l i t t o r a l count r ies t o 
such an extent t h a t i f i t continued i t s old p o l i c i e s not only i t s 
t rade vriLth the East but a l so i t s p o l i t i c a l and s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s 
would have been jeopardised. She Br i t i sh na t ion known as a rea l i s -
t i c one did not delay i n recognising the new r e a l i t i e s and 
adjust i t s p o l i c i e s accordingly, Ihe opening of the Suez Canal 
on Noirember 17» 1869, ushered i n an e ra of considerable geo-
p o l i t i c a l displacement , Being the shor tes t water route between 
the East and the West, i t brought about a revolu t ion in mari-
tiioe comaerce and p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the s t r a t e g i c concepts of 
2 peace and war , I t s s t r a t e g i c an! commercial p o t e n t i a l l -
t i e s led t o b i t t e r r i v a l r i e s among the maritime powers 
1. JUnadi Maity, The Problems of the Suez C a n ^ . (Calcutta 
1956), p.1 . 
2 . H.L.HoBlJln 'The Suez Canal as an In t e rna t iona l Waterway', 
American Jourbal of In t e rna t iona l Law, Vol.37, p.375. 
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from time to time. It may be said that the opening of the Suez 
d 
Canal was;|dividing lln® Tjctween the medieval and the modern times 
of the area east of Suez. 
After the opening of the Suez Canal, the British attitude 
tovrards the Canal had radically changed. Instead of oppsing it 
Britain became yery much interested in the Canal as a camoerical 
and strategic route^, The Foreign Secretary Clarendon wrote to 
4. 
Lessepet 
She successful opening of the Suez Canal has been 
received vTith great and universal sa t isfact ion. In 
haTii% the honour to congratulate you, as well as 
the ?^ en<3h nation ani 0oTemment, which hare talcen 
such a profoxuJd and constant in teres t in y«ur work, 
I know that I fa i thful ly represent the sentiments of 
my fellows c i t i zens . Notwithstanding the obstacles 
of a l l kinds against itoldb. you have had to struggle, 
a b r i l l i an t success has f inal ly recompensed your 
indomitable preserverance. I t affords me sincere 
pleasure to be the organ of transmitting to you the 
fe l ic i ta t ions for Her Majesty* s Ooveraaent oh the 
establishment of a aaw means of ooimsanioation between the 
East and the West, and en the po l i t i c a l £ind commercial 
advantages wUch we may confidently expect wil l remilt 
from your effdrte 
Before the opening of the Suez Canal, Great Br i ta in ' s 
principal fiiim was to prevent France for obtaining a predomJLnant 
influence in Egypt, as such influence was considered a po l i t i ca l 
threat to Br i ta in ' s Indian possession. The opening of 
3, Gteorge lenczowskl. ghe Middle Bast in the World I f fa i r s . 
(Hew York, 1962), p.612. 
4. H,J.- Sohonfield, ghe Suez Canal in the World i^fairs. 
(Hew York, 1953), p.44. 
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the Sues? Canal can be marked as a» eTldenoe of the beginning 
of a more actiTe and positiTB Interes t In Egypt by Bri tain. By 
1869 the Ottoiaan inflneaoe had deoliaed and, was nominal, vdiile the 
French influence in Egypt had correspondingly increased, ftreat 
Br i ta in ' s t rad i t iona l policy of neutralizing Egypt, by inducing the 
powers to regard i t as an in tegra l part of the Ottoman Snpire had 
consequently become more diff icul t to pursue at a time when the 
opening of the Suez Canal route to India had made i t more v i t a l 
5 than ever for Great Bri tain • 
She consummation of the Sues Canal Scheme brought to an end 
a long Gontroversey marked by the efforts of the Bri t ish Givern-
ment to obstruct a pro^eot which was considered to be damaging 
to her near monopoly of iea access to Esurb Afrioa, the Indian 
Ooean and the ?ar East via the Oape of &ood Hope, Until 1369 
the protection of Bri t ish in te res t s in the Bast had required 
only the maintenance of naval supremacy among the European 
s ta tes and close surveillance of Eastern Mediterranean from 
Malta and Constantinople, Tim successf*a opening of the 
Suez Canal ins tant ly changed the above strategy of the 
Bri t ish Government, as i t provided an extension of that 
strategy to the shores of the Mediterranean with a similar 
5. John Marlowe, Anglo-Sforptian Relations 180(V1953« ilson&on, 
1954), p.365. 
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projection of the problemB of the Mediterra33»an to the Indian 
Ocean , As a reso l t , i t teought ahout a change in the basic 
foreign policy of areat Bri tain as well as of other laropean s ta tes 
having maritime in t e re s t s . 
Ihe event of the opening of the 3aes Oanal was not less 
important then the event of the discovery of the Cape route. I t 
again revived the s t ra tegic importance of the Mediterranean Sea 
which had declined after the discovery of the Cape route. The Medi-
terranean Sea had now become the main focus of strategy for 
Britain and other Biropean s t a t e s . The s t ra tegic significance 
of Suez was realised by every s t a t e . Por the l a s t many hundred 
yeaufs EuropeBUI powers except Britain, wer? trying to open a 
route through Egypt. When the Mediterranean s ta tes of Tenice 
and Genoa had los t the i r large and organised trade with the 
Bast after the opening of the Cape route a t the beginning of the 
sixteenth century, i t were the Tent&tiana who had suggested 
the cutting of the IsthKUS to construct navigable oanal, in order 
to restore the i r t rade . Bat now the si tuation had been changed. The 
new way to the East was however no longer useful to the ertswhile 
Mediterranean oeonmercial centres as Tenioe and Genoa because they 
had ceased to be important. When the Canal route was opened, other 
powers both in the Mediterranean (including Black Sea) and on 
6. H.i.Hoslcin| 'The Suez Canal as an International Waterway' 
American Joiirnal of Inte i^at ienal Law. (Hew Tork, 1943), 
Vol. 75, p.373 
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the Atlantic seaboard were the dominating powers in Europe. 
The main ctosequences of the opening of the Suez Canal can 
he summarized In the following three points i 
1) It significantly reduced the importance of the Cape 
route from the commercial point of view, ly reducing 
the distance, time and cost of the passage between 
Europe and the East. 
2) It increased, though did not create the strategic and 
geo-political importance of the Mediterranean, the 
Indian Ocean and especially of Egypt* It altered the 
political geography of nearly half of the globe and 
thus affected not only the trade and industry of many 
countries, but also their problems of peace and 
security, giving a new direction to some of their 
foreign policies and attitudes. 
3) It served as a gateway for the exploitation of raw 
materials from the East, which caused a profound impact 
on the social and economic developments of the Western 
7 
countries, their colonies and dependencies. 
7. H.L. Hoskln, 'The Guardianship of the Suez Canal : A view 
of the Anglo-Egyptian Relations' t Geographical Review. 
(New York), Vol.4, Fo.2 (April 1950), p.lU. 
8 « . j 
As the leading coianerclal s t a t e of the nineteenth century 
with well-developed i n t e r e s t s i n Asia and Africa, Br i t a in adopted 
a new l ine of ac t ion . As far as the B r i t i s h fear regarding 
the Canal was concerned, i t was no longer regarding the danger 
of the separa t ion of Bgypt from the Ottoman Bbi i r e or the e s t a -
blishment of a large French colony along the route to India . 
B r i t a i n now s t a r t e d showing i t s des i re of neu t r a l i z ing the 
passage through the canal by some i n t e r n a t i o n a l arrangenents 
through a t r e a t y among maritime powers i n t e r e s t ed i n i t to 
9 
cover emergency, taxes and other i s sues . Neither the 
character of the concession nor the imperial Firman had 
c l e a r l y defined the l ega l aspects of the new watervyay. All 
t h a t was declared was t h a t the canal would be neu t ra l and 
f ree ly open to commercial vessels paying t o l l s , while the 
company s t a t u t e s decalred t h a t i t would be open to the ships of 
a l l na t ions , including ships of war, both i n time of peace and 
war. Therefwas,however, no guarantee t ha t these regula t ions 
would be observed as i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. The question of the 
n e u t r a l i t y of the Canal ws^ f i r s t t e s t ed during the Franco-
German War ^1870-71) which followed im mediately the opening 
of the \faterway. The waj/vessels of both the b e l l i g e r e n t s 
were permitted to pass i n t r a n s i t . Thus, i n t h i s way,without 
8 . H.L.Hoskin, The Stxess Canal i n the Time of War', Foreign 
Affairs, (New York,1935), V.l5,p.94 
9. H.L.Hoslcin, British routes to India. (London 1966) 
p.371, see also Hoskin No.7, p.H4. 
8^ 
•f 
a formal agreement on this point, the principle that the Canal 
was open to ships of war, in the time of war as r^ell as in peace, 
was indirectly accepted as an established principle though not in 
10 
the form of an international treaty , 
During the construction of the Canal Lesseps himself had 
called attention in 1856 to the desirability of reaching an 
international understanding with reference to the use and 
11 protection of the Canal . Bit such a request had been turned 
down by the British Grovernment. In the same way in 1860, the 
Ottnman Empire^expressed Its will regarding the protection 
and defence of the Canal and its right of sovereignity in 
12 
Egypt . This demand was also turned down by the British 
Government. How Britain was seeking the neutrality and pro-
tection of the canal by an international arrangement, as it was 
a »jugular vein* or vital artery of the British Empire. It became 
a major feature of the British policy to acquire and maintain 
external control of the route. The first international step 
regarding the defence and neutrality of the Suez Canal was 
adopted at the Toniage Conference held at Constantinople in 1373 
which recognised the right of warship passage and transport 
10. Hoskln, Ho.8, pp. 94-95 
11. Hoskin, No.5, p.574-
1?., See in Chapter II on page , 
8. u 
of the belligeraats to use the Canal aiid thus admitted in 
principle that its navigation was under the protection of 
15 
all Europe -^. 
The opening of the Suez Canal hcLd v i r t u a l l y k i l l ed the 
Gape route and subs t i tu ted i t with the Canal route as the 
14 p r inc ipa l channel of t rade between Europe and the East , in 
f ac t before the opening of the Suez; Canalf the overland route 
through Egypt had never beccane a ^ j o r route of t rade between 
the East and the West owing to the physical and economic 
d i f f i c u l t i e s . In thoc^ days s a i l i n g vesse ls found the Red Sea 
too d i f f i c u l t for navigat ion. Even the coming of the steamship 
made no vast difference because of the d i f f i c u l t i e s and expenses 
connected with the t r anspor t a t i on of goods across Egypt under 
the handicaps presented by the bands of deser t invaders , slow 
and ine f f i c i en t caravans, the type of an o r i en t a l government, 
and a t r o p i c a l c l imate . I t was s t rongly arguedi in the House of 
Comjione, and for a time i t was Mdely believed , that an Egyptian 
railway across the Isthmus would revolut ionize t h i s route and 
t h a t quick t r a n s i t and low f re igh t r a t e s would r e s u l t i n turning 
the grea t s t rean of the eas te rn t r ade t o the Red Sea r o u t e , This 
b e l i e f too was proved l a t e r t o be u n r e a l i s t i c because bulky 
13. I^Iaity, No.l, P .5 ; see a l so , Hoskin, No.8,p, 95 
H . Marlowe, No,5, p.70 
8u 
articles could not endure two transhipments en route even 
though the distance would have been nearly halved. '^  The efforts 
of Waghom clearly showed that the overland route was cjuicker only 
for passengers snd mail service than the Cape Route, With all of 
its advantages, therefore, the overland route could not compete 
with the Cape route as a commercial artery and was thus unable 
to challenge the Cape route for heavy mercliandise. 
The opening of the Suez Canal created an entirely new 
situation. The English overland route soon vanished. Its place 
was taken by an all water route, possessiiig all the ^ idvantages 
of uninterinjpted voyage plus a great saving in time, distance 
and expense. Instead of following the rail^ /ay from Alexandria 
through Cairo to Suez, it now continued via Port Said and entered 
the Red Sea via Port Suez, Delays in passing through the Canal 
and high tolls did not neutralize the advantages of the new 
route '. 
It was foimd that over the course of the first few years 
practically 7^ percent of the vessels passing through the Canal 
were British • From -^.he beginning the Canal was a 
15. Hoskin, No,9, pp. H68-U69 
16. Marlowe, No.5i P»70, see also Hoskin No.9, p,^^9 
17. Hoskin, No,9, p.1*69 and 372, see also London Times 
28th January, I870. 
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B r i t i s h Hi^way t h o u ^ i t liad "been constructed and was being 
18 
operated by a corporat ion iidU.ch was e s s e n t i a l l y french , 
n . Finanoial d i f f i c u l t i e a of the Suez Oanal Qomoam and 
P o l i t i c a l IiaplicationB i 
SPhe opening of the Suez Canal i n 1869 was unique achieveiaent 
fr<an engineering point of flew. I t s r e a l importance was,however, 
economic as i t was a d i r e c t s e a - l e r e l commer i a l a r t e r y between 
19 the East and the West , But i t s econcanic iiiiportanoe, for a few 
j ^ a r s a f t e r i t s opening, p r o ^ d to be contrary t o \Mhat was expected 
by lessepB. He had hoped tha t as soon as the Canal v/as completed, 
20 
a golden t o r r en t of p r o f i t s would pour i n t o coffers of tlie Ccxnpany 
I h i s expectat ion did not come t r u e , and, on the other hand, the 
lack of navigat ion through the canal resu l ted i n f inanc ia l t rouble 
for the Ccmpany. There were two main f ac to r s which had important 
bearing on the f inanc ia l c r i s i s of the Company t 
i ) The Btoopean t r a d e r s a t the beginning did not r e a l i s e the 
advantages of the new Canal, The s t a t i s t i c s of those days showed 
13. Hoskin, Ho.9, p .372 | see a lso Appendix D for the trade 
of various countr ies through the Suez Canal during 
1870-1914. 
19. Hoskin, lfo.7, p . U 3 . ^^^ 
20. W,?. Iionggood, Sugg Story i Key toxMiddle East . 
(Hew York, 1957;, p.» 59. 
86 
that tha numberx ships passing through the Canal was below 
the average, which resulted in the to t a l revenue being below 
the economic level j 
i i ) The cost of the construction was proved to be more than 
21 double of the original estimates • 
Sua to these reasons the Suess Canal Company in 1870-71 
plunged into an acute financial t rouble. In Janiiaxy 1370 
after the f i r s t year of operation, the Company had failed to 
pay even the minimum five percent dividends to the shareholders* 
The Canal shares which had the original value of 500 francs 
plunged to 272 francs in 1870 and 208 in 1871 ^^. 
To meet the defici t and to survive the financial c r i s i s , 
the Company in 1870 offered another bond issue of 20 million 
francs with the consent of the Khedive, and imposed a temporary 
surtax of one trend a ton. Public confidence had fallen so low 
that there was at f i r s t l i t t l e response to the loan. Only 
five million francs could be ra ised. However, in early 1872 
twelve million francs were subscribed. This was enough to save 
2^5 the Company from immediate disaster -^ * 
financial c r i s i s of the Company, together vriLth the defeat 
of jftrance in ltanco-<Jerman War of 1870-711 had brought into 
21, Iiord Kinross, Between Two Seasi The Creation of the Si^ i^^  ^Mlftl r 
(london 1868}, p . 257. 
22. A.T.Wilson, Tftg Sueg Ca d 1933}, p.4-4| see also Longgood,No. 20, P.60. ( Oxfor 
25, Kinross, No.21, pp. 257-260| see also longgood. No.20, P.6lj 
Wilson, No.22, p.44. 
8, 
and 
open a nawXslgaifleant polltloal elomt in the affairs of the 
Suez Canal. The change of regime In firrance brought a change In 
the official attltlide of the Erenoh Gov-eminent towards the Canal. 
Being a defeated state its image and political influwice in Europe 
and in West Asia had shattered. Britain profited from this situa-
tion. It determined to convert the Sues Canal into a British 
imperial assett and the task was easier as Irance was no longer 
a powerful state. 
So serious was the financial condition of the Company 
that the Khedire proposed to all it. In his opinion, of all 
the countries only Britain could keep the Canal open. In this 
ccmnection he told the British Agent that he would gladly see 
that Canal to he the property of en English Company, and that in the 
event of such a Company heing formed he would do every thing 
in his power to facilitate the transfer into its hands* In 
April 1871, this proposal reached the British Foreign Secretary 
&ranville even from the people within Lesseps' own camp. But this 
the British Government, l^ eadad ly Gladstone was not, interested. 
There were different opinions in the House of lords. On J^ j^ e 5, 1874 
a memhar Lord Bunsaay, however, pleaded that there could not 
he a more favourahle moment than that one 
24. Kinross, No,21, P.260 
25. Ihid , P.2«4 
26. Marlowe, Ho.5» p.73. 
Bu 
fo r buying up the peouniairy r i g h t s of the Company, and he did 
not suppose t h a t there were any other r i g h t s vs^(di would hare 
t o he s e t t l e d . She serious p o l i t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s which exis ted 
when France claiiaed prep onde rent influence i n Egypt and 
opposed the influence of Br i t a in did not e x i s t , Ife pleaded tha t 
those obs tac les , or s imi la r d i f f i c i a t i e s might spring up i f 
27 B r i t a i n missed the opportunity , Lord Bdward Stanley, a 
member of the Conservative pa r ty was not i n favour of purchasing 
the Canal. In t h i s connection he observed »It i s use less t o 
28 t a l k of buying a property which i s not i n the market . On 
the other band, lord Houghton sa id , ' I t was a very unsat i s fac tory 
thing tha t a work of so important a charac ter as Suez Canal 
should remain permanently in the hands of an almost insolvent 
29 
con5)any , He believed t h a t the Canap proper ty hsd been i n the 
30 
market and t h a t i t was s t i l l i n the market . He fur ther 
31 
conlcudedi 
I t i s extremely dangerous t o leave the Canal i n the 
hands of a p r iva te Caaoany • • • • Some arrangement 
might be made between the country and the Porte by which 
the 23iedive might acquire absolute possession of i t . 
27. Hansarj ,Parliamentary Debatee. Vol.CCXIX, 3rd, Bet ies , 
5.1053 and 1874. 
28. Ib id , P. 1052 
29. Ib id . 
59, Ibid 
51 . Ib id . 
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' " " ^ ^ ^ ' ^ " - P S lU„.eIt Offered . 
* - l - Million pounds a t e ^ ^ ' " " " ^ ' ° ' ' ' * ' ^ ^ -
francs anually tor 50 yeare J 1 ' ' " ^ " * " ' ^° " ^ " ^ -
"«J.a be ensured. Fln^n^ *u 
referred to the SuWi» p „ ^ , , ^ ^ ^ ^ ' ^ ^ *>>« - « e r .^a 
. e o I a « a that . t eouXd not ^ ^ [ ^ Z 7 ^ ' " " 
0 . the OanaX or the oroat.on o. I Z l T " " ' " ' " ^ ^ " ^ 
t lon on I t e own t e m t o r l e a OnTh r " ^ ' ^ ' ^ ^ ^ * -
only the concession of the undertaking, could ne . 
r ight of raising , u e s t l o » of such a t t *'^ 
« or such a nature. The Canal 
company, I t said. „as an ^ y p t l a n Oo^any. and therefore suh.ect 
to the 0.™ and custon,s of the Turkish E ^ i r e " . , ^ s u b l l ^ 
Porte* s statement fa i r ly sett led +>.o «. +4. 
axxxjr Bezziea the matter at the time and 
tb3 idef wae gradually dropped. 
panwhile. in order to save i t s e l f from the financial cr is is 
^ 1 ^ ^panjr took a new decision which created a new diff icul ty. 
Oa^°li 4, 1872, the Oon j^any announced that in futurext'olls 
^d be collected in terms of the gross and not in terms of net 
-a^e Of the shlps^^ ,j,e ^ , ^ , ^ ^ ^^^^^^^ ^ ^^^^^^^ ^^ 
32. Wilson, Ho.22, p.45 
33. Schonfleld, Ho.4, p.46 
34. Kinross, lfo.21, P.258. 
9< 
some 30 percent above the previous r a t e . As a r e s u l t irit a 
storm of opposit ion rose i n England against the Company's 
new po l icy . The controversy took on a p o l i t i c a l complexion . 
(on J^ne 24, 1872, t l ^ Under Secretary of State for Foreign 
iincrcdSE 
Affairs s ta ted i n the House of Commons t h a t the proposed/^of 
the dues levied by the Suez Canal Company was contra^^r t o 
the Sp i r i t of the concession under which the Company was 
35 
es tabl ished add t o the i n t e r e s t of the a c i t i s h ship owners . 
He fur ther argued t h a t out of 100 ships passing through the 
Canal 75 car r ied the B r i t i s h f l ag . The Turkish Government 
a t the i n s t i g a t i o n of B r i t a i n a lso o f f i c i a l l y protes ted 
against the new r a t e s and admitted tha t the change in the mode of 
37 levying dues was i l l e g a l , B r i t a i n p ro tes ted on the ground 
t h a t a r t i c l e 17 sec t ion 5 of the 1856 concession permitted 
38 
a maximum t a x of t e n francs a ton for vesse l s and not more , 
So i t was argued i n the l i g h t of t ha t clause^ the Con5)any had 
no r i g h t t o increase the dues . I t was also said tha t the increase 
of t o l l would affect ma te r i a l l y the i n t e r e s t s of the merc)4antile 
com^iunity of the country •^ , The B r i t i s h opposit ion to the 
increase of t o l l ^ was l e g a l l y co r rec t . But a t the same time 
i t Was character ized by the B r i t i s h prejudice against the 
55. Hansard Parliamentary Debates^ Vol. CCXII,3rd. s e r i e s 
p .101 , 1872 
36. Ib id . 
37. Hansard Parliamentary Debate. Tol.CCXVjSrd, s e r i e s , 
pp. 464, 1873 
38. J.C.Hurewitzi Diplomacy i n the Near and Middle Be^t: 
a documentary Record 1335 -1914 (Hew York. 1956 J 
39. Hansard Parliamentary Debates, 3rd, Ed, s e r i e s , 
Vo.GCXV, pp.455, 1873. 
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Canal sohone whlela mts imdar a fronoli Conseseionalre. The 
opposition might baya had two aims t 
(a) to interfere with the administration of the Company 
and to check Sroich influence over it; and 
(h) to intejnationalizet the administration of the 
Company, so that it could be taken out from pre-
dominantly Irench Control. 
The matter was finally referred to an International 
Commissicm consisting of representatives of the twelve European 
states selected Isr PArte. The meetings of this Commission 
were held at Ccmstantinople during the last three months of 1373 • 
T h ^ examined the dispute on three scores t 
a) to establish a uniform standard of Tonnage; 
b) the course to be pursued as regards to a change of dues; 
4-0 
c) the question odT dues to be levied in future . 
The Commission issued i t s report in DBcmber and declared 
that the Bri t i sh system known as Hoorsom System for determining 
the net tonnage ivas the best and should be adopted by the Company. 
In view of the financial position of the company, the Commission 
authorised i t to recoup i t s e l f "by adding a surtax for four 
francs and in certain cases of three francs per ton. 
40. Ib id , P. 464 
9 ' i 
This sur tax would be gradual ly diminished as the t r a f f i c 
increased and woijdd "be abolished i n the year when the net 
tomage reached 2,600,000. , The recommenations of the 
Commission were supported by a l l the powers except Prance, 
Lesseps, however, protes ted against i t and aJinounced tha t 
the Porte would be responsible for a l l losses incurred from 
42 the app l ica t ion of t l i i s ru l ing . In p ro tes t he telegraphed 
t o the Porte ' t he powers have no r i gh t to i n t e r f e re in our 
43 
a f f a i r s when vie s t r i c t l y observe the termn of our cont rac t ' . 
In r ep ly the Porte ins t ruc ted the IQiedive for an armed i n t e r -
vent ion i f the Company's opposit ion p e r s i s t e d . The Khadive 
inmediately sent an Egjrptian army comiianded by an English 
o f f i ce r , v/ho occupied c e r t a i n s t r a t e g i c poivits of the Canal. 
In view of these moves Lesseps, on the a ivice of the French 
Government, accepted the ru l ing of the Commission and agreed 
44 to continue operating the canal . 
Thus such inc idents brought t o l i g h t the pecu l i a r 
charac te r i s t i c^ of t h i s en te rp r i se within l ess than five 
4 1 . Kinross, No. 21,p.258; see also-Schonfield,No.4,P.45 
Wilson Ho.22, pP-61-62; and H^skin, No.9,p.455. 
42. Hbskin, No.9, p.455 
43 . Wilson, No.22, p.62 
44. Kinross,No.21,P.259, see a l so Wilson,No.22,piD.62-63, 
Hoskin No.9, p.456, B r i t i s h and Foreign State 
Papers. Vol.67, 1875-1876 and pp.602.603. 
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years of its inauguration. It was realized that it could not 
be adzainistered privately like any other company because it 
affected interests - coiiimerclal, political and international -
which were more important than the right of its shareholders ''. 
The controversy produced a general agreement among the powers 
that while the Canal was an artificial channel} it was essentially 
a narrow strait between two bodies of an open sea and as such 
was a matter of international concern. 
11^* Acquisition of the Khedive's shareholdings bv the 
After the opening of the Suez Canal, Britain tried to ensure 
a sort of political ascendency in the affairs of the Suez Canal. 
Being the shortest sea route between the Bast and the West 
it was necessary for Britain to guard the canal so that no 
other power could use it against it. Britain needed to ensure 
the sec\arity which the 'sick man of Europe* could no longer 
provide. It was believed that Inevitably Egypt would come 
to replace Turkey as a focal point in Britain's Ittddle East 
policy. ^ It was vital for Britain to ensure that no power 
h^, Andre Siegfried, Suez and Panama^(Trans H.H. and Doris Hemming), 
p. 123. 
U6. Hoskin, No. 9, pp. h^7^^B. 
if7. Kinross, No. 21, pp. 71*-72. 
9b 
should be i n a pos i t i on to close the Ceuial to her sh ips . The 
French were i n a pos i t ion to do so , as the Canal was administered 
e n t i r e l y "by them, Therefore, i t was necessary t o counterbalance 
t h e i r influence i n the Company's adminis t ra t ion by any of the 
following means : 
1) The French influence i n Egypt was to be counterbalanced 
by equal B r i t i s h influence or 
2) The "Erenoh inf luence was to be 8Upplan:^d by the Br i t i sh 
inflisie;ic«, or 
5) The French influence was to be replaced by d i r ec t 
43 i n t e rna t i ona l con t ro l , 
The Suez Canal presented a s i t u a t i o n which becajne impossible 
for B r i t a i n t o leave Egypt a lone. Previously i t had been possible 
for B r i t a i n t o neu t r a l i ze Egypt by keeping foreign powers out . 
But now a foreign power (Frcince) was there i n a s t ronger pos i t ion . 
I s m a i l ' s indebtedness became an excuse r a t h e r than a reason 
for the i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n of foreign in te r ference with Egypt. The 
r e a l reason for such in te r fe rence was the existence of the 
49 Canal i t s e l f .^ "^ 
48. Marlowe, No.5, pp. 71~72 
49. Ib id , pp. 72-73. 
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l y 1875* a new s i t ua t i on a r o s t a f fec t ing the future of the 
Canal because of the f inancia l predicament of the H:hediye> who 
was in desparate need of ftinds. Ismail was very extravagant 
because he was in the habi t of acquir ing hnour and glory "ty 
giTing br ibes end otherwise spending m^aay. He spent l a rge amount 
of monty on pres t igeous p r o j e c t s . He paid l a rge br ibes in 
Constantinople for the purpose of e x t r a c t i n g successiye i n s t a l -
ments of independence tram the Por te . The E ^ p t i a n t r i b u t e 
which upto 1867, had amounted t o the equivalent of of 4-14,000 
a yea r , was increased t o the equivalent of'^ 690,000 a year in 
1867, in considerat ion of the addi t ional p r iv i l eges granted t o 
v iceroy . As a r e s u l t he Mijcyed cer ta in extra-ordinary p r i v i -
50 leges which h i s predecessors did not possess'^ . At the time 
of said*8 dsath the Egyptian t reasury was in debt t o the extent 
some 
of/^ 7,000,000. By 1875 Egyptian foreign indebtedness rose 
t o ^ 68,000,000, i t s i n t e r n a l indebtedness rose to about 
J: 14,500,000 and i t s f loa t ing debt to about '^ 16,000,000. 
By 1873 the i n t e r e s t on Egypt *s fo re ig i loans amounted t o nearly 
J: 5,000,000 per annum which was more than the whole of Egypt 's 
51 
annual revenue dxiring the re ign of Mohammad Said . 
In t h i s way the f inancia l pos i t ion of the Egyptian G*vem-
ment was constantly d e t e r i o r a t i n g since the opening of 
50. Hoskin, No.9, p . 449 
51. Marlowe, Ho.5, p . 9 1 . 
9, 
Sues Canal. In NoYember 1875 I email found himself in iirgent 
naecl of four million pounds to meet obligations due to the 
beginning of December and there was no mon^ in the Egyptian 
treasury. The sources of borrowing had almost "baen exhausted* 
It became clear that only the Canal shares remi^ ined unmort^ igaged 
and thus represented a possible form of security for another 
loan. Meanwhile the Talue of the shares on the European market 
CO 
had risen abore par'^  , as they had become an acceptable form of 
property, either for outright sale or for securily against a loan^^. 
Due to the financial burden, Ismail decided to sell his 
shares. Two rival groups of the Brwuch banking houses Andre 
Dervieu and Creit IV>ncier, with extensive claims on the Egyptian 
debt, were, for different reasons, taking interest in the matter; 
one for the purchase of the shares, and the other for their reten-
tion as security for mortgage* indre Derrieu offered 92 million 
francs with 3 percent interest. The other, i.e., Creit Poncier 
represented in ^ grpt "W the inglo-Egyptian Bank was not interested 
in the purchase of the shares but for the establishment of 
solvency in Egypt through conversion of its floating debts, composed 
mostly of short-term obligation into a consolidated log term 
loan 5^. 
52. :^ this time Sues Canal Company started paying dividends 
to the shareholders. 
53. John Marlowe. The Making of the Suez Canal.fLondon.iq6A^ 
P.243, see also, Kinross,No.21,P.263. 
54. Kinross, Ho.21, P. 263. 
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The news that the Khedive was contemplating to use th i s Canal 
shares as security for a loan from certain French capi ta l i s t s reached 
the foreign Secretaiy, lord Derty^^, By t h i s time a Conservative 
Govemmant with KLsraeli as Prime Minister had come into power who 
was always interested in acquiring a sort of po l i t i ca l domination 
Kg 
in the Suez Canal affairs . On Novemher 15,18751 Derly inquired 
ahout the news through Major General Stanton, the Bri t ish Consul -
General in Egypt. Cn Novanh«c 16, he confirmed the news. I t was 
a chance of po l i t i ca l significance which appealed instantly to 
Disrael i ' s imagination. I t was an opportunily for Britain to 
convert the Canal into Bri t i sh imperial a sse t s . Inspired \^ these 
thoughts and imagination Bisraeli decided to avail of th i s oppor-
tuni ty . He called a cabinet meeting in which a t l a s t i t was 
le 
58 
57 decided that Btitain should acquire th shares . After the 
cabinet meeting Stanton was informed t' 
It is of great importance that the interest of the 
Viceroy of Egypt in the Sues Canal should not fall 
into the hands of a foreign comnany .... intimate 
that Her Majesty's Government are disposed to 
purchase if satisfactory terms can he arranged. 
In response to this communication the Khedive replied that he had g 
55. Hoskin, No.9, p.460 
56. Marlowe, No.5, p.75 
57. Kinross, No.21,p.267} Cabinet in the beginning was not ready 
to purchase the Canal shares, "fcwt at last in the view of 
Rrime Minister *s determination the cabinet unanimously 
decided that the interest of the Khedive should if possible 
be obtained. 
58. British and Foreign state Papers. 7ol.62,p.550. 
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present no intention of Belling ble eliares. He further assured 
that he would glre Her Majesty's Government the option of purchase 
i f he changed his mind^. 
UeannMle* Sdouard D^leu in order to get an off icial help 
in t h i s iMitter approached, with the help of lesseps , the Itench 
foreign Minister Sao Decazea. 3)ecaBe8 agreed, but did not want 
to take any action without giring any information to the Bri t ish 
Goremment. She reason was obvious. Germany was threatening 
to renew the war, and the Bri t ish Govemmeat urns restraining I t . 
So, he was reluctant a t t h i s m<»Bent to take any step which might 
prejudice Branch re la t ions with Bri ta in . Derlgr replied that the 
Bri t ish Goremment's national in te res t s in the Canal were four 
times greater than those of a l l the res t of the world and that thay 
valued the Canal as a portion of the highway to India. They 
would not l e t an undertaking on which so many of thei r Interests 
depended be monopolized ly foreignwrs. So they would strongly 
disfavour the disposition of the Khedive's shares. I t was 
pointed out that the only two agencies through which Britain 
could bring pressure to besur on the Directors of the Canal Company 
were the Khedive and the Porte. And since the guarantee 
result ing from the control of the Porte was now no longer sufficient, 
i t was a iMitter of deep concern to the Bri t ish Government 
59. Kinross,iro.21,p.265; see also,Marlowe,No.53»p.299. 
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that the KhedlTe should not dispose of h i s in teres t s in the 
Canal . DerT:y also infowied the Khedive t 
HOT Majeslgr's Government wouldjcegard as a violat ion 
of the Urman of the '^orte ancfTin con s i stent with 
the integrity of the Ottoman Empire any act of the 
Khedive dispossessing himself of the control over 
the Suez Canal. 
Deoase's reaction to t h i s reply vm,s conclusive. He 
refused Irench o f f i c i a l support. In th i s situation the Khedive 
offered his shares to the Bri t i sh Government. The Egyptian 
Brime Minister Sharif Fasha played a tr ick . He said to Stanton 
that one mil l ion francs had "been offered through lessops . But 
the Khedive preferred to s e l l them to Her Majesty's Government 
for that amount. Stanton on Hovwaher 23f 1875 coimnunicated 
the offer to the foreign o f f i c e . The situation which had 
developed vexy sudd^ly placed the Brit ish Govenment in a 
del icate pos i t ion , hecause the parliament was not s i t t i n g . 
Secondly, the finding of four mil l ion pounds s ter l ing within 
the space of a few days was ahig prohlem in i t s e l f . Finally 
the whole matter was taken up 1^ Brimier Disraeli himself who 
62 
solved i t in h i s own characterist ic nmnner , He called a 
cabinet meeting and ordered h i s secretary Corry to stand outside the 
door,He said that when a decision was reached to borrow the money 
60. Hoskin, No.9»p,4-60,see also Kinross,No,21 ,pp.267-268 
61- Britieh.iforeign State Papers. Vci.66, i«")5' P, 578 
62. Hoskin, No.9, p,460. 
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Disraeli would stlc]^ h i s head out and say *y«a'* ^hen 
CoriT' was to rush to Rothsehlld* In the course of the meeting 
Ulsraell rushed to the door and said *J9&* • Coriy, at t h i s 
pre-erranged sign rushed straight to the off ice of Rothschild 
and said that the Prime Minister wanted four mil l ion pounds 
the following day, Rothschild asked, *What i s your security ?* 
•The British Goremmcnt • replied Coiry. *You shall have i t • , 
answered Rothschild •^ , 
On the assurance of Rothschild on KoTemher 24» Der'fcy 
telegraphed to Stanton 'The Vicercy's offer i s accepted. Her 
Maje8'fy*B Government agrees to purchase the 177f642 shares of the 
54. 
Viceroy for four mill ion pounds sterl ing* . jsa. agreement was 
drawn between Stanton and the Blnance Minister of Egypt and 
signed. The purchase was completed "by the afternoon of November 
23* and the shares were delivered to Stanton. I t was found that 
the Khedive owned only 176,602 shares instead of the prestimed 
177,642 shares. Therefore the price of 1040 shares was deducted 
66 from four mill ion pounds original ly agreed upon. 
63. Iionggood, No. 20, pp.67-68; see also Hoskin,No,9,p.460, 
Kinross, No.21, p.271. 
64. Kinross, No.21, p.268. 
65. I t was found that IO40 shares had already been disposed 
off some ten years back. 
66. Bri t i sh and FpfgJLm StatB PftPftrP* Vol.66,pp.70-71 
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The purchase of the Canal share by the B r i t i s h Sftvemment 
was c l e a r l y aimed at sharing i n the adminis t ra t ion of the 
Canal Company and reducing the French influence i n the control 
of such an important s t r a t e g i c a r t e r y . One may a lso say with 
the hindsight t h a t t h i s purchase provided B r i t a i n with a 
p re tex t t o penetrate deeper and deeper i n t o the pf t l i t ics of 
Egypt and u l t imate ly to i t s occupation i n 1882, However, these 
were a l l impe r i a l i s t i c s t eps , 
Di s rae l i a f t e r the completion of the t r ansac t ion wrote 
67 
t o Queen Victoria* 
I t i s j u s t s e t t l e d s Tou have i t Madam. The French 
Government has been outgeneralXfied, They t r i e d too 
much, offering loans a t an usurious r a t e , and with 
conditions which would have v i r t u a l l y given them the 
Goverianent of Egypt . . . . The en t i r e i n t e r e s t of the 
Khedive i s now yours Madam. 
The news of the purchase was publised i n The Time • on 
_ sect's 
November 26, and/^ greeted in England with general but not uni-
versal satisfaction. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir 
Straf ord Northoote was not in farour of the deal and in a 
68 private letter to Disraeli he wrote* 
Our policy or our proceeding - with regard to 
the canal has not been such au3 to gain ui^ much 
credit for magnanimity. We opposed it in its 
67. Charles Beatty, De Lesseps of Sueat. New York, 1956,p.27: 
68. Cited in Wilson, No.22,p.50, see also Longgood, 
No.20, P.70. 
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origin, w« reftised to h«lp De Lasstps in his 
diff iealt ios) w« havo uaod i t fAi«n i t had 
miceaedodt wa bava fought tha Imttla of our 
ship evaare Taxy s t i f ly and wa now aTfd.1 our-
oalTaa of our influaaea with Egypt to gat a 
quita sl iea of what promiaaa to ba a good 
thing . . . . X don't l ika i t . 
Eoropaan aantimanta ganarally approrad tha action of 
tha British OoramiBant. Tha Crown Brineass of Gamany wrote 
to QEiaan Tietoria, 'Eraxyhody i s plaasad hara, and wishas 
i t nay hring England good . . . . * Brinoe Bisffiark baliarad 
that tha British Gorarniiient had dona tha right thing at tha 
right momant towards tha Suas Canal. In Italy England's 
sudden ehanga in attituda tov/airds tha Canal aftar having opposad 
i t for so many yaars was acplainad ty tha fact that Turkay was 
no longar a good ally of England and that a naw ally was 
naoessary If Russia was to ha opposad suocassftilly in Asia* 
nev/ 
Tha^ally was to ha Egypt. Austrain Gorammant axprassad 
thair plaasura. Lassaps histsalf accapted tha situation with 
a good graoa. Hi thought that Britain's long standing hostality 
69 
was now ovar ^. 
In Sranoa thara was bittamass and humiliation at this 
unforasaan British ooup. Tha XM<^ , tha defaat and also tha 
alarms whioh always follow graat miafortunas had haightanad 
69* Citad in Qoskin, Ho.9, p.464. 
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its sensibility, Regarding the transaction Derby on Hovember 27, 
clarified to the French Go-Ternment, England had no wish, he said, 
that the Khedive apuld sell his shares or that the status quo 
in Egypt should be altered in the least. But the British Goeyern^ 
meniihad no power to prevent the sale of the shares, and since 
the KhediTe was apparently determined to sell it, the British 
Government had used the only means at their command to prevent 
the possibility of the ajhares falling into the hands of interests 
which might not be favourable to Britain. For this purpose 
the Govemjaent had been compelled to act quickly in order to 
exploit the opportunity- England's object was not to establish 
an exclusive right, v^ iich could not be done with the minority 
of the shares in any event, but it was rather to prohibit the 
establishment of an exclusive right. The French Government 
in reply to the above clarification expressed the fear that 
if the Egyptian government should fail in paying the interest 
on the shares, England would use some means of coercion 
which would establish English authority on Egypt. Then Derby 
disclaimed any intention on the part of the British Government 
of taking such action at any time. He said that he personally 
had favoured the direction of the Canal by an International 
Comnission, but as the French Government had been opposed to 
such a plan, he had not brought it forward. However, the 
lOu 
70 passage should be kept t r e e for eyeryone , 
She Sublime Porte disapproved the s tep ta3oen by the 
KhediTO on the ground t h a t he had not considted i t . The 
71 B r i t i s h Soferaaaent assured the Porte* 
Her Majesty 's (Joyermient liave no intent!oi l 
Of derogating frean the sovereignity of the 
Sultan and t h a t ^ u r c h a s e of the Suez Canal 
shares was a OBcessary seasure to prevent them 
from f a l l i n g in to the possession of p a r t i e s 
who might have made use of them in a manner 
p r e j u d i c i a l both t o the Po^^e and t o England, 
Qa February 14» 1876 the matter was considered in the p a r l i a -
ment and c r i t i c i s m was made by the members. By t h i s t i i ^ ITorthcote 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer had agrred t h a t the pArehase was 
72 
a good th ing . In rep ly t o a question he said t 
. . . . the ac t ion of the Government was taJcen 
not becasue i t desi red the Canal for the purpose 
of war, but the (Jovernctent was desirous to seeing 
t h a t the Canal should not be used as a p o l i t i c a l 
engine against England. 
Se fur ther sa id t h a t tlie purciase of the shares was a p o l i t i c a l 
t r ansac t i on so tha t the B r i t i s h might obtain a foothold on 
70. Bpl t i sh and foreign State Papers . Vol. 66./«^^'-76,pp.93a -
944J see a l s o , Hoskin, No,.9i pp.4-63-46#. 
7 1 . Citad i n Marlowe, Ho.53, p.307 
72 . Hansard Parl iamentary Debates. 3rd. s e r i e s , Vol.CCXDIII 
p.1622. 
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that part of Africa '• On oae occasion h« explained that the 
purchaee was merely a protective neaerora to prevent the hostile 
interests frtan obtaining a greater degree of control of the waterway 
as well as to secure the privileges of transporting troops to 
India if and when necessary^. It seems that it was Britain itself 
which wanted to use the Canal as a political engine against other 
powers. The explanation of Horthcote indicates that the British 
Government wanted to convert the Canal into an imperial asset. 
Prohably the British Government thought that the acquisition of the 
Canal shares would ftilfil that end* Another debate was held on 
Pebruaiy 21, 1876 in which Gladstone, an Opposition manber , 
strongly opposed the transaction and condemned the d^al for 
such a high rate of e<Himiission« The same day Disraeli frankly 
stated the object of this purchase in the House of Commons and 
strongly defended nis action "^  « 
I have never reconmeadad and I do not now recotomend 
this purchase as a financial investment .... I do viot 
recommend it either as a commercial speculation, 
although I believe that many who have looked upon 
it with little favour will probably be surprised 
with the pecuniary results of the purchase. I have 
alleys and do now recommend it to the country as a 
political transaction and one which I believe is calculsted 
73. Ibid 
74. Hansard Parliamentary Debates. 3rd. series,Vol.(KXXVI,P'^^ 
75. Hansard Parliamentary Debates, 3rd. series, Vol.CCXXVII 
p.1441 
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to •tr«ngtlien the Effipiro. That 1B the spirit 
in whieh i t has h«en aeespttd ^ the eofuntzy, 
ivhieli tinder stands i t . . . . The (fhe B-itish 
people) want the Qnpire to he luaintained, to he 
strengthened» they will not he alarmed eren 
i f i t i s increased I heeause they think we are 
getting hold an interest in this important 
portion of Africa, heeause thior heliere that i t 
secures to us a highwagr to our Indian Qapire 
and other dependencies. 
It i s dear that the purchase of the shares were financially 
not henefleial. I t might haye even heen a had hargain. But i t 
gave Britain a polit ical gain. I^sraeli had realized the 
strategic and geo-political significance of the oanal. His 
speech further rereals that the British Goremmfnt was 
cosapelled to purchase the shares. He prohably accepted tbat the 
8eeuri1^$' of the Indian Empire was dependent tm the security 
and» 
of the l^es/CanalA fbrther, the security of the Canal could 
not he maintained unless they had a voice in the Canal Company's 
aff«dre. The press generally approved this speech. S t i l l 
Britain had no official voice in the Company's management,because 
"by a decision of the Sues; Canal Company Board in 1871 Ismail 
had heen depriTed of voting power in respect of his shares 
until 1394« as a result of his having l^rpothecated his dividends 
until that date. Secondly, under the act of concession the 
maximum number of votes any shareholder could have was ten. 
British Government claimed that being a major shareholder 
i t should be exempted from this ruling. After negotiations 
10 J 
orjagreement between Colnel Stoloe and the Company was signed 
on Peto iary 23, 1876. I t was agreed t h a t three B r i t i s h 
d i r ec to r s aoiild be namecl to the twenty four -man 8oard 
of Direct OS and t h a t they should have the maximum ten 
votes among them. 
Ifow tab B r i t a i n had become the l a r g e s t shareholder, 
i,e.,cif44 percent , of the Company and these holdingiwere 
su f f i c ien t i n value to give the Br i t i sg Goverisnent a 
considerable voice i n the a f f a i r s of the Canal Company, 
even though on the s t rength of these shares alone the 
Corapany pol icy could not be con t ro l led . The gre-^t water-
way had at l a s t v i r t u a l l y achieved an i n t e r n a t i o n a l character , 
B r i t a i n was the rea fe t r conceded to have leading p o l i t i c a l 
i n t e r e s t s i n the waterway 
IT. Anglo-French Rival&ry and The B r i t i s h Occupation of 
Egypt I The purchase of the aaez Canal shares by the B r i t i s h 
was looked upon by sane of the more opt imis t ic exponents of 
the Sov mments po l icy , as the l a s t step i n the long struggle 
t o cont ro l the p r inc ipa l route to Ind ia , China and Aust ra l ia . 
I t was an important diplomatic v ic to ry by which Br i t a in came 
to exercise a vey g iea t cont ro l over the canal route leading 
76, Longgood, No.20,p.9, see a l so Marlowe,IJo.53,-^.307 
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to its eastern dominion, '^he haste and the zest with which the 
shares were purchased clearly indicated that if Britain had 
failed to secure the control of the Canal by some such means, 
it woTxLd not have hesitated in talcing unilateral measures to 
secure its objectives^. The opponents of the purchase were 
convinced that such definite venturing into Egypt would produce 
nothing but trouble, intervention in the iChedive»s affairs, 
loss of friendship witaa other i^ oropean powers, and all without 
tangible gain. It was argued that the purchase of the large 
block of Egyptian shares in the Suez Canal Company by Britain 
was with a view to establishing a strong position relative to 
the defence of that waterwsgr which already had come to play an 
important part in the British imperial life line' . It was clear 
that Egypt was no longer master in her own house, but vulnerable 
to foreign interference both in its internal as well as external 
affairs''^. 
Gn March 19» I876, Disraeli in the House of Commons 
clarified the British position regarding these feelings. He 
said.8° 
Let the people of India feel Idaat there is a 
sympathetic chord between us and them, and do 
not let Europe suppose for a moment that there 
77. Maity, No. 1, p.7 
78. Hoskin, No. 2, p. 95 
79. J.A. Obieta, S.J. The In1iQI|;^ t^j,Qnal Stg^ t^ s pf l^ hQ S^^g (?m^ 
(Hetherland 1960) , p. 9. 
80. HansardyParliamentary Debates. 3rd. series, Vol., CCXXVII, 
p. 1727 
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ar« any in this House and who art not deeply 
eonoiauB of the importance of the Indian 
Bmpire. 
He elaborated t 
The frontiers of Raesie, X will not say a 
riTal power t bat the ^rentiers of Russia 
are cmly a few days nareh from those of 
Her Kajesty in Indie . . . . This announcement 
. . . . wil l oAgniiy in a Banner lAiieh cannot 
be mistaken t that the parliament of En^and 
i s resolTsd to uphold the Itepire of India. 
Certainly the British &oTemaent *B attitude towards 
both Egypt and Russia underwent a considerable change as a 
result of the erents of 1875*76. The hi^way to India receired 
attention which had been denied i t since i t s f irst establishment. 
There was a strong and popular feeling in England that the 
Canal must be held W England, and that i t should be protected 
from land. They could not run the poBsible risk of some Aiture 
Egyptian rul«becoming an ally of an enemy who, before thay 
could take measures for protecting i t , might render their road 
8? to India useless for an indefinite period . 
The %-itish interests in Egypt were not as those of the 
ItrmiQh., but of a slightly different order. Like the Exreneh 
the British had important inrestment in Egypt. Basically 
howerer, Egypt represented to Britain a strategically 
81, Ibid, Tol. CCXVIII, P. 450. 
82. Beskin, No.9, p. 474. 
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located t e r r i t o r y on the route t o the East , With the cons-
t r u c t i o n of the Suez Canal and the in t roduc t ion of steam power 
i n shipping Egypt 's signifioance had increased. Also, the 
Canal had made the t r i p from England t o India sho r t e r . As i t 
developed in to an important dipl imat ic problem, the Egyptian 
quest ion became a burning issue i n the B r i t i s h p o l i t i c s . Even 
before the occupation of Egypt, the B r i t i s h statesmen were 
83 
aware t ha t firm p o l i c i e s would have to be evolved . The 
B r i t i s h (loTOriiQen**s fore ign pol icy regarding WHf Bgjpt and 
the Suez Canal can well be understood i n the l i g h t of various 
even t s , which took place a f t e r the opening of the waterway. 
All the events helped i n developing a s i t u a t i o n conducive 
to p o l i t i c a l influence i n Egypt, 
After the opening of the Suez CaJa&l, the secur i ty of 
Ind ia and the l i n e s r ad i a t i ng from Ind ia i n t o the Arabian 
Sea depended on the Red Sea and Gulf of ideri. The single 
strong hold on which t h i s channel r e l i e d a t t h a t period was 
the harb )ur and f o r t r e s s of the Aden, i n southern Arabia. 
This Icey pos i t i on waskfrulnerable at one point ; i t derived 
much of i t s food Supply from the po r t s on the opposite 
coast of the Giaf of iden» Any act a f fec t ing t h i s supply would 
83 . Robert L.Tignor, Modernisation of B r i t i s h Colonial Rule 
in Egypt, 1882-1914 (Princeton 1966)i*.12. 
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have been a ser ious a f f a i r . Accordingly, when i n 1870 the 
Khedive olaeed the previously free Somali f o r t s of Bolhar arai 
Berbera, on the African coast of the Gulf of Aden, he had 
unwil l ingly touched the Achil les heel of the whole Br i t i sh 
economic and p o l i t i c a l s t ruc tu re i n the Eas t . Besides,other 
European powers were s t i l l t r y i n g to get es tab l i shed a t some 
na tura l s t r a t e g i c area i n the east African coas t , B t i t a i n 
had not yet discovered any effect ive method of excluding 
European powers from the ma.^ s t r a t e g i c places on the East 
African Coast. At t h i s c r i t i c a l moment Br i t a in loolosd upon 
Egypt and considered i t as the only s t a t e which could serve i t s 
purpose. Shey adopted a pol icy t h a t t le maintenance of 
nominal Egyptian sover iegni ty and i t s formal recogni t ion in 
Bast Africa would c e r t a i n l y y ie ld sorrie def in t e advantages. 
Another f ac to r tha t ^icouraged Br i t a in i n a t t a in ing p o l i t i c a l 
cont ro l i n Egyptian a f fa i r s was t h a t the 3!ur3cish Government 
had offered Egypt to B r i t a i n i n r e tu rn for guaranteed 
support of the Ottoman govemB^nt against a l l foreign i n t e r -
ven t io i ^ . At the same time Geaaaany was employing a l l methods 
to encourage Br i t a in to se ize Egypt. F ina l ly the B r i t i s h 
purchase of the KMdeval sKaree i n the Sues; Oaual Company 
was a heaven- sent opportunity to implement a po l icy t h a t had 
already been determined i n a general way and t h a t might thus 
34. be given more consis tent form and d i r e c t i o n ^. 
84-. H.L.HosldLa, B r i t i s h Policy i n Africa, 1373-1877, She 
Grographioal Review (jffew York), Vol. XXXII January 
1948, PP.140-U9. 
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H«anwbile» the continued derelopmeat of the Hueslaa 
rallimy in Central Asia and Russian declaration of ivar 
against furkay on April 24, 1S77, greatly increased the 
question of protection of the Canal* With a Tiew to pre-
venting ho s ta l l t i e s in the Canal zone, which was legally a 
part of the Ott<Maan Itapire, Britain had already as aimed the 
85 
role of the protector of the Canal "^, In this eonneotion 
British Itoreign Secretary Derly on May 6, 1877 despatched a 
note to the Bussia4 Gonremaent defining British interests in 
Egypt and elsewhere in the Hear Sast. li%T\is stated in his note) 86 
Foremost .... is the necessity of keeping open 
un|n;3ured and uninterrupted, the coinmunication 
hetween Borope and the last % the Sues Canal. An 
attempt to blockade or otherwise to interfere with 
the canal or its approeahes would he regarded tor 
theia as menace to India, and as a grave injury 
to the coBBnercB of the world. CSi hoth these grounds 
any such step which they hope and ftally believed 
that there is no intention on the part of eith«* 
belligerent to take — would be inconsistent 
with the maint«:ianee "by them of an attitude of passive 
neutrality. 
She mercantile and financial interests of 
Suropesa nations are also so largely involved in Sgypt 
that an attack on that country, £•» its occupation, even 
tampirazy for purposes of war, could seareely be 
regarded with unconcern l:y the neutral powers certainly 
not ty Sagland. 
85. Maity, Ho.1, P.7. 
8^. Ttel-^ lfth and Rareign State gauen. Tol.68, pp. 867-868. 
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An analysis of the aboire dispatcli points out that Br i ta in ' s 
main aim was to protect the Canal and maintain the autonomy of Sgypt 
for her (Britedn) own in t e re s t s . I t also revealed that i f any nation 
attempted to occupy Egypt, Bri tain would come forward openly and 
would not hesi tate to taloe counter pleasures. 
To th i s the Russian GoTernment replied ' ' 
Ihe imperial caMnet wi l l neither bloclcade, nor 
Interrupt nor in any way menace the navigation of 
the Suez Oanal* They consider the Canal as an 
iixlernatiOBal work in MMGh the commerce of the 
world i s interested and which should he kept ftee 
from any attack, 
Purtber to strengthen her position in the Canal zone on September 
7, 1877 the Bri t ish Gtovemment signed with the Egyptian Ooveriment 
ana Anglo-Egyptian agreement which to a l l intents and purposes envisage 
Britain as the protector of Egyptian t e r r i t o r i a l In te res t s . In May 
of the following year the a i r was thick with rumours of Russian design 
upon the Canal. As a are suit m£ the Bri t ish naval unit were stationed 
at Alexandria and Port Said to ensure safety of the Canal and the 
Red Sea, This stept of the Bri t ish aovernment was in fact sufficient 
88 
to prevent any interference with the navigation of the Canal . 
The Anglo-Egyptian Agreement and the stationing of the Brit ish 
naval units at Alexandria and Port Said focussed on the Brit ish 
87, Malty, Ho.1, pp. 7-9 
88. Hoskln, No.2, p.575 
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defensive policy. It can be said that after the opening of 
the Canal Britain shifted her attention from Constantino^ 
to Cairo, Britain now was interested in maintaining the 
authority of the Khedive and toeep him away from the influence 
of other nations. This policy of Britain also indicated 
that sSie was no longer serious in maintaining Egypt as the 
integral part of the Ottoman Empire, because Britain took upon 
herself the responsihility of prote ting Egyptian territorial 
interests, 
Ihe increasing interest of the British Groverianent in 
the Canal cautioned the other nations, Pranoe sepoially 
started seeking a kind of international agreement regarding 
the neutrality of the passage through the Canal', Prance was 
warned because Britain by this time had almost, though not 
officially, acquired a sort of control over the Suez Canal 
affaits cannnercially as well as politically, Britain at this 
time was not obviously ready to take a lead regarding the ques-
tion of neutralization, for it was of two minds. On the one hand 
Britain was opposing the neutralization of the Canal, and on the 
other, it realized that any alternative regarding this question 
11. 
l e f t the oanal open t o poss ib le a t t ack i n the event of a 
IPurldLsh war. In B r i t i s h aovernaent*s view there was only 
one so lu t ion to the problen, riz, t o b r ing Egypt under t h e i r 
p ro tec t ion and cont ro l , i n consequence of which Egypt, a t l e a s t , 
might safe ly and p ro f i t ab ly be neut ra l ized by an in t e rna t iona l 
agreeuBnt. While the revolt^of Qrabi Pasha supplied the 
occaBion for the B r i t i s h Ocupation of Egypt, i t was the Suez 
89 Canal which furnished the motive , 
The f inanc ia l d i f f i c u l t i e s of the Khedive provided for 
strong Anglo-Prench r i v a l r y i n the i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s of Egypt. 
\fithin a few days of the purchase of the shares Khedive aslcedtWe 
B r i t i s h GrOveriEnent to send f inanc ia l exper t s t o Egypt t o 
examine and maice reconmendatioa about the s t a t e of Egypt 's 
f inances . The B r i t i s h Government accepted the Kliedive's 
i n v i t a t i o n and i n £!arch 1876 sent Mr. Stepher^Gavs M.P, 
This acceptance was i l l received i n France, where i t was 
regarded as one more stage i n concerted B r i t i s h plan t o assume 
90 
cont ro l of Egypt , Derby ex5)lained, t h a t Cave's mission 
implied no desir8|to i n t e r f e r e in the i n t e r n a l a f fa i r s of 
ifeypt. At the beginning of May under strong pressure Khedive 
issued two decrees . The f i r s t created an i n t e rna t i ona l 
89 . HoSkin, P . 96 
90. Marlowe, lfo.53, P,311. 
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Calase da la Dette Publlouef with British, French, Italian, 
Austrian and German members for the management of Egyptian foreign 
debt. The second provided for the consolidation of the v^ole of 
the secured and floating debt. But the scheme did not work out 
well and eventually was replaced by Anglo French Mssicjn headed 
by Messrs Joubert (French) and Goschon (British). This mission 
also made no impression and failed.^ 
In February 1078 M. Waddlngton, French Foreign i-Ilnlster 
wroted to Derby that if Britain and France did not act in 
m c z m ccaicert the matter was in danger of slipping out of their 
hands, Derby replied that the British Govemmeait would be 
happy to cooperate with that of France in any measures not 
inconsistent \/ith Khedive's independent administration of 
Egypt.^^ In March 1878 both the powers obl&ged the Khedive 
to accept the constitutional form of the Govem-aent, with a 
Chanbers of Notables and a Cabinet Including a British and 
a French Ministers. As a result in August a new Government 
was installed vnLth Kpaber Pasha as Prime ItLnister, River 
Wilson (British) as Minister of Finance and fie Blignieres 
(Fr«ich) as Minister of Public Works. It was a dual control 
of the British and French Governments over Egypt. The new 
government did not have an easy passage. At the beginning 
91. flarlowe , Ho. 5, p. $h 
92. Marlowe, llo. 5» P« 96 
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of 1879 a demonstration was staged by the retrenched people 
against Nubar and Wilson. Isioail Pasha (the Khedive) under 
pressure dismissed botii Nubar and Wilson for his Govemment'^^. 
As a result of these developments European creditors became 
restless, Bismark who had hitherto shown little interest In the 
fortune of Egypt's European creditors, now informed Britain and 
France that unless they were prepared to intervene effectively 
in Egypt to protect the Interests of these creditors, Germany 
would be compelled to take such step as it ccaisidered necessary 
to this end° . Bismark in protest demanded the immediate 
deposition of Ismail and active intervention of the Porte In 
Egypt as the only alternative. This d^oand and protest of 
German Government gave a profound shock to the whole of Europe"^. 
Britain and France started pressing Ismail for abdication In 
favour of his scai Tewfik. Ismail rejected the advice and at 
the same timd spent money freely in Ccaistantinople in an attempt 
to avert a firman of d^osition. Finally in response to an 
appeal of Britain and France, the Sublime Porte In June I879 
deposed him and made his son Tewfik the Khedive of Egypt,° . 
The change in regime brought a new phase In the history 
of Egypt. It brought about a change in the political structure 
93. Desmond Stewart, Young Egypt. (London, 1958), P.67 
9U-. Marlowe, No. 5> P« 101 
95. Hoskin, No. 9, p. h76 
96. I«Iarlowe, No. 5t P» 102, see a l so Kinross, No.21, P.277 
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of the country a l s o . I s m a i l ' s departure marked samething more 
than the triumph of Europe an in t e rven t ion . I t also marked the 
beginning of the Egyptian nat ional ism. 
The change of regime under pressure enabled the* powers 
t o e f fec t the establishment of a j o in t f inanc ia l administrat ion 
for the new Khedive. This dual control t o a l l i n t e n t s and 
97 purpose, made the new KhediYB thetv,jard of Epi ta iu and France , 
The other European powers as I t a l y , Gei^any and Austria p ro-
tes ted against the dual cont ro l of B r i t a i n and France, The 
Austrian Government proposed for an i n t e r n a t i o n a l administrat ion 
of Egypt. B r i t a i n and France reacted shaprply to t h i s proposal . 
tKey 
Both the Sovernments declared that/would not t o l e r a t e the 
establishment i n Egypt of p o l i t i c a l influence on the par t of 
any other ©iropean nations i n competition with t ha t of England 
and Fj.ance, and tha t they were prepared to take ac t ion to any 
extent tha t might be found necessary t o give ef fec t to t l ^ i r views 
98 i n t h i s respect , 
The r e a l d i f f i c u l t y s t a r t e d when Tewfik came to power. He 
was Soon confronted with a serioiis i n t e r n a l upheaval. He was 
97. B r i t i s h and Foreign State Papers . Vol.70 (1789) 
pp. 623-624. 
98 . Ib id , Vol 73 (1881-1882) P.277. 
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regarded as the nominee of the Baropean powers. He reduced the 
army from 45*000 to 27,000 men which created a large group of 
disaffected soldiers open to sedition* As a resul t a r i o t broke 
out in Cairo which hag hecome a signal for a xoajor nat ional is t 
revol t . The leader was an anay colnel namedl Almad Orabi» i t s 
sologan was •Egrpt for the Egyptians' . In September 1881, 
Orabi with 5000 troops surrounded the Khedive's palace and 
demanded (1) the dismissal of the whole ministry | (2) the 
convocation of the national Parliament, and (3) the putting into 
force of the recommendation of the military Comrission, i . e . , the 
increase of army to 18,000 men ^ . Tewfik accepted the demand. 
Sharif Pasha resigned and was replaced by Mohammad Sami Pasha as 
Prime Minister with Orabi as minister of war. The Tiirkish goveimment 
sent a mission to Egypt to res tore normalcy. The intervention 
of Turkey in the affairs of Egypt was i l l received by Britain 
and Eremce. Both the powers reacted sharply and condemned the 
steps tak«a ly the Sublime Porte without informing them. On 
October 4, 1881, Grcfflaville, the Br i t i sh Foreign Secretary stated 
that thiiy had no desire to take any steps towards a Bri t i sh 
occupation or annexion of the country. Th^ were anxious to 
maintain the existing s tatus quo and to uphold the Sultan's 
r ight but they should object to auiy attempt to extend thede 
W, Kinross, No. 21, P, 277 
100. Br i t i sh and Foreign State Papers. Vol.75,1881-1882 
p. 1135. 
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r igh ts or to use thasi for the purpose of diminishing the autonos^r 
of Egypt, and interfering in i t s internal administration . The 
oTsjection of Itance and Britain does not appear to be fair,because 
IPurkny, and not Britain or Erance, was responsible for the protec-
tion of Egypt, the maintenance of status quo and the preservation 
of the Khedival authority. The interference of Britain and Erance 
in the administration of Egjrpt can be said to bey(political i n t e r -
ference against the r ights of the Sultan and the Ottoman suzerainty 
oyer ^gypt. There were four issues which the Bri t i sh and French 
Groremments wished to d^al with»(1) the maintenance of the authority 
of the Khedive, (2) the protection of the European population in 
Egypt, (3) the security of the Suez Canal, and (4) the interests 
of the European bond holders. Blrench and Bri t ish Governments 
under the pretext of these four purposes despatched a warship 
to Alexandria. The presence of naval squadron off Alexandria 
enebaled Twefik to dismiss the 8ami ministry and reappoint 
Sharif Pasha as Prime Minister. The reassertion of the 
Khedival authority could not l a s t long. Orabi Pasha again came 
to pow«r through a military intervention, this time as Prime Minister 
102 
and v i r tua l ru ler of Egypt . The Turkish Govemmwit protested 
against the step taken by the Bri t ish and Erench Governments and 
also reasoned that both the governments were claiming the r ight of 
the Sultan. The Bri t ish Governmrait replied that they had no 
101. Ibid. pp. 1140-1151 
102 Marlowe, No.53, pp. 315-316. 
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deslrs to umurp the 8crr«riegn rights of the Sultan, hut that the 
103 
elreumstajrioeB were pressing am inaaediate action nas neeessaiy 
On Jiane 6, 1882, Britain and iKranee made an idantioal declaration 
saying that the British and Krenoh GoremiBents considered the 
maintenance of His Higlmess on the throne. !!!he two goremments 
were closely associated in the resolre to guard ty their united 
efforts against a l l the causes leading to complicaticm, internal 
or external, which mi^t menace the order of things estaltaished 
in lgn ,*1« . Ih . not. - . t I t h . , l .X« . t r.Bpan« In BgTpt. 
where It was r^arded as an undue interference in Egypt's internal 
affairs. The Idoitieal Notes giren ly Britain and l^ance were 
actually contra*y to the rights of the Sultan (1841 agreement). Both 
the powers in fact lyp&SBAd the Sultan as a protector of Egypt. 
In this way these two European powers had heen united in their 
policies regarding Egypt for their own imperialistic interests . 
In summer of 1882 Egypt's internal position became so 
critical that both these powers started thinking of militaiy 
intervention. Meanwhile the sudd^i change in the Ministxy 
of France, changed the Tiew of the Irench Groremment. VriMt 
Minister Gambetta was replaced lor M. de l!r«ycinet. He was not in 
fayour of any militajey interrention. At the end of Mey I^ ranoe 
103. Bpitiflh and goreim State gapers. Vol.74, 1382^1883, 
P.401 
1C4. Ibid, P. 368. 
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proposed a conference on the Egyptian a f f a i r s . Bismark was 
anxious t o maintain^status quo i n Egypt as far as poss ib le , 
but he thought t ha t i f i n t e rven t ion becaine necessary, Turlcish 
in te rven t ion was the l e a s t object ionable , ^ was against the 
j o in t Anglo-French occupation, bel ieving t h a t it would lead 
105 to disagreement and quarre l between the two countr ies , But 
before the conference had time to meet, a r i o t broke out i n 
Alexandria i n which f i f t y Europeans were k i l l e d . On June 15» 
1882, Grranville telegraphed t o the B r i t i s h represen ta t ives i n 
I t a l y , Germany, Aus t ra l i a and Russia saying t h a t the time had 
arr ived when the progress of order i n Egypt cal led for some more 
1 06 
decided action • The French, (Jermany and lustrain govern-
ments were in favour of an acconmodation with Orabi, The 
British Government found itself alone in advocating his over-
throw. The conference was held at Constantinople and decided 
that if intervention became necessary their respective countries 
would not seek territorial advantage or an exclusive position 
in Egypt-""^. 
Meanwhile Orabi prepared to resist a foreign invasion and 
started to strengthen the fortification of Alexandria, Britain 
105. Ibid, P.393 
106 Ibid. P.443 
107. Kinross Fo,21, P.279, see also Marlowe,iro.5,P,123. 
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proposed jo in t ac t ion with France to p ro tec t the Canal against 
tKe 
anye-rontuality. On July 5, 1882/French (Jovemment announced 
tha t the jo in t ac t ion would be an act of offensive h o s t a l i t y 
against Mm Egypt, i n which they could not taks par t without 
108 
securing the consent of the l e g i s l a t u r e , After the refusal of 
the French Government, B r i t a i n decided t o take u n i l a t e r a l act ion 
against the r e v o l t . On July 9,1882 B r i t i s h Admiral Seymour 
warned t h a t i f the f o r t s were not surrendered t o him within 
twenty four hours he would open f i r e on them. Colonel Orabi 
refUBd t o accept i t . On Ju ly 11 , Seymour s t a r t e d the bombard-
ment of the fo r t s and u l t ima te ly occupied Alexandria. On July 
22, the Khedive, now under the p ro tec t ion of the Br i t i sh f l e e t 
decalred Orabi a r e b e l . Towards the end of Ju ly , the B r i t i s h 
navy act ing under the nominal au thor i ty of the IQiedive, occupied 
Port Said, Ismalia and Suez, i n sp i t e of the p ro tes t of the 
109 French (Jovernment and of Lesseps , 
On August 15, B r i t i s h forces under S i r G-arnet "^olseley ^irnvc^ 
a t Alexandria occupied the Oanal Company*s office and entered 
the canal which was closed t o navigat ion for the next five days. 
After t h a t B r i t i s h forces advanced towards Cairo and on September 
13, 1882 defeated Orabi a t Tel -e l .Kebir ^ * a?he follov/ing day 
108. B r i t i s h and Foreifm State Papers. Vol.74,1882-1383,P.480 
109. Marlowe, Ho.5,P^.123-124? see also Kinross,No,21,P.273 
110. Marlowe, No.53, pp.317-320. 
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Britlsli troops occupied Cairo. On August 24-» Wolseley retunaed 
the control of the canal to the Company and normal navigation 
was resumed. The action taken by Urn Britain was i l l ega l 
Ijecause she occupied Egypt, which was a t e r r i t o ry of the 
Ottoman empire. Besides, during the mil i tary operations Britsiin 
used the Canal as a base against Orabit 's forces, which resulted 
in the closing of the Canal for five days. T^is action of 
Britain was contrary to the a r t ic le 14 of the concession of 
1856. After the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 Britain had 
attempted to seek the neutral i ty of th is pasv^age in the form of 
internat ional t rea ty . During Russo Ohirkish war (1877) British 
Foreign Secretary had despatched a note to the Russain G-overn-
ment in which he had"Wkmed Russia against blockading the 
Canal. He had further warned that Britain would not remain 
neutral , i f Russia occupied the coimtry even temporary. 
However, for her own In^er ia l i s t i c purpose Britain herself 
in 1882 did what she had a l l along been opposing, This shows 
that Bri tain was not interested in the neutral i ty of the Canal 
for other nations. I t was In fact Interested in Baintaining the 
neutra l i ty of the Canal to serve I t s own imperial in te res t s . 
KcicI 
At last the canal had proved ndiat Moharamad Aliy( always 
feared that it would be a channel through which the British wftuld 
sail and occupy Egypt. Palmerston's prediction also came true 
12/ 
tha t If the Canal was ever bu i l t , Britain would sooner or 
111 
later be obliged to annex Egypt 
111. Siegfried, No.45, pp. 82-83, See also Marlowe, IJo,53, 
pp. 317-320, Tignor, No.83, P.21. 
CHAPTER - lY 
miTISH OCGUPUION TO VfOBU) WAR I 
I . Proposal for the Seoond GaOal i 
B r i t a i n ' s concern for the secur i ty of the Canal had given her 
a p re tex t t o land her t roops i n Alexandria aM along the Canal and 
t o occupy the whole of Egypt, Having occupied the country the 
B r i t i s h (JoTemment began t o organise i t s new defacto p ro tec -
t o r a t e . An immediate r e s u l t of the invasion was the end of the 
dual con t ro l , giving B r i t a i n an unof f i c i a l recogni t ion as the 
guardian of the Isthmus and Canal, The new s i t u a t i o n had a 
profound impact on England, I t gave r i s e t o a strong feel ing of 
1 
se l f assurance and exh i l a r a t i on , Soon a f t e r the occupation of 
Egypt by the B r i t i s h goveriment a popular a g i t a t i o n began in 
B r i t a i n for the construct ion of the second canal . There were 
several f ac to r s which brought t h i s quest ion i n to prominence.Although 
about fou r - f i f t h s of the t r a f f i c t h a t passed through the Canal 
was B r i t i s h , the management was exclus ive ly French, There 
were many complaints agains t the p i l o t s a l s o . I t was claimed tha t 
they were often incoiapetent and tha t no B r i t i s h p i l o t s had been 
employed. S t r i c t adherence to the l e t t e r of the Company's regula-
t i o n s , au tocra t ic a t t i t u d e of i t s senior o f f i c i a l s and the absence 
1, J , A. Obieta, The I n t e r n a t i o n a l Status of the Suez Canal. 
(Netherlands , 1960), p .10 . 
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of any Bri ton in the higher ranks of management, e i t h e r i n 
London or P a r i s , were the causes "behind the loud complaints 
2 both publ ic ly and privatel ;^ mad ; by shipo\7ners and others . 
Strong complaints were being reg i s t e red by the end of 1881 by 
shipping i n t e r e s t s against the inadequacy of the ex is t ing canal 
f a c i l i t i e s . 
I t Was demanded tha t as the Canal was now able t o pay as 
much as s ix teen percent i n dividends s teps should be taloen t o 
remedy the d i f f i c u l t i e s . Three general plans were proposed from 
various quar ters as poss ib le solut ions t (1) The enlargement 
of the ex is t ing Canalj (2) the const ruct ion of a second canal 
from Alexandria v ia Cairo t o Suez ,and (5) the bui ld ing of an 
e n t i r e l y new canal outside Egypt. The route indicated for the 
t h i r d proposal was t o cut a canal from Haifa i n Pa les t ine via the 
Dead Sea t o the Gulf of Aqaba. The l a s t of these proposals gained 
l i t t l e favour because of the wide-spread be l i e f even i n England 
t h a t such an en te rpr i se would infr inge on the concession of 
1854 and 1856 granted to Lesseps amclconfirmed by the Su l t an ' s 
firm n of 1866. The second proposal was supported by many 
engineers and other a u t h o r i t i e s on the ground tha t two channels 
would provide safer and more effect ive t r a n s i t f a c i l i t i e s than 
^ 3 
a s ingle canal* a£ equal width . Iiesseps, on the other band, 
2, A.T.Wilson, The Suez Canal: I t s Pas t . Present and Future. son. he uez canal : (Oxford, 1 ^^3), P T U . 
3. H.L.Hoskin, a c l t i s h Routes to India (London, 1966) 
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asser ted tha t tiie Act of Concession gave h i s company the monopoly 
of c ana l ' s const ruct ion from sea to sea . He supported h i s claim 
by point ing t o the preamble which s t a t ed tha t he was t o have an 
exclusive power of cons t i tu t ing and d i rec t ing a un iversa l company 
for the cu t t ing of the Isthmus of Suez and the exp lo i t a t ion of a 
canal between two s e a s . He ^ vigorously objected tha t a competing 
canal would v io la te h i s concession, and t h a t i f i t were b u i l t 
he would demand compensation from the %yp t i an Government, The 
Egyptian G-overnment also supported l e s s e p ' s claim tha t a seconi 
canal could not be constructed without the approval of the Suez Cana 
Company. 
B r i t i s h Government on the other hand charged tha t the Suez 
Canal Company was a r b i t r a r y and high handed i n i t s d alingvs with 
the shippers; i t s fees were excessive and tha t i t discriminated 
against the B r i t i s h shipowners. The B r i t i s h Government supported 
t h e i r p r o t e s t by point ing out t h a t they had supplied approximately 
fou r - f i f t h s of the Canal t r a f f i c . The a g i t a t i o n for the r i v a l 
canal reached i t s zeni th i n 1883. Lesseps, however, did not adopt 
a merely negative a t t i t u d e . He empowered h is son Charles Lesseps 
to enter in to nego t ia t ion with the B r i t i s h d i r e c t o r s of the 
Company, John StAlces and Charles River Wilson. After a long 
discussion both the p a r t i e s signed an agreement on Ju ly 10,1883. 
The agreement provided t h a t the Company would construct a second 
canal as fa r as possible p a r a l l e l t o the exis t ing cana l . The 
13 
second canal was t o "be ccanpleted, i f pos s ib l e , by the end of 
1888, The Company would reduce the dues i n proport ion t o i t s 
p r o f i t s . The Cou^any would engage in fu tu re , a f a i r proport ion 
of English p i l o t s . In r e tu rn , the B r i t i s h Government was to 
aid the Company i n ge t t i ng a concession for the proposed Canal, 
the necessary land, and lending the Company upto ^ e ight mi l l ion 
for i t s cons t ruc t ion , 
The draf t agreement was confirmed by the Board of the Company 
with a great re luc tance , Tlie French d i r e c t o r s d i s l iked the idea 
of a loan, even on very favourable terms, from the B r i t i s h 
Treasury and they resented the s t i p u l a t i o n regarding the addi t ional 
B r i t i s h p i l o t s . The B r i t i s h d i r e c t o r s expressed t h e i r be l ief 
t h a t the agreement which was signed was adequate t o protect the 
B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s . 
The t ex t of the agreement was com lunioated to the House of 
Commons by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, I t was general ly 
demanded tha t if the second canal was to be constructed i t could 
not be under the control of Ijesseps, but under the B r i t i s h Grovern-
ment. In general the scheme was not favourably received by the 
members of the House. The Chancellor of the Exchequer Joseph 
Chi lders and the President of the Board of Trade,Ciamberliin, and 
the Prime Minister Gladstone, were s t rognly c r i t i c i s e d by the 
Opposition and by the business community. I t was argued tha t 
the provis ion regarding the B r i t i s h p i l o t s was inadequate and t h a t 
1.3, 
the agraanant failed to protect the Bri t ish shipping in teres ts 
4, 
froB exoeeslTe charges . OB July 30, 1885 a long dehate took 
place in the House of CoDOTons which lasted j&r some t a i hours. 
The same day in the House of COBBBOBS Stafford Korthcote in an 
exceedingly b r i l l i an t speech stated that Bri ta in , having a hand-
some share in the eastern t r ade , which was based on Saez Canal 
waterway should have been an inf luent ial voice in the Suez Canal 
Company, ^garding the monopoly claimed by Lesseps he said that 
5 there was no suggestion in the published documents . He (juoted 
Granville 's despatch to the Porte on March 5, 1873i 
Her Majesty's Govemmsnt do not in the sl ightest 
degree impuga the r ight of the Porte to increase 
the dues . . . . fhe Company i s , as Her Majesty's 
Government consider, Egyptian, and the r i ^ t s over 
i t of the Porte are undoubted. Her Ma j e s t ' s Govern-
ment, however, feel confident that the ^Turkish 
Govemm«nt cannot but be sensible of the equitable 
consideration which i s due tram the Porte to the 
great OAritime in te res t s which are concerned . ^ 
the Urman of 1866 the Porte solemnly endorsed the 
concession of 1856, on the faith of which number 
of vessels have been constructed in Skranee, England 
and el&ewhere for t r a f f i c through the canal, which 
has thus become one of the highway of the world, the 
obstruction of which "by the imposition of an excessive 
t o l l would be an injury to commerce, which Her Majesty's 
Govemmwit cannot believe that the Porte would willingly 
in f l i c t and against which every nation would be 
driv«a to protest 
4 . Wilson, Ho.2, pp. 65-68 
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H« furthar pointed out that tht niattar cotild not b« laid 
at r«8t as baing confined to Egyptian Gorenmant and the Sues 
Canal Company t IrrespeotiTe of the interest of the marl time 
nations. She sooner it was cleared np, and the less it was 
trifled with, the better. A member called Herwood, who represented 
the constituencQr of the merchants and shipowners urged that time 
should be allowed for the misunderstanding to be remored and 
for the mareantile men of both countries to reach a solution. 
It was more important to uphold a standard of highest oGmmercial 
moralilar than to secure a temporaiy advantage over the Sues ianal 
C(»npany. He beliared that Xicssaps would admit the British 
Gcnremment into fUll partnMhip with one half of the administra-
tion and one half of the responsibility with alternate I!r«neh 
and British presidents after his death. The dibate was ocmtinued 
"i^ Charles FalmcTt who stated that whereas the ecmceesion 
required that the nations prineippaly interested should 
be represented on the Board, they were in fact excluded. 
He|nantioned that if the British merchants preferred to go round 
the Cape soon the eanal would lose its Talue. Another member 
Henry de Worms pointed out that the principal defect of the 
agreement was the absence of specific reduction in tolls to 
take effect at definite periods. He emphasized the provision 
of a London Office of the Canal Ccnnpany as another essential 
condition. Mr. T. C. Bruce mentiimid that the Act of Concession 
134 
required the directors of the Coaipany to be chosen from the 
nationalities principally Interested, He further held that this 
provision had been ignored and ttoe company had obstinately refused 
to grant other nationalities their due representation and their 
just share in t^ ie administration. He lather said that to hand over 
the traffic of the East to a single company for a hundred years 
^im.s an inj\2stice. He also stated that Lesseps and hts French 
associates had contributed only £6 million as against £16 millions 
in the construction of idae Canal, vhile Egypt siapplied forced 
labour of innumerable peasants, financial assistance and moral 
stuport, but it had no fineoicial interest and share in the returns 
vhatsoever in the Company. Giles, the member of the Southampton, 
presented a very practical suggestion. He said that one canal double 
of the present width vottld be more useful than the two narrow ones. 
Therefore he proposed that the existing canal could be widened for 
less thaii a half of the cost of making a new canal. But the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer replied "Uiat the \Hianimous opinion of the merc^ian-
tile world was in favour of two canals. As last the debate ended 
against the argument and the proposal was soimdly defeated. In view 
of these opinions Gladstone dropped the projected agreement'• 
7. Hansard Parli^entary DebatesT 3rd. ser. Vol. CCLXXXII, 
PP.97**«980, see also Wilson, No. 2, PP.72-7^ 
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Meanvrtiile the shipowners of B r i t a i n were growing desperate 
i n t h e i r demands for r e l i e f . At t h i s moment Granville invi ted 
Lesseps to London for nego t i a t ion regarding the growing d i f f i -
c u l t i e s of the aihipowners, Lesseps reached London and a se r i e s 
of meetings between him and Granvil le removed the pre ions 
misunderstanding. Lesseps saw tha t he had no a l t e rna t ive 
but to seek a good understanding with B r i t a i n . He held a s e r i e s 
of meetings with the B r i t i s h shipowners and others most in te res ted 
i n the navigat ion of the Canal. On November 30, 1883, at the 
office of the Peninsular and Oriental Company in London, a meeting 
was held . At t h i s meeting an agreement was reached as to the 
future pol icy of the Canal Coaaipany. The agreement in br ief 
provided tha t the Company should enlarge the ex s t ing Canal. 
Enlargement would be more r ap id ly accomplished and shipping would 
benefi t a t once from the work as i t s t a r t e d . The g rea te r breadth 
would render possible a g rea te r speed of the individual shipn 
when not passing each o ther . In addi t ion to the three Directors 
appointed by the B r i t i s h government^ seven others be added from 
among English shipowners and merchants, tha t an office of the 
Company be opened i n London, t h a t the remaining sur tax levied 
since 1873 be discn'nt\Y\ue(l,and t h a t t r a n s i t and operat ion of the 
Canal be reduced i n proport ion to the earn ings of the Con^any, I t 
was a l so understood t h a t one of the three B r i t i s h government 
r ep resen ta t ives should have a s e a w n the Executive Committee . 
8. Hoskin, No.3, P.4-70j seealso Wilson, iro.2, p.80 
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The founder of the Canal made no mlstalce when he received the new-
comers graciously. The presence of England as an aBsooiate in the 
great enterptise helped to consolidate it,more especially as her 
representatives were always strictly loyal in their collahoration. 
In the long run the Suez Canal became a binding link between 
Q 
Prance and Br i t a in , 
I I , The Nature of the B r i t i s h Occupation of Egypt and the 
French Proposal for the n e u t r a l i z a t i o n of the Canal t Ever 
since the Canal was opened, the guiding p r inc ip le of the Br i t i sh 
pol icy had been t o ward off any power t h a t might menace the 
secur i ty of her route to Ind ia , For may years France had been 
considered the chief danger, but the occupation of Egypt by the 
B r i t i s h forces minimized t h i s f ea r . France by her own act ion had 
l o s t for ever her s t a t u s i n Egjrptian a f f a i r s , and Egypt had become 
10 e 
i n a l l but name a B r i t i s h Pro tec tora te , At the end of Sep'^pber 
1832 B r i t a i n was in absolute and uni isputed possession of Egypt. 
I t Was regarded and widely believed tha t the occupation had been 
accomplished as a r e s u l t of a deeply l a id and well organised plot 
designed t o oust any other povser from any share in the control of 
Egy t . The f ac t s according t o the B r i t i s h view point tha t led to 
the occupation were as follows: 
9, Andre Siegfr ied , Suez and Panama, ( t r ans . B.H, and Dorris 
Herming) (London, 1940;, P .82. 
10. S iegfr ied , No,9, P .87. 
fL^olf\m), PP, T^5-i26. 11. Jon Iiferlowe, Anglo Egyptian Relat ions 1800,1953. It 1954;, 
13 
(1) I t was Jtanct and not Britain who had takeaa the 
i n i t i a t i v e and thus had made foreign inteiwention 
inevitable; 
(2) I t was Branca and not Britain who had persistently 
opposed Turkish intervention; and 
(3) I t was Sranoet 1^0 in the most unequivocal terms, had 
refused to join with Britain in the hcaahardment of 
Alexandria or in the occupation of the Sues Canal. 
The valid caritioiam of the Br i t i sh Government policy in the 
12 ev^ats leading up to the occupation was ; 
(a) that i t ignored to seek an acccmimodaticai with moderate 
nationaliaat in the days of the Sharif Government* Imt 
instead, at Erench inst igation consolidated and united 
(the ertrone) Egyptian nationalism against the dual 
oontrol \^ means of the Joint Bote; and 
(b) that i t did not devote sufficient at tention to the possi-
bili-ty of t rea t ing Qrabi Pasha as the accredited represaa-
ta t ive of the Egyptian nation. 
The ostensible reasons advanced hy the Bri t i sh for the i r 
occupation of Egypt were rathereontrary to the rea l facts , ftrcan 
the very beginning i t had been the cardinal point in the Bri t ish 
12. Ibid. 
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foreign policy to save Egypt from the political domination of 
any other power. The British politicians had already realized 
that the lose of Egypt would mean the loss of imperial domination 
in the :^8t. &fter the opening of the Saez Canal Britain had 
strengthened this policy and was searching for a pretext to control 
Egypt and the Canal through its naval power. At last OraTDi^ s 
revolt provided the British Government 7/ith an occasion for the landing 
of her troops. It would be wrong to say that France alone made 
foreign intervention inevitalDle and opposed the Turkish Government 
with regard to intervention. Actually, Britain through her policies 
had ma ;e the foreign intervention inevitahle. It was Britain 
which persistently opposed the incr^ise of the canal tolls. It was 
Britain which purchased the Canal shares and out-witted the French 
Government in this regard. It was Britain which in 1877 undertook 
the responsibility of protection of the Canal without any regard 
to the fact that Egypt was an Ottoman territory. Besides, whenever 
the Turksih Government intervened in the affairs of Egypt, Britain 
strongly opposed it. It seems that France after 1875-76 events 
cooperated with Britain in its Egyptian policy only to check the 
rising influence in Egypt. 
Ever, after ocoapation ^f Egypt remained a burning issue in 
British domestic policies. It was generally regarded that the 
occupation of Egypt was the first and decisive step towards 
13J 
1 "5 B r i t i s h expansioiknto the r e s t of Africa ^. The reasons glTen 
by the B r i t i s h ao-9Brnraent In occupying J^ypt wei^ J (a) the 
danger to both l i f e and property of the B r i t i s h sub;)ects, (b) 
the desire t o maintain the s t a tus quo i n Egypt, and (c) to 
save the European shareholders . 
B r i t i s h Foreign Secretary Granville on May 15, 1882, i n 
the House of Commons s ta ted the aims of the B r i t i s h Governments 
po l i cy i n Egypt were (a) the maintenance of the soveriegn 
r i g h t s of the Sultan; (b) the maintenance of the pos i t ion of 
the KWsBiive; and (c) the preserva t ion of the l i b e r t i e s of the 
Egyptian people under the Firman of the Porte ^. Qn the other 
hand,the c r i t i c s of the B r i t i s h occupation argued tha t i n fact 
the French govemnent discovered the B r i t i s h government as a 
more e f f i c i e n t too l i n t h e i r hands for the d i s rup t ion of the 
Ottoman Empire and the separat ion of Egypt from the Sublime 
15 Porte than Orabi Pasha and h i s pa r ty , 
In fac t Egypt was occupied pr imar i ly for the s t r a t eg i c 
and defensive reasons, The Orabi r e v o l t and adminis t ra t ive 
chaos i n Egypt threatened tlie navigat ion of the Suez Canal. 
13 . Robert T.Tignor, Modernization and B r i t i s h Colonial 
Rule i n Egypt. T882~19U (Princeton 1966)7 p . 2 1 , 
H . Hansard Parliamentary Debate^.^rd. s e r . Yol. CCLXIX, pp. 
460 and 64-7. 
15. Tignor, Ho.13, P .23 . 
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that 
British gsfemment thought/^ if the situation persisted it 
might have posed a danger to its eastern dominion. So in the light 
of this fact British goTernment had taken the initiative,Therefore 
it would not "be wrong to say that Egypt was occupied because of 
India, not because of the reasons mentioned by the British 
Governaent. The occupation was largely due to Britain's desire 
to control the Suez Oanal for this purpose and for a new stra-
16 
tegio link in her iMpexlol communication , 
The subsequent policies of reforms and control in Egypt 
reflected the defensive nature of the occupation. The primary 
concern of the administration in Egypt was to maintain peace 
in a country considered important because of its strategic 
location. This policy clearly reflected that they wanted a 
permanent control of the country and not to hold it temporarily 
as they claimed, For example, in October 1882 the Turkish 
government proposed that England and Turkey should enter into 
negotiation of the Egyptian question and that the basis should 
be the treaty of 1841» the existing Firmans, and the sovereign 
right of the Sultan. To this G anviUe replied that when the 
proper time arrived his government would be prepared to consider 
the views of the Ottoman governuffint on the subject, and 
that any discussion on the subject at that time would be 
16, Ibid, PP.20T24; see also, George Lenczwoski, 
The Middle Bast ixx the World Affairs. (New Tork, 1956) 
p.490. 
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premature^'^. Despite t h i s po l icy of permanent occupation 
the B r i t i s h goTerianent had been cont inual ly s t r e s s ing the 
temporary nature of occupation On ffovemher 3, 1882, Granville 
18 
i n a c i r c u l a r t o the Powers s ta ted t 
Her Majesty's aovernment. while des i r ing t h a t 
the B r i t i s h occupation shotad l a s t for as/short 
a time as pos s ib l e , f e e l bound not t o withdraw 
from the t a sk thail imposed on them u n t i l the 
adminis t ra t ion of a f fa i r s has been reconstructed 
on a bas is which wi l l afford s a t i s f a c t o r y guarantee 
for the maintenance of peace, order and prosper i ty 
of ^ y p t , for the s t a b i l i t y of the Khedive's 
au thor i ty - for the judicious development of self 
government and the fulfi lment of obl iga t ion 
towards the foreign powers. The object ives are 
i n the the r e a l i n t e r e s t s of Egypt, of t h i s 
country and of Europe. 
The occupation of Egypt by Br i t a in r a i sed a new question 
i n connection with the freedom of navigation through the Canal. 
In the course of operat ion, the B r i t i s h troops ac tua l ly used th 
Canal, as a bas is of a t t ack and temporari ly in te r rupted i t s 
commercial use . This brought i n t o r e l i e f the necess i ty for a 
general agreement with respect t o the s t a t u s of the Canal. The 
other powers, e spec ia l ly Prance, were very much anxious about 
the p ro tec t ion and n e u t r a l i t y of the Canal. I t was argued tha t 
a permanent occupation of the country would upset the t r a d i • 
t i o n a l balance of power i n the Bast , and i n addi t ion t o i t 
17. B r i t i s h and Foreign State Papers, y41.75,pp.670-79 
18. Ib id , PP. 670-671 
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i t was feared t h a t the freedom of navigat ion i n the Canal might be 
jeopardised, The p e t i t i o n was such t h a t the control of naviga-
t i o n through the Canal was de .lure i n the hands of Turlcey, 
heing i n the (Purlcish t e r r i t o r y but de fac to i t was i n the hands 
of Br i t a in as i t was not only the predominant naval power i n 
the Mediterranean but also because Egypt was under i t s occupa-
t i o n , Ifenoe t h i s anamolous s i t u a t i o n intensif idd^ the ddsire of 
other powers for an agreement which could compel Br i t a in t o 
19 
respect the freedom of the Canal , However, the i n i t i a t i v e 
came from the S r i t i s h s ide . ITot more than a month af te r the 
b a t t l e of f e l - e l -Keb i r , d ranv i l l e wrote to Bismark, • We wish to 
suggest t h a t f ree passage through the Suez Canal i n time of piace 
and war be soured t o a l l sea fa r ing nat ions under an i n t e r -
20 
na t iona l guarantee of the powers* After some prel iminary 
oonversatlon (hranville, on January 3, 1885 addressed c i r c u l a r 
d ispa tch t o the powers proposing a convention tha t would ensure 
freedom of passage through the Canal t o a l l ships i n any ciroum-
s tanoes . Ihe formula proposed i n t h i s c i r c u l a r note carefu l ly 
avoided any suggestion of neu t r a l i z ing the Canal, but did in 
substance propose t o r egu la r i s e the use of the Canal in time of 
peace and war, by declar ing the Canal toXfree for the passage 
19. Marlowe, lfo.11, pp,79-80} see a l so H.L,Hoskin, ' Ihe 
Suez Canal as an iBte rna t lona l Waterway, American Journa 
of I n t e r n a t i o n a l law. (Washington D.C. 1^43; ,TolJ? , 
p .375, Obie taJ fe ,1 , p .10 . 
20, Haskln, Ho.19, p .375 . 
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of a l l Ships i n any circumBtanoes, forbidding h o s t a l i t i e s within 
i t s p r e c i n t s , providing for the defence of Egypt, and leaving 
to the government of Egypt the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of enforcing the 
nieasures^\ Regarding the n e u t r a l i t y of the Canal Granville 
wrote to Bismark *We can never agree t o the Suez Canal being 
neu t ra l i zed . No B r i t i s h adn i s t e r can agree to t h i s ^ a passage 
22 being closed t o us i n the event of itm war' , I t was fur ther 
maintained tha t i t was the i n t en t i on of B r i t a i n t o preserve her 
r i gh t over the Canal zoaajbo long as the necess i ty for her 
23 present occupation of the country continued ^, I t appeared t h a t 
Br i t a in was not i n t e r e s t ed i n maintaining the n e u t r a l i t y of the 
Canal. After the occupation of Egypt she adopted delaying t a c t i c s 
and wanted to convert the canal i n to a B r i t i s h imperial a sse t , 
B r i t a i n ' s po l icy i n Egypt and i n regard t o the Canal shows tha t 
she wanted to remain permanently in Egypt and not for a short time 
as claimed by her . 
Response t o Granv i l l e ' s proposal was slow as i t f a i l ed t o 
provide the provis ion f0f< the n e u t r a l i z a t i o n of the Canal. Two 
years J If ef:-, i n 1385 duting an ambassodorial conference meeting 
i n London t o discuss the f inanc ia l a f f a i r s of Egypt,^French 
government suggested for a conference i n Pa r i s t o discuss the 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l character of the Suez Canal, At the suggestion 
21 . H.l.Hoskin, 'The Suez Canal i n the time of War', 
Poreign Affairs (Weif York, 1935),Vol.14, p.96 
22. Amadi Maity, The :EWoblem of the Suez Canal . (Calcut ta . 
1956), p . '^T"^ 
23. Ib id . 
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of the French goyerument i t was decided t h a t a conmiittee of experts 
should assemble i n Pa r i s t o draf t a de f in i t e agreement regula t ing 
the s t a t u s of the Canal, ?y t h i s time France had become wholly 
alarmed by England*s delaying t a c t i c s with regard t o evacuation , 
and v/as, therefore anxious t o remove the purported reasons for 
the B r i t i s h occupation of Sgypt by placing the secur i ty of the 
Canal i n the hands of an i n t e r n a t i o n a l organ. Otl^r po\7ers also 
supported the view of the French government. In view of the 
French proposal a seven power conference wajs held a t Pa r i s , In 
t h i s conference, on June 13» l885f a draf t t r e a t y was drawn up 
a t the French in s i s t ence which provided for an i n t e rna t iona l 
Canal CcwaAssion conqjosed of r ep resen ta t ives of the powers. This 
Commission was t o be responsible for the p ro tec t ion of the Canal 
24 
ana for the execution of the t r e a t y . B r i t i s h delegate accepted 
t h i s arrangement subject t o a broad r e se rva t ion tha t the agree-
ment should not be understood to f e t t e r the l i b e r t y of ac t ion 
of Her Majesty's Government during the occupation of Egypt, The 
B r i t i s h r e se rva t ion rendered the provis ion p r a c t i c a l l y use less 
and i t r e su l t ed i n a deadlock. The conference ended inconclu-
s ive ly as Br i t a in was wi l l ing t o concede neutrali25ation i n the 
sense of freedom of navigat ion, but was against the i n t e r n a t i o n a l -
26 i s a t i o n of the Canal, as desired by France and other powers . 
24. Obieta, lfo,1, P. 11 
25. Hbskin, Ho.21, P.96 
26. Goerge Young, Egypt. (London,1927), p .145. 
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The fa i lure of the powers to come to an agreed conclusion 
led t o heated discussion anong themselves to explore a new 
formula. 'F'j^ax^e was press ing England to resume negot ia t ion in 
27 
order "Go reach a def in i te conclusion , At l a s t by a ITote of 
August 19, 1887, the B r i t i s h Government shov/ed i t s e l f ready-
to accept some of the proposals put forward by the French 
Foreign Minister , France and Turkey in p a r t i c u l a r were 
attempting to discover t he base on which the Br i t i s l i &ovarnment 
wo l id be wi l l i ng to withdraw from Egypt, Eventually, a f t e r 
some len^5thy negot ia t ions a draf t convention respesrting the 
free navigat ion of the Suez Maritime Canal< was prepared by the 
Br i t i sh GrOveriEnent'based on the provision of the abortive 1885 
t r e a t y . I t was formally signed at Constantinople on October 29, 
1883 by the represen ta t ive of Br i t a in , France, Germany,Austria, 
Htingary, I t a l y , Russia, Spain, Turkey and the Netherlands. All 
the Signatory power r a t i f i e d t h i s convention but Br i t a in r a t i f i e d 
i t with r e se rva t ion t h a t • in so far the Treaty i s incompetaole 
with the t r a n s i t i o n a l and the exceptional s i t u a t i o n and would 
impede the l i b e r t y of ac t ion of the B r i t i s h Government during the 
29 
occupation' -^  I t fur ther said t h a t Br i t a in might consider 
i t s e l f free to disregard the terras of the convention, France 
accepted t h i s r e se rva t ion with the understanding t h a t the powers 
27. Maity, No.22, P.10 
28. Obleta, No. l , P. 11 
29. Hoskin, No.20, P.377 
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might take advantage of it"^  . 
In this way the status of the Canal was generally regarded 
as established "by a document. In fact, the Constantinople Con-
vention provided for neither neutralization no* intemationali-
satlon in the usual sense of those terms, but the Canal was 
universalized and became a corridor for all belligerents, and 
31 
made Egypt responsible for carrying out its provisions'^ . 
"By the 1888 Convention the Canal was declared to be opened 
to all vessels, whether merchant ships or war ships in time of 
war as in time of peace. She Canal was not to be blockaded, no 
acts of hostality were to be oonnnitted within its precints, and 
no permaosnt fortifications were to be erected alor^ its line. 
In case of danger the Egyptian government was to be responsible to 
t€ike the necessary measures. Further clauses contained a provision 
that recognised the right of the Sultan or Khedive to take mea-
sures they might find necessary inaecuring by their own forces 
the defence of Egypt and the maintenance of public order. In 
Article twelve M the right of Turkey as the territorial power was 
assured, The British Sovernment refused to concede jurisdiction 
of any kind of international commission as such, but consular 
30. Ibid 
31. Hoskin, Ko.21, p.97J see also Vilson, No.2, P. 92. 
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agents of the signatory powers were authorised to maintain an 
innocuous kind of surve i l lance over Canal a f f a i r s with respect 
32 t o the carrying out of the provisions of the Convention . 
The Suez Canal Convention of 1888 was the outcome of 
Br i ta ine delaying po l icy regarding Egypt and the Canal. Though 
the Convention was not benef ic ia l t o other natioiffi, the l a t*e r 
got a l e g a l t o o l for a t tack ing B r i t a i n , i f she used the Canal 
against the Convention, The r e se rva t ion made by Br i t a in also 
shows t h a t she wanted t o be the v i r t u a l r u l e r of Egypt. 
In one important respect the Suez Canal Convention was 
quite anamolous. Due t o the r e se rva t ion made by Br i t a in the 
Convention remained i n abeyance for many yea r s . The f i r s t serious 
t e s t of the B r i t i s h a t t i t u d e was i n 1898, when the Spanish war-
ships a t Port Said wished to coal and r e f i t while enroute through 
the Canal t o the East with the purpose of ending the American 
occupation of the Ph i l ipp ines , Lord Cromer, the B r i t i s h Consul-
General t n Egypt refused the permi' s ion sought, so proving tha t 
the Suez Canal was not i n f ac t i n t e rna t iona l i zed . Curzon ,Under 
Secretary of Foreign Affairs on July 12, 1898, i n the HoUse of 
33 Commons s ta ted i n rep ly t o a fuestion"^"^. 
The Convention i n question (Constantinople 28,1888) 
i s c e r t a i n l y i n existence but has not been brought 
32. Qeorge W.Davis, • F o r t i f i c a t i o n a t Panama* American Journal 
of In t e rna t iona l Law. (Washington D.C. 1909;,yoll .3,No.2 
P.897|see a lso Quincy wright, ' I n t e rven t ion 1956' American 
Journal of I n t e rna t i ona l Law (Washington D,C. 195f ),Vol51 
pp.261-262,Hoskin No.20,PP.375-377, For d e t a i l s of Conven-
t i o n see Appendix E, 
33. Davis, No. 32,P.899. 
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i n t o p r a c t i c a l operat ion. This i s owing t o the 
reserves made i n behalf of Her Majesty's govern-
ment by the B r i t i s h delegates a t the Suess Canal 
Coranission i n 1385f which was renewed by Lord 
Salisburg i n 1877. 
The r e l a t i o n e betvreen France and B r i t a i n in the meantin» 
became straiiasd, France had been squeezed out of Egypt, and out-
manoeured again and again by B r i t a i n , which now held v i r t u a l l y 
exclusive cont ro l over the Canal. France was not alone i n her 
resentment, for most of the powers sharedl t o grea ter or l e s se r 
35 
extent im her feel ings of b i t t e rnes s and opposition t o Br i t a in . 
B r i t a i n however wanted t o get recogni t ion from France of her 
pos i t ion i n E/rypt, At l a s t France agreed t o yie ld to Br i t i sh 
wish being assured by B r i t a i n of an equivalent compensation and 
free hand i n Morocco* A compromise was f i n a l l y reached 
and Anglo-French Agreement of April 18, 1904 was the outcome of 
t h i s understanding, which changed the whole p ic ture of European 
ere 
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"56 diplomacy . In the House of Commons^Earl P rcy, the Under 
Secretary of State fo r Foreign Affairs sa id: 
The two powers agreed t o recognised Egypt and 
Ilorocco as f a l l i n g r e spec t ive ly within tlie sphere 
oiff paramount influence of Br i t a in and F ance. At 
the same time, i t guarantees for a period of a t 
l e a s t t h i r t y yea r s , and independently of any p o l i -
t i c a l changes which may supervene i n the i n t e r v a l 
35. Obieta, No.1, P.12 
36. Maity, No.22, P. 10. 
37. Hansard Parliamentary Debate. 4 th s e r i e s . Vol.0XXXV, 
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the principle ia Ixrtli these eountriee of ahsolute 
eosBserolal freedom and equality of opportunity. 
I t also secures for an unlimited period the principle 
of the free narigation of the Sues Canal and the 
Straits of Oibralter and the non-fortification of 
the large part of Hediterranean and Atlantic Sea 
Board of Morocco. 
Similar declarations were signed in the folloiring months 
1:!7 Germany, Italy and Aastrid- Hungaxy. % this Agrewnent 
Britain reiterated her adherence to the original Sues Canal 
Conventi(m and thus the Convention at last came into force . 
In this way the anamolous position of Britain in Egypt that 
had for many years poisoned her diplomatic relations with the 
other powers, was at last given a certain legal hasis as an 
internationally recognised de facto situation. The essential etMaeff 
element of the Anglo-French Agreei'^ ent was that llrance would 
not oppose British imperialism in Bgypt and in the East. In fact 
Egypt had, for a l l purposes become part and parcel of the British 
Etapire'^. 
The impact of this agreement was such that during the 
Russo-Japanese iter (1904-1905) Russian warships enroute to the 
Pacific Ocean were allowed to use the Canal, despite the fact 
that Japan was Britain's a l ly . At the outhreak of the Turko-
Italian war (l911) the Egyptian GoT«mment for the f irst time 
38. Hoskin, No.20, P. 377| see also, Obieta, No.1, P.12. 
39. OTt,i0ta, Ho.1, P. 12, see also, Maity, Ho.22, P. 15. 
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employed some of the power specif ied i n the ConTention of 
1888. Egyptian a u t h o r i t i e s boarded and diBarmed the Trirkish 
gunboats which fa i l ed to q^ult Port Said vTithin twenty four 
hours . At other t M e s armed vessels of both be l l i ge r en t s used 
the Canal without;^incident regard less of the fac t tha t Egypt 
4-0 
was the pa r t of the Ottoman Empire , 
The ac t ion of Egjrptian Oovernment was l ega l and i n 
accordance with the Ar t ic le IT of the 1888 Convention. More-
over, the reason was also p o l i t i c a l . By t h i s time the IPurkish 
Grovernment had begun t o adopt pro-German p o l i c i e s . I t had 
granted d concession t o Germany for the construct ion of the 
Berlin-Baghdad rai lway. In the l i g h t of t h i s f ac t , one can 
say t h a t the Egyptian ac t ion was not only l e g a l l y correct but 
was a lso p o l i t i c a l l y motivated. 
In t h i s Way, Br i t a in through her diplomacy^ appeased 
Prance and thus bought off i t s only r i v a l by allowing her a 
f ree hand i n Morocco, while reserving to herse l f the r igh t to 
s tay i n Egypt for the p ro tec t ion of i t s main »Juglar Yeln' 
i n order to safe-guard her eas te rn empire. . 
40. Marlowe, No.11, P.SOj see a l so , Hoskin, No.20,P.378 
4 1 . Malty, No.22, P . I 5 . 
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I I I . The Braag Hacti Oaten of Oermany and Bri-fcleh Counter 
Polioy t After the opening of the Suez Canal, Br i t a in adopted 
as discussed abo^re, a defensive pol icy regarding t h i s waterway, 
the 
go t h a t no power could menace^ secur i ty of t h i s gateway to the 
East , For many years Prance had been regard d^ as the chief 
r i v a l , hut the agreement of 1904 turned her a t t en t ion more 
and more towards North Africa. Another r i v a l power was Gzarist 
Russia, which. i t was genera l ly alleged ^wanted to come down to 
the warm waters . Russia w ^ not now i n p ic ture as she had 
been paralysed because of her defeat In Manchuria i n 1905 at 
the hands of Japan, and the agreement of 190? regarding Pers ia 
f i n a l l y ended her Jong r i v a l r y with B r i t a i n . However, the 
comparative i n a c t i v i t y of these two powers i n t h i s area did n t 
end the danger, A new power, i . e . , Gtermany began to emerge as 
a t h r ea t to the B r i t i s h supremacy i n tfee West Asia towards the 
end of the n ineteenth century, 
B^ the t u r n of the century (Jerman indus t ry had made such 
rapid s t r i d e s t ha t i t began to seek new marloets and the Ottoman 
empire offered a l og i ca l o u t l e t . Between 1886 and 1910 Gfermany 
jumped from f i f t een th to second plaoe i n the Ottoman foreign 
t r a d e , outstr ipped only by England • Inspired by the German 
42. J .C . l i i rewitz. Diplomacy i n Hear and Middle Eas t . 
A Documentary Record t 1535 " 1914. (Hew York, 1956) 
p.252. 
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imperialistic policsy* Garnan agtnte btgaa to capture markats and 
Spread German ealture in the region of West Asia with a riew to gain 
political foothold^^. Emperor Kaiser Wllhelm II said * Germany 
oust never weaxy in the work of civili;^ation| Germany, l ike to 
spirit of Imperial Rome must expand and impose iteslf^^. 
German strategieis thought i t possihle that British domination 
Sgjrpt and the Sues Canal waterway to the East could he dislodged, 
at least in part, \^- re-eetahlisblng the northern overland 
route Tia the Persian Gulf. The Germans thought that tgr 
doing 80 t h ^ would outflank their rivals "W "building a r a i l -
road from Berlin to Baghdad, extending i t to the head of the 
Gulf. Such a railway scheme in which they could dominate the 
Ottoman Impire would faci l i tate the latter in the re-occupa-
tion of Igjrpt and the ousting of Britain from West Asia. The 
plan was designed on the assumption that i t woulA ass i s t the 
Sultan in controlling more effectivelj the outlying parts of the 
Ottoman BBipire. Thus in her b^ranf i^ i^ ^ fist an German hegan 
to look tonards the Ottoman Itepire as a promising area for the 
expansion and for the ctmtrol of the profitahle rcmte to India^-'. 
41. H.J. Schonfield, The gyei Canal pi th^ Wprifl jffa^yff, (Hew York, 195? J, ?. 61} seealso Iionggood, Sues Story 
Key to thii Middle Bast. (Hew York, 1957). P.sDT 
44. Schonfield, Ho.43, P.61. 
45. Schonfield, Ho.43, p.62| see also Longgood, Ho.43, p. 84. 
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With t h i s aim i n mind, Kaiser Wilhelm I I v i s i t e d «se 
Constantinople i n 1898, At Constantinople he persuaded the 
Sultan to promote the Berlin-Baghdad ra i lway pro-^eat under 
German auspices . The Sultan welcomed the proposed project 
mainly due t o the growing fear of Russia, The Sultan f e l t 
t h a t the project once in operat ion would contr ibute t o the 
economic development, un i f i c a t i on and defence of h i s Asian 
dominions. With t h i s view i n mind he issued a prel iminary 
concession in 1899 and on March 5,1905 granted de f in i t e 
oonoesaion to the Ottoman Anatolian Railway Conipai^, which was 
owned mainly hy the Deutsche Bank (Germany) and "by some French 
46 inves to rs . The Berl in BagMad railway scheme was a matter 
of g rea t concern t o the European nat ions e spec ia l ly to Br i t a in . 
I t Was a counter scheme put fo r th by the Germans with a motive, 
s imi la r to t h a t of Alexandria-Suez railv/ay scheme proposed by 
the B r i t i s h government i n 1852, In 1856 when Mohammad Said 
awarded the de f in i t e canal concession t o l e s s e p s , B r i t a in 
s t rongly opposed i t and argued tha t i t would delay the construc-
t i o n of the ra i lway. How Baghdad railway scheme created the -Wteae 
same s i t u a t i o n . The opening of the new route was considered 
to be damaging to the ^ioimnercial advantages of the Canal as the 
Canal had affected the Cape r o u t e . 
Schonfield i n h i s analyia goes fu r the r . According to him 
46. Harewitz, No.42, P,252. 
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the award of the ooncession to the Gterman iiompany created a 
s i t u a t i o n s imi la r t o t h a t vthlah had exis ted a century e a r l i e r 
when French imperial alms had clashed with those of B r i t a i n 
and, France had hoped under Napoleon t o destroy t l ^ power of 
England through Egjrpt, Thus, indeed Egyptian importance had heen 
recognised again and again by the i m p e r i a l i s t i c world due to 
47 her g e o - p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n , 
At the beginning of the twent ie th century and espec ia l ly 
a f t e r the Anglo-French Agreement i n 1904, B r i t a i n s t a r t e d t o 
fur ther consolidate her pos i t i on i n the Q-ulf and the Red Sea 
areas agednst the Gterman expansion. With t h i s aim B r i t a i n in 
1906 prevented the Sultan from construct ing rai lway l i ne s in 
the Sinai Peninsula, one of which was to cross the canal and 
the other was to go towards the Red Sea, The B r i t i s h alleged 
t h a t these would prove a danger t o the l i b e r t i e s of Egypt and 
48 t o the secur i ty of the Canal . After the m i l i t a r y occupation 
of Egypt B r i t a i n ' s pol icy with regard t o Ohirkey .^aabeen progress-
i v e l y changing. lurlcey which had previously been protected by 
B r i t a i n against Russia, was now becoming a source of danger t o 
B r i t a i n owing to her a l l iance with Gtermany. In f a c t , B r i t a i n 
had long since taken precaut ion to p ro tec t her i n t e r e s t s i n 
West Asia by occupying a whole s e r i e s of strongholds t Aden 
47. Schonfield, lfo.42, P.252 
48. Obieta, No.1, p.13 
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i n 1859, the i s land of Perim i n 1857, Cyprus i n 187*, Egypt 
i n 1881, the i s land of Socotra i n 1886 and the Somaliland 
coast between 1884 and 1886, In t h i s way the Persian Gulf 
49 
and the Red Sea had become p r a c t i c a l l y Beritish lakes , 
After October 1904, the const ruct ion of the Baghdad 
rai lway was s t a l l e d for more than s i x yea r s . The tfinancial and 
p o l i t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s arose mostly from the s t ra ined re l a t ione 
of Germany with Br i t a in , Prance and Russia . Meanwhile i n 1907 
an Anglo-Russian Convention was signed, ^sftiich v i r t u a l l y divided 
Pers ia i n t o B r i t i s h and Russian spheres of inf luence. This 
convention was mainly due t o common fear of German expansionist 
a c t i v i t i e s in Wfest Asia. In t h i s way B r i t a i n by concluding 
ime agreen^nts with Prance i n 1904 and Russia i n 1907 respec t ive ly 
was in a pos i t i on to block the way of German expansionist? in 
Vest Asia^°. 
At the Beginning when Berlin-Baghdad rai lway project was 
i n the offing, B r i t a in was so powerful t h a t she was not very 
much concerned about the t h r e a t r i s i n g from the p ro j ec t . Br i t a in 
was even ready in the i n i t i a l s tages t o give her cooperation 
i n Carrying out the scheme. But lus she r ea l i zed the motive 
of the proposed p ro jec t , she began to take defensive measures. 
49. Siegfried, No.10, p.88 
50, Hurewitz,Ifo,42; see a l so , Schonfield,No.43,P.63. 
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I t was only i n 1909 t h a t Br i t a in demanded frcan Germany the 
cont ro l of the sect ion of the l ine from Baghdad t o the Gulf, 
In 1911 a book was published named Die Baghdadbhan vsrritten 
by Dr. Paul Rohrbach which increased B r i t a i n ' s f ea r . In t h i s 
Book Rohrbach c l e a r l y mentioned the whole conception of the 
s t ra tegy regarding Egypt and the Bast , and also outl ined a plan 
for cu t t ing the main a r t e r y of the B r i t i s h Eapire . Followir^ 
51 
was the plan t 
England can be at tacked and mortal ly wounded by land 
from Europe only i n one place - Egypt. The loss of 
Egypt would mean not only the end of her dominion 
over the Suez Canal and of her communication with 
India and the Par East , but would probably e n t a i l 
a lso the loss of her possessions i n 6en t r a l and 
East Africa. The conquest of Egypt by a Mohammedan 
power, l ike Turkey, would also imperi l Enp;land»3 hold 
ovier feei- s ix ty mi l l i on Mohajnmedan subjects i n India 
. . . . Turkey, however, can never dream of recovering 
Egypt u n t i l she i s mis t ress of a developed railway 
system i n Asia Minor and Syria, and u n t i l , through 
the progress of the Anatolian rai lway to Baghdad, 
she i s i n a pos i t i on t o withstand an a t t ack by England 
upon Mesopotamia . . . The s tronger Turkey becomes 
the g rea te r wi l l be the danger for England, i f , i n 
a German-Baglish war, Turkey whould be on the side 
of Germany. 
After the publ ica t ion of t h * book the B r i t i s h Government 
with g rea te r force pressed the German GovernnEnt for the B r i t i s h 
cont ro l ofy^said sec t ion of the p ro j ec t . The B r i t i s h Foreign 
Secretary explained to the B r i t i s h Committee of Imperial Defence 
51 . Schonfield, Ho.43, pp.62-.63} see also Longgood 
T)T3.84^85. 
in. 
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on May 26, 1911» the following Tlews regarding the Baghdad Railway'': 
*e have only got two ©h^ecta as regards tha 
Baghdad Bailway; one i s to secure that when 
that railway i s made British trade shall not 
he at a disadvantage and the other that the 
situation in the Persian GxLlt . . . should not 
he altered in a way which would damage our .. 
strategical positicm. 
On the demand of the British Government and the pressure 
trim the Whitehall, negotiations started and at lart an inglo-
German Agreement on June 15, 19 H, was reached which fixed 
the terminus of the r a i l ? ^ at Basra until Britain should permit 
54 of i t s further extension to Kuwait • ^ this agreement Britain 
got two seats in the directorate of the railway company. But 
hefore the Agreement could he ratified the World llNur I hroke 
out and the convention could not he ratified. 
Soon after the declaration of the war, i t hecame immediately 
apparent that the Sues Canal was endangered. fhe Gnmans 
were convinced that ly cutting England's • Juglar 
52. ftirewits, No.4-2, p. 269 
53. Itor details see Horewitz, pp. 281-286 
54. In 1899* Britain made an agreement with the Shaikh of 
Kuwait, hy which the 15hM3£hundertook not to cede,mortgage 
or otherwise dispose off parts of his territories to any one 
except the British {rovarament, nor to enter into any relation 
ship with ftbreign Oivemment other than the British Govern-
ment, without British Consent. 
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Soon a f t e r the dec la ra t ion of the war, i t became 
isEnediately aprjareirt t h a t the Suez Canal was endangered. 
The Germans were convinced t h a t by d u t t i n g England's ' jugular 
ve in ' they vvoiad br ing down the B r i t i s h Empire, The Conven-
t i o n of 1888 provided tha t Egypt was to p ro tec t the Canal, 
and i f unable to do so, she would c a l l upon the Turkish 
government. However, Turkey sympathised with Germany, and 
Egyijt was s t i l l nominally a par t of the Ottoman Empire, and 
i t s de tt«ye r u l e r Khedive Abbas Hilmi Pasha was pro-German, 
On November 5, 1914 Turkey declared war on the Al l ies and 
openly joined vyith the Centra l Powers including Germany, 
These circumstances compelled the B r i t i s h goveriaaent to adopt 
a defensive pol icy regardiiig Egypt and the Suez Canal. The 
B r i t i s h Secretary of Sta te for Foreign Affairs therefore , 
on December 18,1314 issued the followini^ Note - J^^ 
His Britejiic Ma3esty»s p r inc ipa l Secretary 
of State for Foreign Affairs gives not ice 
t h a t , i n view of the s t a t e of war a r i s i ng 
out of the ac t ion of Turkey, Egypt i s placed 
under the p ro tec t ion of Hie Majesty and w i l l 
henceforth cons t i t u t e a B r i t i s h p r o t e c t o r a t e . 
The suzerainlkty of Turkey over Egypt i s 
thus terminated and His Majesty 's Goveranent 
w i l l adopt a l l measures necessary for the defence 
of E^rpt and the p ro tec t ion of i t s inhabi tants 
and i n t e r e s t s . 
55. B r i t i s h and Foreign State Papers, Part I I , Tol. CCyill 
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The following day Khedive Abbas Hilmi Pasha was deposed 
and Prince Hussein Kamil Pasha was elected with the title 
of Sultan of Egypt . Soon after the declaration of Egypt 
as protectorate by the British Grovernoent, all Egyptian ports 
thereupon became belligerent ports, British troops were 
stationed at strategic points on the Canal and it was closed 
57 for merchanfe vessels , 
She British declaration of Egypt as a protectorate and 
the closure of the Canal for the use of the Central Powers 
was contrary to the 1888 Contention, It was elearlj?- stipulated 
in Article I t^^ 
The Suez Maritime Canal shall always be free and 
open In time of war as in time of peao© to every 
vessel of commerce (» of war without distinction 
of flag. 
Ihe Canal shall never be subjected to the 
exercise of the right of blockade. 
In Article XII the rights of Turkey as Territorial power 
59 had been fitssured'"^. Britain, despite this stipulation, acted imi-
laterally in violation of the 1888 Convention. 
56. Ibid 
57. Hoskin, Ho. 20, p. 378 
58. For details see Appendix E, 
59. Ibid, 
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The out Ijreak of the World Wtir I changed the international 
character of the Sues Canal. After declaring Sgypt as protectorate* 
i t became entirely a British Channel, Biritain at last succeeded 
in her policy i . e . , to protect the Sues Canal gateway to the Sast, 
from the other powers, i , e . , Pranee, Germany* Italy and Russia. 
CHAPTER - V 
SUMMiRT AND CONCLUSION 
The analyslB of the ancient and medleayal oonaseriial histosy 
shows that sBgypt has been eithvr the connnercial centre or the 
connectlong l ink between the l^s t and the West. I t s Importance from 
ooramerclal point of view had been realized by merchants, poli t icians 
and emperors from ancient times. The geographical location and 
r e l i e f f^itures of West Asia and i t s surrounding areas have made 
Egypt a natural passage between the East and the West. Tor th i s 
reason* every major empire had stressed the need of a canal, 
direct (through the Isthmus) or indirect ( via the Nile River) 
across Egypt to serve commercial, po l i t i ca l and military purposes. 
The discovery of the Cape (of Good Hope) route to the east 
in 1498 disturbed the well organised international treuie and 
laid imste the old trade routes of West Asia. The prosperity 
of the ports of the Mediterranean Sea aas also los t . The 
commercial supreisacy of the Mediterranean powers came to an end. 
The Cape route shifted the major commercial ac t iv i t i e s from the 
hands of the Mediterranean powers to those of the Atlantic powers of 
Europe. The. discovery of t h i s route also immeasurably decreased 
the geo-polit ical importance of the Mediterranean Sea. Consequently 
the *middle sea ' raoained no longer the middle sea of the 
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world and f e l l In to d i suse , except for l oca l purposes, for three 
cen tur ies to ccMe. 
irapoleon*s expedition rn Egypt i n 1898 again reviTed the 
geo -po l i t i c a l and commercial intportance of Egypt- Hapoleon was vei 
much convinced t h a t ifeypt wsis the place from where he could s t r ike 
a t the B r i t i s h supremacy i n the e a s t . He was also in te res ted 
i n cu t t ing of a canal across the Istlrnxus of Suez, But his 
defeat a t the hands of the furldLsh and B r i t i s h forces l a t e r 
f rus t ra ted h i s ambition. The r e s u l t s of Napoleon's expedit ion 
t o Egypt were two-fold * (a) i t introduced a new question, i . e . , 
Egyptian quest ion, i n the diplomatic h i s t o r y of Europe; and (b) 
i t d iver ted the a t t en t i on of f^ B r i t i s h Government towards 
Egypt. Henceforth B r i t a i n adopted a defensive pol icy and 
4^ <!)HHied preventive measures, so t h a t no other power could get 
prepoMierent influence i n EgyDt. This po l icy of Br i ta in can be 
understood in the context of the Eastern Question, In the major 
pa r t of the n ineteenth century B r i t a i n ' s main pol icy was t o 
maintain the i n t e g r i t y of the Ottoman Empire, so t h a t the balance 
of power i n Europe could remain i n t a c t , Prance, Austr ia and 
Russia were t r y i n g to gain advantage of the decl ine of the 
Ottoman EnQ)ire. B r i t a i n a l so wanted to maintain the secur i ty 
of her Eastern dominions, e spec ia l ly Ind ia , For t h i s purpose 
she regarded ef fec t ive maintenance of the Ottoman suzera ln i ty 
over Egypt as the bes t guarantee of the continuous secur i ty 
16 « j 
of her empire In the Bast. 
After Napoleon's expedition to Egypt rarlous schemes for 
piercing the Isthmus were put forward In Moharanad I l l ' s time by 
French sponsers. But none of the schemes proceeded farther 
than the stage of discussion. At the beginning tf the Bri t ish 
GoTemment opposed every sohone, but after 1840 Paln^rston, the 
then Bri t ish Foreign Secretary made a coiuater proposal for the 
construction of the railway across Egypt, The main aim of this 
proposal was to create an alternate s i tuat ion, so that Mohanmad All 
could not take any firm decision regarding the canal scheme. 
In fact un t i l his death Mohammad All did not take any decision 
for fear of antagonising e i ther side. 
The story from tlie Napoleonic expedition to Mohammad Al l ' s 
doath reveals that the canal question,which was rea l ly a sound 
idea from commerelal point of view, became a po l i t i ca l issue in 
the European diplomatic^ quarters. The European nations, which 
took active Interest in the issue of the canal posit ively or 
negatively, had ei ther consnerclal or po l i t i ca l motives. The 
French. St, Simonians had mainly humanitarian and cornmercial 
In teres ts , while Britain opposed the scheme for po l i t i ca l reasons. 
Egypt being a s t ra tegic area between the East and the West, France 
and Austria wanted at l eas t in dis tant future to use i t as a means 
of' bringing down the conmercial supremacy and pol i t ica l domi-
nation of Britain in the l a s t , Britain, on the other hand, was 
Ib'i 
Interested in making Sgjrpt a shield agairet the French and 
Auatrain enoroachmenfr^ towards the East, 
Ahbas Pasha w^ho hecajne the Viceroy of Egypt after Mohamimd 
Ali, being an Anglophile e3!5>elled a l l the French advisors and 
appointed the Bri t ish ones. As a reaia t French influence d i s -
appeared from Egypt^ and^ the nihole po l i t i ca l si tuation turned 
for a while in favour of Bri tain. Britain exploited th i s s i tua-
t ion and i^cceeded in obtaining a concession for constructing 
railway from Alexandria to Suez, I t seemed that ^ i t a i n had 
won the ground and that Prance would never fu l f i l Ker ambitiooB. 
However, t h i s s i tuat ion could not l a s t long. In 1854 Ahbas 
Pasha died anA Mohajnmad Said became the Ticeroy of Egypt, 
Mohaianad Sais*s accession as the Viceroy of Egypt was the 
turning point in the history of the Suez Oanal. The situation 
proved very auspicious to France, Ferdinand de lesseps, a 
Frenchman and f r i ^ of Mohammad Sdid succeeded^ in convincing the 
l ^ e r about the U t i l i t y and importance of the Suez Canal Scheme. 
Mohammad Said granted the concession to Lesseps for the construc-
t ion of the Canal through the Isthmus, but with a clause, which 
proved to be a great hurdle l a t e r , that Otomman consent was 
necessary before the work on the canal could s t a r t . 
The news of the concession was i l l received in Britain. 
IGu 
I t s t a r t e d ^ i s opposing the scheine with grea ter force than 
Ijefore a t Constantinople. B r i t a i n ' s influence at Constantinople 
was paramount to the extent of delaying the Ottoman r a t i f i c a t i o n . 
The reason for B r i t i s h domination was obvious i during the 
CrineanWar the Sultan of HHirkey was ^ r y la rge ly dependent on 
the B r i t i s h support due to the l a t t e r * s naval supremacy. Besides, 
Br i t a in was the only na t ion iiftiich was in t e re s t ed i n maintaining 
the i n t e g r i t y of the Ottoman Empire, thoguh to serve i t s own 
i n t e r e s t s , Otier European nat ions as Russia, Aastr ia and Pyance 
were in t e re s t ed i n talcing advantage of the •s ick man* of Europe, 
Palmerston, who was now the B r i t i s h Prime Minister , regarded 
t h i s scheme as a french p lo t and t o separate Egypt from the from 
IHB r e s t of the Ottoman Bppire and t o dest roy B r i t a i n ' s domina-
t i o n i n the East* He considered the scheme i n the context of 
the prohahle Prench i n ^ e r i a l motives. However, the merchantile 
conKiunity of Br i t a in s t rongly supported the Suez Canal scheme. 
But Palmerston played down the commercial aspect of the Canal 
as he over en5)hasi2ed i t s damage to the B r i t i s h p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t s 
He considered the scheme from geo-s t ra teg ic point of view, but 
i n a negative sense, Lesseps, on the other hand was continuously 
st2?essing the need of the canal for a comraerc a l world. He even 
advocated the benefi t of the scheme t o Br i t a in in times of emerr 
gency. Ihe Indian Mutiny proved Iiesseps' view point t r u e . But 
the B r i t i s h G-overianent s t i l l opposed the scheme because Lesseps 
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was a French coiacessionaire. I t may probably lie said t h a t i f 
the coasessionaire had been a B r i t i s h vjational, Br i t a in would 
not have opposed the scheme. The cliplomatic a c t i v i t i e s of those 
days c l e a r l y ind ica te t h a t B r i t a i n was act ing on the dual but 
cons is ten t po l icy of sh ie ld ing the Ottoman Einpire against the 
northern (Russian and Austrian) onslaught, on the one hand and 
on the other , of loeeping Egypt wi th in the Su l tan ' s t e r r i t o r y 
against the future p robab i l i t y of French attempt to separate 
i t . The f i r s t pa r t of the pol icy was mainly meant to maintain 
the European balance of power and the second aimed at keeping 
the passage t o India uwler the B r i t i s h con t ro l . 
By the middle of the nineteenth century a l l the B r i t i s h 
objections ' i^ tha t the canal was impract icable , t echnica l ly 
unfeasible and ec momically unsound^had proved t o be wrirng. 
But Paln^rs ton was s t i l l opposing the scheme on the same old 
grounds. Besides, B r i t a i n was s a t i s f i e d with the Cape route 
and was l e s t Ih t e re s t ed i n opening the Suez rou te . Palmerston 
feared t h a t Egypt would pass under the French influence a f te r 
the const ruct ion of the Canal, 
The French a t t i t ude towards Lesseps pro jec t was determined by 
two conf l i c t ing cons idera t ions . On the one hand li-ance was 
supporting i t because i t was a meritorious and coramensially 
benef ic ia l pro jec t and i n perfec t accord with t r a d i t i o n a l French 
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ajnbitions and a s p i r a t i o n s . On the other hand, the Prench 
(Joverrment did not want to provide any serioiis affront t o the 
B r i t i s h s u s c e p t i b i l i t i e s . TTOB Uharkish Government also hes i ta ted 
i n giving consent for the const ruct ion of the canal due t o the 
passive a t t i t ude of the French government. 
I n t h i s way Ijesseps was almost alone despi te Said Pasha's 
support a t the e a r l i e r s tage i n the t e e t h of B r i t i s h and IDurlcish 
opposi t ions, French luloewarm a t t i t u d e and Ismail f a s h a ' s dubious 
support a t the l a t e r s t age . He pursued h is project with great 
courage and pa t ience . He formed the Suez Canal Company i n 1858 
and a huge amount of Prench c a p i t a l was invested i n i t . This had 
provided Lesoeps a b e t t e r grouM in persuading the Prench au thor i -
t i e s for open aiffficial support . However, the Prench government 
did not support him ipenly u n t i l 1865. The work of the canal 
Corrt\'nued. 
construct ion^despi te a l l hu rd les , p o l i t i c a l , f inanc ia l and technical 
At l a s t the grea t dream of Lesseps became a r e a l i t y and on November 
17, 1869 the Suez Canal between the two seas was opened for world 
t r a f f i c . Palmerston's argun^nt t h a t the Suez Canal projec t was a 
buble scheme stood repudiated and h i s own opposi t ion proved to 
be a bubble which burs t f o r th i n 1869. 
The opening of the Suez Canal brought a dramatic chaise in 
the diplomacy of Europe as well as i n the coranercial world. I t s 
geo-economic, geo-s t ra teg ic and g e o - p o l i t i c a l e f fec t s were fa r 
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reaching, ^eing the shor tes t water route between Iforth Ijaerlca 
and Earope, on the one hand, and South Asia and East Asia» on the 
other , i t n a t u r a l l y reduced the commercial importance of the Cape 
rou t e . The ships vsftiich were passing through the Cape rou te , now 
turned towards the Mediterranean Sea and s t a r t ed passing through 
the Canal. The canal enhanced the geo-s t r a t eg ic importance of 
the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean to European and Iforth 
ijnerican na t ions . The opening of the Suez Canal created a new 
geo-s t ra t eg ic area i n the hear t of Mn Vest Asia. I t a lso 
influenced the foreign p o l i c i e s of European nat ions and the 
Ottoman Empire. In e n t i r e l y new g e o - p o l i t i c a l concept was deve-
loping i n the European diplomacy. 3ome important European nations 
s t a r t ed thinking i n terms of p o l i t i c a l domination over Egypt 
and effec t ive control of the Canal. This led to protracted p o l i t i -
ca l and diplomatic warfare between the powers i n t e r e s t ed in Hfest 
Asia and South Asia. In t h i s way the in^ortance of Egypt from 
g e o - p o l i t i c a l point of view immensely increased, 
A most important change i n the foreign pol icy of Br i t a in tool 
p lace . B r i t a i n was the f i r s t country, which had a f t e r opening of 
the Canal r a i sed the question of n e u t r a l i t y of the Canal. The 
fear t h a t the French t e r r i t o r y woxild be carved out along with 
the canal and t h a t i t v/ould lead t o t i e separa t ion and independence 
of Egypt trcm Ottoman Empire was no longer t enab le . The Br i t i sh 
merchants s t a r t e d seeking commercial p r i v i l eges i n the Canal 
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Company. The B r i t i s h p o l i t i c i a n s were claiming tha t tli* of 
hundred ships t ha t passed throiigh the canal 75 ships belonged 
t o B r i t a i n , On t h i s grouni they s t rongly opposed the Canal 
Conqaany^s decis ion t o increase the t o l l s . In ^ o r t , Br i t a in 
was s earching for an opportunity for effect ive control of 
the Canal and her comriunications system with the e a s t . The 
f i nanc i a l d i f f i c i a t i e s of the jlfhedive Ismail presented the 
golden opportunity t o B r i t a i n for in tereference i n the Canal 
Company's a f f i r s . The dramatic pijrchase of the 44 percent 
of the Khedive's shares by the B r i r i s h Primier Dis rae l i i n 
November 1875 was the f i r s t p r a c t i c a l and decisive step towards 
con t ro l l ing the Canal, After t h i s event Br i t a in s t a r t ed i n t e r -
fer ing more and more i n the a f f a i r s of Egypt, Durii^Russo-
Turkish War of 1877 B r i t a i n had assumed the role of protector 
of the Canal. The Anglo-Egyptian agreement of 1877 and the 
s t a t ion ing of the B r i t i s h naval u n i t s a t Alexandria and Port 
Said i n May 1878 were c l e a r ind ica t ions of B r i t a i n ' s forwa d 
pol icy regarding the Canal and Egypt, F ina l ly the rewadt of 
Orabi Pasha agains t the increas ing fore ign in te rvent ion i n the 
a f f a i r s of Egypt provided a p re tex t fo r the landing of the 
B r i t i s h troops and the occupation of Egypt, 
The ope ling of the Suez Canal led t o a change in the Br i t i sh 
po l icy of keeping Egypt free from foreign influence which 
B r i t a i n had been pursuing t i l l the Canal was constructed. This 
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change was the r e s u l t of the comlDirmtion of three fac to r s i 
(a) the grovidng weakness of the Ottoman Empire, (h) the 
growing i n t e r e s t of the B r i t i s h hond holders i n Eg3rpt and, (c) 
the opening of the Suess Canal. The l a s t fac tor inval idated 
the old B r i t i s h pol icy of neu t ra l i z ing Egypt and led i t gradually 
and STrentually to the m i l i t a r y occupation of Egypt. On the 
surface, the existence of the Suez Cana]. was the l e a s t important 
of the above three fac to r s i n determining t h course of events 
i n Egypt between 1875-1882, But the underlying reasons indicate 
t h a t the existence of the Suez Cana3. was the most important 
fac tor i n determining the increas ing B r i t i s h involvement i n 
Egyptian a f f a i r s from 1375 onssrards. At the time of OraM's 
r e v o l t against the European in te rvent ion and the author i ty of 
the Khedive, the B r i t i s h fea r for the secur i ty of the Canal 
r a the r than the fear for the secur i ty of bond holders ' money 
and safe ty of the English subjec ts , was probably the most dec i -
sive fac tor behind the B r i t i s h occupation of Egypt. The un i -
l a t e r a l m i l i t a r y in t e rven t ion of Br i t a in shows t h a t t h i s was her 
f i n a l s tage i n a ca re fu l ly concieved and long thought out plan. 
The B r i t i s h occupation of Egypt was another land mark i n 
the h i s t o r y of the Suez Canal. During the operations Br i t i sh 
forces used the Canal as base against Orabi 's forces , which 
re su l t ed i n the closure of the Canal. This incident worried the 
other Buroi)ean powers regarding the future prospects of t h i s 
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i n t e r n a t i o n a l waterway. These powers s t a r t e d thinking in terms 
of neu t r a l i z ing the Canal. S^om 1882 t o 1888 the question of 
n e u t r a l i t y was upper most i n E^ropean diplomacy. Br i t a in was 
hot i n t e re s t ed i n the f ree navigat ion of the the canal hecuase 
i n her view i t would l i i a i t her l i b e r t y of act ion during her 
occupation of Egypt. However, a f te r lengthy negot ia t ions a 
d ra f t convention regarding the free navigat ion of the Suez 
Maritime Canal was signed on October 29, 1888 a t Constantinople, 
by the countr ies i n t e r e s t ed i n the Canal, All the powers r a t i f i e d 
i t but bttt B r i t a in did so with r e se rva t ion . In fac t the Canal 
Convention provided free navigat ion of the Canal only on paper. 
This s i t u a t i o n continued u n t i l Anglo-Prench Agreement on 1904 
was concluded, when B r i t a i n withdrew her rese rva t ion . 
At the beginning of the twent ie th century a new power i . e . , 
Germai^ began to emerge and posed a t h r e a t t o B r i t a i n in the 
a f f a i r s of t lB West Asia, Germany inspi red with impe r i a l i s t i c 
motives had s t a r t e d promoting i t s influence i n the Ottoman 
Bffipire, The l a t t e r d l s o paid a t t e n t i o n t o GermaH y^ as a poss ible 
a l t e rna t i ve to Br i t a in , The reauson was t h a t a f t e r the occupation 
of Egypt, B r i t a in turned her a t t e n t i o n from Constantinople to 
Cai ro , In these circumstances i t was not po r s ib l e for the 
Ottoman empire t o maintain i t s i n t e g r i t y against Russia as the 
l a t t e r was continuously press ing towards the south, Germany 
took ad/antage of t h i s s i t u a t i o n and succeeded i n ge t t ing the 
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Berlin-Baghdad railway ooneasslon for undoing the British 
domination in the Eaat and reducing the importance of the Canal. 
In Britain this railway scheme was considered to he a source 
of danger to her eastern Empire. 9or this reason Britain 
demanded the control of the railwsQr line from Baghdad to the 
Gulf. After negotiaticms in June 1914 an agreement nas signed 
between Germany and Britain which fixed the terminus of the 
railway at Basra. It was also agreed that the construction 
could not proceed to Kuwait without Britain's permission. 
After this svent the World lar began and Egypt was declared a 
protectorate ly the British Ooremm^it. 
It seems that during the ninete^ith century and upto the 
World War I Britain was the dominant power in Europe, West Asia 
and South and South East Asia. After the op«aing of the Suez 
Canal in I869 the political power and influence of the Britain 
was dependent on the security of West Asia and of the Suez Canal. 
it will not be wrong to say that the Suez Canal being geo«-stra-
tegic and important waterway, played a vital role in consolida-
ting the British domination in the South and South East Asia, 
Particularly, India. 
In the light of the important factors as geographical loca-
tion of Egypt, the topography of West Asia, the ambitions of 
the Mediter:?anean powers, the deteriorating situation of the 
Ottoman Empire, the British dominions in India amd her commercial 
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domination in the last coupled with the economic and eommerci&l 
rise of the European powers and their imperialietic sffiMtione 
all of which have been discussed in detail above a s series of moves 
were made regarding the excavation of the Canal. The main eonclu-
sione which can be drawn fro® the whole story are the following 
(1) The Cape route discovered in 1498 opened the gateway 
to the Bast for the European Powers. The Commercial activities 
and rivalries between the European Powers* the decline of the 
Mughal Bnpire in India and similar conditions in other parts of 
Asia led to the atew establishment of the British, Butch, Portuguese 
and Stench coimnercial and ultimately political domination in the East 
While Holland and Portugal ceased to be big pow«7S in Europe in 
the later centuries there remained only two powers on the Atlantic 
dea-lM)ard of Sirope which could compete with each other effectively. 
The discovery of the Cape route had also led to the decline of the 
commerce of the Mediterranean powers. 
(2) The Krench Revolution tov.'ards the end of the eighteenth 
century and the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt in 1798 with a view 
to ultimately destroy the British domination in the Bast, revived 
the Hedite raaean. This lead to various schemes for the excava-
tion of the Canal through Egy^t. 
(3) Britain which had become a dominant coranercial and imperial 
istic power ly that time looked with suspicion and fear at all the 
17^ . 
Ue 
schemes of digging/Canal tjeeause It thought that the ccmnnerce 
of the fiaditcrranean powers would he reviyed and the Canal loute 
would challenge the Cape route and ultimately the British 
position would he jeopardised. Britain v^s also looking at 
this issue f^ om another angle i.e., the Russian expansion at 
the exoense of the Ottoman Empire and towards the Central Asia, 
impinging on British India, Britain suspected that it would 
result into t (a) the weakness of the Ottoman Hoopire leading 
to the disturhanoe of the European halance of powers, and (h) 
the pressure on the British Indian Qipire. Xhis, Britain 
thought , imist he checked. 
(4) Falinerston had sared the Ottoman Empire from the 
amhitions of Hohammad Ali as he had heen saving it team the 
expansion of the Cjsarist Russia, The Branch proposal for the 
Canal across the Isthmus was seen iQr Britain as a danger to 
the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Etapire and the Ottoman 
suierainty over Egypt. Palmerston decided that this must h« 
stopped at any cost. Hence the British Opposition to the 
Lesseps scheme* 
(3) When the Canal was excavated despite the opposition 
of Britain, a new situation had come into existence • A fait 
accompli had presented itself which could not hare heen ignored 
"by Britain. The latter, despite her traditional use of the 
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Cape route, had to turn to the Canal route. As a matter of fact, 
no other country Including france, used it so rauch as Britain did. 
This was heeauee of the widespread British interests in the last* 
(6) Now Britain be^m to think of controlling the Canal 
heoause it ym.s "becoming its Juglar vein*. It pounced upon the 
opportunity of "buying the CbtediTal shares of the Canal Company. 
After a series of political laanoeuTring it occupied Egypt in 1882. 
(7) Now Britain had acquired shares not only in the Canal 
Company hut had also occupied the country through which the 
Canal passed. The territorial integrity of the Ottoman lipire was 
no longer important for Britain. Now it was the turn of the other 
European Powers including Srance and Turkey to save the Canal 
trcm the British Ccmtrol. They v«nted to neutralisue and inter-
nationalize it which Britain always resisted. 
(8) Britain neutralized the ohjections of Erance Tcy 
diverting the latter to North Africa. It checked the German 
amhitions of Brang nach ostaa ly sharing in the railway scheme 
and eetahlishing complete political control in the Persian Gulf. 
It also satisfied Russia ly giving it a part of Persia in 1907. 
(9) Britain got the final opportunity of strengthening 
her position in Egypt and in the Canal ly declaring Egypt as the 
British protectorate at the beginning of the World War I. This 
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became possible beeause of Turkish declaration of war against 
the Allied Powers in suriport of the Central Powers* 
Thus we see that Britain managed to remain always predominant 
in the European diplomacy, in her influaiee in^Eas* ®od in 
controlling the passage to India from Gibraltar via the Suez Canal 
to Muscat due to her naval supremacgrt political manoeuvring 
and sophisticated diplomacy. She gave up the Cape route when 
the Canal route became a reality and acquired control over it and 
checked all other schemes which attempted to lessen its Importance. 
Ill this was done in the imperialistic interests, and the people 
of Asia and Ifrica were treated as mere pawns on the chessboard 
of international politics. 
APPENDIX - A 
ACT OP QOWESSIOS OF THE VITEROT OP EGIPf FGR THE 
CONSTRUCTION AND QPERATIQHr OF THE SUEZ MARITBJB 
CANAl AND APPURTENANCES BETWEEN THE MEDITERRANEAN 
AND THE RED SEA. CAIRO, NOVEMBER 30, 1854 
Our f t l e n d M.Perdinand de Lesseps , having c a l l e d our 
a t t e n t i o n t o the advantages t h a t would r e s i a t fo r Egypt from 
connecting the MedlterranBan Sea with Red Sea "by a navigable wat 
way for large veflsels,y(informed us of the p o s s i b i l i t y of esta?-
b l i sh ing , for t h a t purpose, a company composed of inves tors 
of a l l na t ions , vre have received the plans which he has submitted 
to us , and have given to him, by these presen ts , exclusive 
power t o e s t a b l i s h and d i r e c t a imiversa l company t o cut through 
the Isthmus of Suez and t o operate a canal between the two 
seas , with au thor i ty to undertake or cause t o be undertalcen 
a l l work, including cons t ruc t ion , the company being l i a b l e for 
furnishing i n advance any compensation to pr iva te individuals 
i n case of expropr ia t ion for public purposes, a l l t h i s to be 
wi th in the l i m i t s and with the c o n d i t i o n and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s 
s e t fo r th i n the following a r t i c l e s : 
Ar t i c l e I - M. Ferdinand de l esseps s h a l l e s t a b l i s h a 
company,the managen^nt of which we en t rus t to him, t o be known 
as the Compagine Universal is du Canal Maritime de Suez, t o cut 
through the Isthmus of Suez, t o operate a passage sui table for 
B r i t i s h and F o r e i m Sta te Papers . Vol. 55, 1861+-1865 (I870) 
pp. 970-973 
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la rge ves se l s , to e s t a b l i s h or adopt two adequate entrances , 
one on the Mediterranean, the other on the Red Sea, and to es tab l 
one or two p(»:ts. 
Ar t ic le I I - 5nie manager of the company sha l l always be 
appointed by the Egyptian government and selected, i n so fa r as 
possible from among the stoclcholder having the most shares i n 
the e n t e r p r i s e , 
Ar t i c l e - I I I - The durat ion of the concession s h a l l be 99 
years, beginning with the date of the opening of the Canal 
between the two seas . 
Ar t ic le IV - The work w i l l be car r ied out so le ly a t the 
exoense of the Company, to which a l l the necessary land not 
belonging t o pr iva te indiv idual w i l l be granted without charge. 
The cos t of the f o r t i f i c a t i o n which the goireriinent may deem 
f i t t o e s t a b l i s h s h a l l not be borne by the Con^jany. 
Ar t i c l e V • The Egyptian government w i l l receive annually 
from the Company 15 percent of the net p r o f i t s appearing on 
the balance sheet of the Conrpany,without prejudice t o the 
i n t e r e s t and dividends from t t e shares v ^ c h i t reserves the 
r i gh t to take for i t s own account a t the time of t h e i r i s sue , 
without any guarantee on i t s pa r t with respect to the execution 
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of the work or the operat ion of the Company. The remainder of 
the net p r o f i t s w i l l be devlded as follows » 
75 percent for the Craipanar 
10 percent for the founding members. 
Ar t ic le VI - The r a t e of the t r a n s i t charges of the Suez 
Canal, arranged between the Company and the Ticeroy of Egypt 
and col lec ted by the agents of the Compaay , sha l l always be the 
same for a l l na t ions , no spec ia l advantage may ever be stipiilatei 
for the exclusive benefi t of any of them. 
Ar t ic le 711 - I n case the Company should consider i t 
necessary to connect the Hlle by a navigable waterway, with 
the d i rec t passage through the Isthmus, and i n case the Maritime 
Canal should follow an i n d i r e c t course served by the water of 
the Ni le , the Egyptian goverinnent would t r ans fe r to the Company 
the lands of the public dranain which are uncul t ivated a t the 
present time and v\4d.ch would be i r r i g a t e d and cul t iva ted a t i t s 
expense i t s e f f o r t s . 
The Company sha l l en;3oy the use of the said lands tax free, 
for 10 years , beginning with the date of the opening of the Canal, 
during the 89 years remaining before the exp i ra t ion of the 
concessioni i t w i l l pay the l i t t l e to the Egyptian government 
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after that it may continue to enjoy the use of the above mentione 
oYiiy to 
lands/BO long as i t paysy^the said government a tax equal t o 
t h a t which sha l l he levied on laacls of the BSSDB na tu re . 
Ar t ic le T i l l - In order to avoid any d i f f i c u l t y regarding 
the l a a i s which w i l l be t ransfered t o the concessionary Company 
a plan drawn up by M. Mnant Bey , our engineer' Commissioner, 
with the Company, sha l l ind ica te the lands granted for the 
passage, and the establishments of the Maritime Canal and of the 
feeders canal leading off from the Ni le , as well as for the 
pujpose of c u l t i v a t i o n i n confirmity with the s t i p u l a t i o n of 
Ar t i c le VII . 
I t i s , ie fur ther more understood tha t any speculat ion 
i n the lands of the public domain to be granted i s henceforth 
forbidden, and tha t the lands formerly belonging t o pr iva te 
ind iv idua l s , vitoich the o'^ners may wish l a t e r t o have i r r i ga t ed 
by the water of the feeder canal , constructed a t the expense of 
the Company s h a l l pay a roya l ty of . . . . per feddan cul t ivated 
(or a roya l ty fixed by sonicable agreement between the Egyptian 
g o v m a e n t and the Company.) 
Ar t ic le IX i Las t ly the Concessionary Company i s granted 
the r igh t to ex t rac t from the mines and quar r ies belongii^ to 
the public domain, without paying any fees , a l l the mater ials 
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necessary for the works of the caiaal and i t s appurtenant 
s t ruc tu re s ; s imi la r ly i t w i l l enjoy duty free ent ry for any 
machi lery or mater ia l s t h a t i t may cause t o he s en t from 
abroad for the operat ion of i t s concession. 
Ar t ic le X - On the exp i ra t ion of the concession the 
Egyptian government sha l l talce the place of the Conqpany, i t sha l l 
enjoy a l l i t s r i g h t s without r e se rva t ion and sha l l enter i n to 
f u l l possession of the Canal between the two seas and a l l the 
establislanents dependent therewn. An agreement reached amicably 
or by a r b i t r a t i o n sha l l determine the compensation t o be a l lo t t ed 
to the Canpany for the t r ans fe r of i t s equipaent and manable 
proper ty . 
Ar t ic le XI « The a r t i c l e s of the Company s h a l l be submitted 
to us at a l e t e r date by the manager of the Company and must bear 
our approval. Such amendments as may l a t e r be made must receive 
our approval beforehand, fhe said a r t i c l e s sha l l s t a t e the names 
of the founders, the l i s t of whom we reser ro the r i g h t t o approve 
That l i s t sha l l consist of the persons whose work, s t ud i e s , 
e f f o r t s or c a p i t a l s h a l l have previously contr ibuted t o the 
execution of the g rea t en te rp r i se of the Suez Canal. 
Ar t ic le XII - Las t ly , \ve promise our good and loyal 
ass is tance and t h a t of a l l the o f f i c i a l s of Egypt for the 
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purpose of facilitatiag the execution and exercise of the 
present powers, 
Cairo, HoTemljer. 1854 s To my devoted ftieni of high birth 
and high rank M.Ferdinand de Lesseps. 
In Tiew of the fact that concession granted to Compagine 
Universalle du Canal de Suez must he ratified hy His Imperial 
Majesty the Sultan I, transit this copy to you so that you may 
keep it in your possession. As to the work relating to the 
digf;ing of the Suez Canal, it sh-^ .ll not be commenced until 
after the authorization of the Sublime Porte hpx been given. 
Ramadan 5, 1274 
0, Seal of the (ficeroy. 
APPEMDIX - B 
REPORT OF INTiJRNAriOlfAL SCIEN!PIPIC COI'MISSIOIT 
JAmiAEY 1, 1856 
Your Highness summoned us t o Egypt to exajnine the 
quest ion of the p ierc ing of the Isthmus of Suez. While 
supplying us with the means of deciding, do TISU, as to 
the mer i t s of the d i f fe ren t solut ions proposed, you requested 
us to l ay before you the one which was the e a s i e s t , the 
s a fe s t and the most advantageous for European oonmeroe. Our 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n . . . has revealed t o us innumerable obs tac les , 
not to say i m p o s s i b i l i t i e s for taMng the route by Alexandria, 
and unexpected f a c i l i t i e s for e s t ab l i sh ing a port i n the 
Grulf of Pelusium. 
The d i r e c t canal from Suez to the (Julf of Pelusium i s 
therefore the sole so lu t ion of the problem for joining the 
Red Sea t o the Mediterranean; the execution of the work i s 
easy, and the success assured . . . . We are unanimous in our 
convict ion upon t h i s po in t , and we w i l l develop our reasons 
for i t i n a de ta i l ed repor t . . . This i s a long and minute 
work, which w i l l occupy severa l months, but i n the meanwhile 
we beg t o acquaint your Highness with our conclusions, which 
are as follows t 
H.J. Schon f i e l d . The Suez Canal i n World Affairs 
( New York, 1953 )» pp. 29-30 
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1. The route by Alexandria i s inadmissible from both 
the t echn ica l aM economical point of view. 
2 . The d i r e c t route offers every f a c i l i t y for the 
execution of the Canal i t s e l f , with a branch t o 
the M l e , and presents no more than the ordinary 
d i f f i c u l t i e s for the c r ea t ion of two p o r t s , 
3 . The P€«ct of Suez w i l l open on t o a safe and large 
roadstead, access ible i n a l l weathers, and with a 
depth of about 39 fee t of water within a mile of 
the s(hore, 
4 . The Port of Pelusium, which, accArding to the 
draUPt schenra, was t o be at the extremity of the 
Gulf, w i l l be es tab l i shed about 17 miles f a r the r 
t o the west, a t a point where there are 25 fee t of 
water wi thin a mile and a half of the shore, where 
the fiinchorage i s good, and ge t t ing xinder way easy. 
the 
5. The cost of the canal and ofy(^ works connected V9ith 
i t w i l l not exceed the f igure 8,000,000 given i n the 
draf t scheme of your Highnesses engineers . 
APPENDIX - C 
DmiSlTlTB EGYPTIAJf CONCESSION FOR THE CONSTRUCTION 
OP THE SUEZ SIABjDIME GjLNAL 
AiEXANimU , SmJmY 5, 1856 OBLIGATIONS 
Axtlce I - The Company founded "by our frien<i M, Perdinand 
de Lesseps, by Tlrlnie of our grant of November 30, 1854, must 
execute a t i t s own expense, r i s k and p e r i l , a l l works, including 
construct ions necessary for the establishment of : 
(1) A Canal for large sea going yessels,between Suez on 
tlie Red Sea, and the gulf of Pelusium i n the Mediterranean; 
(2) i n i r r i g a t i o n canal also su i table for use by Nile 
shipping, connecting ghe r i ve r with the Maritime Canal above 
mentioned ; 
(3) Two i r r i g a t i o n and feeder branches leading off from the 
above mentioned canal and flowing i n the two d i rec t ions of Suez 
and Pelusium. 
The work w i l l be ca r r i ed out so as to be f inished within a 
period of s ix years , except i n the event of hinderance and 
delays r e s u l t i n g from force majeure. 
Artice I I - The Company sha l l be empowered t o carry out 
the work with which i t i s charged by i t s e l f under s t a t e supervisio 
J . C . Hurevitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Mddle fest. A Doou-
15^^-I^M- . i N e v York 19^6). PPT jgi^lifQ: Record: 
18u 
or to cause it to be carried out fay contractorg through compe-
titive "bids or on an agree price "basis. In all cases at at* leas-
four-fifths of the worlanen employed in this work are to "be 
Egyptians, 
Article III - The Canal sultalale for large sea going 
vessels shall "be dug to the depth and width fixed by the 
programjof the International Scientific Connnission, 
In confirmity with the programme it shall start the Port 
of Suez itself J it shall use the "basin known as the Bitter Lakes 
Basin and Lake limsaii, it shall have its outlet in the Mediterra-
Bean, at a point on the Bay of Pelusium to be determined in 
the final plans to "be drawn up by the Company's engineers. 
Article 17 - The irrigation canal suitable for river shipping 
under the conditions of the said Programme shall "begin near 
the city of Cairo, follows the valley (wadi) of Tumilat (ancient 
land of (Joshen) and meet the large Maritine canal at Lake 
Tims ah. 
Article Y - The tranches of the said Canal to he lead off 
from it above the outlet into Lake TinBah, from that point 
they will be made to flovj i in the one case toward Suez and 
in the other case toward Pelusium, parallel to the large 
1 8 V 
MaHtime Canal, 
Ar t i c l e VI - I»aloB Timsah wi l l be converted in to an inland 
por t capable of receving vesse ls of the a l rges t tonnage. 
The Company wi l l be bound, moreover, i f necessary i ( i ) to 
construct a harbour a t the point where the Maritime Canal en te rs 
the Bay of Pelusiutn, ( i i ) to improve the port an^. roadstead of 
Suez, so as also to afford she l t e r t o vesse l s t h e r e . 
I r t i c l e VII - The Iferitime Canal and por t s belonging to i t 
as wel l as the canal connecting with the Nile and lead off canal? 
s h a l l a t a l l times be loept i n good condi t ion by the Company,at 
i t s expense. 
Ar t ic le VIII - The owners of the r i p a r i a n property wishing 
t h e i r land to be i r r i g a t e d by water from the canals constructed 
by the Company may obtain permission from i t for t h i s purpoee 
through payment of compensation or a fee , the amount of vdiich 
sha l l be fixed by the condit ions of a r t i c l e XVII here-inr-after 
mentioned, 
Ar t ic le IX - fe reserve the r igh t to appoint a t the 
adminis t ra t ive head quar te r s of the Company a spec ia l Commit*. 
3 s i oner, v;feose sa la ry sha l l be paid by i t , and who w i l l represent 
with i t s administrat ion the r i g h t s and i n t e r e s t s of the Egyptian 
government for the execution of the provis ion of these present^. 
If the Coiirpany*s adminis t ra t ive head quarter i s establ ished 
elsewhere than i n Egypt ,the company s h a l l have i t s e l f repretealsea 
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at Alexandria by a superior agent vested with all powers necessary 
to see to tlie proper functioning of the service and the Company'' 
relations with our givernment. 
II : Concession 
Article X - In return for the construction of the canals 
ai»i appurtenances mentioned in the foregoing articles, the 
Egyptian government allows the company, without tax or free, 
to enjoy the use of all such land, not "belonging to private 
parties,as may be necessary. 
It also allows it to enjoy the use of all now uncultivated 
land not belonging to private parties, which will be irrigated 
and cultivated by its efforts and at its expense, with this 
difference t (1) That the portions of land included in this 
last category shall be exempted from all taxes for ten years 
only, dating frcan their connection with the undertalcLng; (2) 
That after that period and xintil the expiration of the concessions 
they shall be subject to the obligations and taxes to which 
the land of the the other Egyptian provinces is subject under 
the same circumstances; (3) That the Company can, subsequently, 
acting itself or through its assigns, retain the right to enjoy 
possession of this land and of the water supply facilities 
necessary for its fertilization, subject to payment to the 
Egyptian government of the taxes levied upon land under the 
18 u 
same condi t ions , 
Ar t i c le XI - To determine the extent and l imi t s of the 
and granted t o the Company iinder the condit ions of (1) and (2) 
of I r t l o l e X above, references I s made to the plans annexed 
he re to . I t "being understood t h a t on the said plans the lands 
granted for the cons t ruc t ion of the canals and appurtenances 
tree of tax or free In conflrmlty with (a) are shown In black, 
and the land granted for c u l t i v a t i o n through payntent of ce r t a in 
fees In conflrmlty with (2) are shown In b lue . 
All ac t s executed subsequent t o o i r act of November 30, 
1854 sha l l be considered n u l l and void I f they would r e s u l t 
In c rea t ing for p r iva te p a r t i e s as aga l re t the Company e i t h e r 
r i g h t s t o compensation which did not ex i s t a t the time with 
respect to those lands , or r i g h t s to compensation tha t are 
more extensive than those which they were able to claim a t 
t h a t t ime. 
Ar t ic le XII - The ifeyptlan government w i l l make over to 
the Coiapany, I f de s i r ab l e , p r i v a t e l y owned land the possesion 
of which may be necessary to the execution of the work and 
the exp lo i t a t ion of the concession, provided the company pay 
a jus t compensation to the woners. 
Compensation for temporary occupation or for de f in i t ive 
ISu 
expropriation shall be settled amicably in so far as possible; 
in case of disagreement, it shll be fixed by a Court of Arbitra-
tion acting in summary proceedings and composed of i (1) an 
arbitrator chosen by the Company; (2) an arbitrator chosen 
by the interested parties, and (3) a third arbitrator 
appointedj^us. 
Ihe decision of the court of arbitrator shall become 
executory immediately and shall not be subjected to appeal. 
Article XIII - The Egyptian government grants the concess-
innary Company, for the entire life of the concession,the 
right to extract from mines and quarries belonging to the 
public dranain, without payment of any fee, tax,or compensation, 
all materials necessary for the work of constructing and 
maintaining the installations ojoA establishments belonging 
to the Company. 
Furthermore, it exempts the Company from all customs, entry, 
and other duties on the importation into Egypt of all machi-
nery and material of any kind that it may bring in from abroad 
for the need sof its various services during construction. 
Article Xiy - We solemnly declare, for ourselves and 
our successors, subject to ratification by His Imperial Majesty 
10. 
the Saltan, that the great Maritime Oanal from Suez to Peluslum 
and the ports belonging to i t shal l be open for ever, as neutral 
passage, to e"TOry merchant "^asel orosGing from one sea to/mother, 
without any dis t inct ion, exclusion or preference with respect 
to persons oY na t iona l i t i es , in consideration of the payment of 
the fees and compliance with the regulations established by the 
unlTersal Company, the concession holder for the use of the 
said Canal and i t s appurtennaces. 
Article XY - In consequence of the principle laid down 
in the foregoing a r t i c l e , the universal Company holding the 
concession may not, in any case, give to any vessel, company 
or private party any advantage or favour not given to a l l other 
vessels, companies, or private par t ies on the same terms. 
Article XVI - The l i fe of the Company i s fixed at 99 
years, counting from the completion of the work and the opening 
of the Maritime Canal to large vessels. 
At the expiration of that period, the Egyptian government 
wil l reserve possession of the Maritime Canal constructed by the 
Company, and i t shall be i t s responsibi l i ty , in th is case, to 
take over a l l the materials and supplies used in the Company's 
Maritime service and, in return, to pay the Company the value 
to be fixed, ei ther by amicable agreement or on the basis of 
li) (^ 
an opinion of exper t s . 
Hevertheless, should the Company r e t a i n the concession 
for successive periods of 99 years , the levy for the benefit 
of the Egyptian government s t ipu la t ed i n Ar t ic le XVIII below 
sha l l be increased for second period to 20 percent , for the 
t h i r d period 25 percent,and so on, a t the r a t e of 5 percent for 
each period, but such levy s h a l l , howrver, never exceed 35 
percent of the net p r o f i t s of the Company, 
Ar t ic le - XTEI - In order t o condensate the Goii5)any for 
the expenses of const ruct ion, maintenance and operation for 
which i t i s made responsible by these p re sen t s , we authorize i t , 
henceforth and for i t s e n t i r e term of possession, as specified 
i n paragraphs 1 and 3 of the foregoing a r t i c l e s , t o e s t a b l i s h 
and c o l l e c t , for passage i n the CanaBand the por t s belonging 
there t o , navigat ion, p i l o t a g e , towage and anchorage f e s , 
according t o r a t e schedules which i t may change at any time, 
subject t o the express condit ion t h a t i t sha l l \ 
(1) co l l ec t these without exception or favour from a l l 
iressels under the same terms. 
(2) Publ ish the ra te -schedules t h r ee months before they 
become ef fec t ive i n the c a p i t a l s and p r inc ipa l commercial ports 
of the countr ies concerned, 
(3) Not exceed for the specia l navigation fee the maximum 
19o 
f igure of t e n francs per ton of Ijurden for vessels and ten 
francs a head for passengers . 
The Company may a l so , for a l l water supply f a c i l i t i e s 
grairted a t the request of p r iva te p a r t i e s , by v i r tue of Art ic le 
YIII above, c o l l e c t , according to the r a t e schedules which 
i t wi l l f i x , a free proport ionate t o the quant i ty of water used 
and the area of the laittl i r r i g a t e d . 
Ar t i c le X7III - At the same t ime, i n view of the land 
grants and other advantages accorded t h con^jany i n the forgoing 
a r t i c l e s , we sha l l make, for the benef i t of the Egyptian 
government a levy of 15 percent of the net p r o f i t s for each 
year as determined and apportioned i t the general meeting of 
the shareholders . 
Ar t i c le XIX •• The l i s t of character members who c o n t r i -
buted by t h e i r work, t h e i r s tudies and t h e i r c a p i t a l t o the 
accomplishment of the under- taking, before the founding of the 
Ccanpany^shall be prepared by u s . 
After deduction of the anount levied for the Egyptian 
government s t i p i aa t ed i n a r t i c l e XTIII above, 10 percent of 
the annual net p r o f i t s of the en te rp r i se i s to be a l lo t t ed to 
the charac ter members or t h e i r he i r s or ass igns . 
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Art ic le XX - Independently of the time necessary for the 
execution of the work, our f r i e n i and represen ta t ive M.Ferdinand 
de lesseps , w i l l preside over and d i r e c t the Company a^ s f i r s t 
founder for t en years from the time when the period of the 
enjoyment of the 99 years concession "begins, under the terms 
of a r t i c l e X n above. 
Ar t ic le XXI - The a r t i c l e s of Incorpra t ion of the 
Corapai^ y thus created under the name of un iversa l Company of the 
Maritime Canal of Suez are hereby approved, t l i i s approval 
c o n s t i t u t e s au thor iza t ion for establishment i n the form of a 
corporat ion ef fec t ive on the date on which the c a p i t a l of the ^ 
sha l l have been subscribed i n f a l l . 
Ar t ic le XXII - In t<i|ten of the i n t e r e s t we a t tach to 
the success of the en te rpr i se , vte promise the Company the 
loyal cooperation of the Egyptian government and by these 
presents expressely request the o f f i c i a l eind agents of a l l the 
departments of our government to accord i t ass is tance and 
p ro t ec t ion vuadr a l l circumstances. 
Our engineers , Lindnt Bey and Mou^l Bey whcan we place 
a t the Company*s d isposa l for the d i r ec t ion and management of 
the work l a id out by i t , sha l l be i n charge of the supervision 
of the workers, and sha l l be responsible for enforcement of 
10 u 
the regula t lo iB for pu t t ing the wurk prograimnes In to operation. 
Ar t ic le XXIII - All provisions of our ordinance of November 
30, 1854 are hereby revoked, together with any others which may 
be i n Conflict with the claJises and terms of the present a r t i c l e s 
to 
and condi t toi» which alone s h a l l govern the concession/which 
they apply. 
Done at Alexandria , January 5, 1856 
5)0 ray lo^;al friend of high b i r t h and high rank M.Ferdinand 
de I»esseps. 
Since the concession granted t o the uj i iversa! Company 
of the Canal of Suez must be approved by His Imperial Majesty 
the Sul tan. I am t r a n a a i t t i n g to you t h i s authentic copy so tha t 
you may e s t ab l i sh the said f inanc ia l Company. 
As for the work connected with c u t t i n g through the Isthmus, 
the Company may car ry i t out i t s e l f as soon as the authorizat ion 
of the Subline Porte i s granted t o me. 
Alexandria, Rabi-ul^Akhar 26,1272 (January 4, 1356) 
0. Seal of His Highness the Viceroy. 
APPENDIX - E 
COirVENTION RESPBOTIIG THE FREE KAVIGATIOH OP THE 
SUEZ MAEEPIME OAJTAI : THE BOROPEAJf POWERS AHD 
THE OTTOMAN EfilPlRB, CONSTANTINOPLE, OCTOBER 29, 1888 
ConYentioa between Great B r i t a i n , A u s t r i a r Hungary, Prance 
G-ermany, I t a l y , the Netlierlands, Russia, Spain and Turkey 
respect ing the free navigat ion of the Suez Maritiiae Canal. 
Ar t i c l e - I t The Suez MaritiiOB Canal s h a l l always be 
free and open, i n the time of war as i n the time of peace, to 
every vesse l of Commeroe or of war without d i s t i n c t i o n of f lag . 
Consequently the High Contract ing p a r t i e s agree not i n 
any wssty t o i n t e r f e r e with the tree use of the Canal, i n time 
of war as i n time of peace. 
The Canal sha l l never be subjected t o the exercise of 
the r i g h t of bloclcade. 
Ar t i c le - I I t The High Contracting p a r t i e s TOco/ignising 
t h a t the f r e sh water canal i s indispensable t o the Maritime 
Canal, talce note of the engagements of His Highness the Khedive 
towards the un iversa l Suez Canal Company as regards the fresh 
water Canalj which engagements are s t ipu la ted i n a convention 
bearing date 18th March 1863, containing an expose and four 
Americal Jounia.y) of IntematlCTial Law. (New-York), Vol .3 , 
N0.1, 1909, pp . 123-127. 
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Articles, 
SJhey undertake not to interfere in any way with the 
security of that canal and its hranohes, the working of which «hal 
shall not he exposed to any attempt at obstruction. 
Article -$II I The High Contracting Parties likewise 
undertake to respect the plant, establishment, buildings 
and Works of the Maritime Canal axd of the Presh Water Canal 
Article IV I The Maritime Canal remaining open in time 
of war as a fSree passage, even to the ships of war[, according 
to the terms of Article I of the present treaty, the High 
Contracting Parties agreed that no right of war, no act of 
hostility, nor any act having for its object to obstruct the 
free navigation of the Canal, shall be committed in the Canal 
and its ports of access, as well as within a radius of three 
marine miles from those ports, even though the Ottoman Bi^ire 
should be one of the belligerent Powers, 
Vessels of war of belligerents shall not revictual or 
take in stores in the Oanal and its ports of access, except in 
so far as may be strictly necessary. The transit of tle 
aforesaid vessels through the Canal shall be effect with the 
least possible delay in accordance with the regulations in force 
19 D 
and without any other intermlBsion than that resulting from 
the necessities of the service, 
Sheir stay a,t Port Said and in the roadstead of Suez 
shall not exceed twenty four hours except in case of distress. 
In such case they shall Tje bound to leave as soon as possible. 
An interval of twenty four hours shall always elapse between 
ihe sailing of a belligerent ship from one of the ports of 
access and the departure of a ship belonging to the hostile 
power. 
Article - 7 I In time of war belligerent Power shall 
not disembark or embark within the Canal and its ports of 
access either troops, munitions or materials of war. But 
in case of an accidental hinderanoe in the Canal, men may be 
embarked or disembarked at the ports of access by detachment 
not exceeding 1,000 men, with a corresponding amount- of war 
material. 
Article - VI I Prizes shall »•% be subjected in all 
respects to the same rules as the vessels of war of belligerents. 
Article - VII i The Powers shall not keep any vessel of 
war in the waters of the Canal (including Lake Timsah and the 
Bitter Lakes). 
Nevertheless, they may station vessels of war in the 
20U 
por t s of access of Port Said and Suez, the number of which 
s h a l l not exceed two for eaoh power. 
f^ is r i ht sha l l not be exercised by b e l l i g e r e n t s . 
Ar t ic le VIII J The Agents in Egypt of the signatory 
Powers of the present t r e a t y sha l l be charged t o watch over 
i t s execution. In case of any event threa tening the secur i ty 
ot the free passage of the Oanal, they sha l l meet on the sunmons 
of three of t h e i r number under the presidency of t h e i r Doyen, 
i n order t o proceed to the necessary v e r i f i c a t i o n s , Tbey 
sha l l inform the Khedival government of the danger which they 
may have perceived, i n order t ha t the government may taloe proper 
s teps to ensxire the p ro tec t ion and the f ree use of the Canal. 
ITnder any oircumstanoes, they sha l l meet once a year t o take 
note of the due execution of the Treaty. 
The l a s t mentioned meetings s h a l l take place under the 
presidency of a specia l Gcamnissioner ncaainated for t h a t purpose 
by the Imperial Ottoman government. A Commissioner of the 
Khedive may also take par t i n the meetings,and may preside over 
the 
i t i n case ofy(absence of the Ottoman Commissioner. 
They sha l l e spec ia l ly demand the supression of any work 
or the d i spers ion of any as emblage on e i t h e r bank of the Canal 
20. 
the object or ef fec t of which might be to i n t e r f e r e with the 
l i b e r t y and the a a t i r e secur i ty of the navigat ion. 
Ar t i c l e IX I The Egyptian gOYermmnt s h a l l within the 
l imi t s of i t s powers r e s u l t i n g from the Pirmans, and under 
m 
the conditions proirided fo r / t he present Treaty, taJce the i^cessary 
measures for insur ing the execution of the said Treaty, 
In case the Egyptian government should not have suff ic ient 
means at i t s d i sposa l , i t s h a l l c a l l upon the Imperial Ottoman 
government which shal l talcs the necessary measures t o respond 
to such appeal, s h a l l give not ice thereof to the Signatory 
Powers of the Declarat ion of London of the 17th March 1885? 
and s h a l l , i f necessary, concert with them on the subject . 
The provisions of Ar t i c l e s IV, V, VII and VIII sha l l 
not i n t e r f e r e with the measures which s h a l l be taloen i n v i r tue 
of the present A r t i c l e , 
Ar t i c le X t S imilar ly , the provis ions of Ar t i c l e s IT, V 
VII and VIII sha l l not i n t e r f e r e with the measures which His 
Majesty the Sultan and His Highness the Khedive, i n the name 
of His Imperial Bfejesty, and within the l i m i t s of the Pirmans 
granted, might find i t necessary to take for securing by t h e i r 
own forces the defence of Egypt and the maintenance of Public 
20, 
order . 
In case His Imperial Majesty the Sia tan , or His Highness lil 
the Khedive, should find it necessary to avail themselves of the 
exceptions for which this Article provides, the Signatory Powers 
of the Declaration of London shall be notified thereof by the 
Imperial Ottoman government. 
It is liloBwise understood that the provisions of the four 
Articles aforesaid shall in no case occasion any obstacle to 
the measures vfeich the Imperial Ottoman Grovernment may think 
it necessary to talce in order to insure by its own forces the 
defence of its other possessions situated on the eastern coast 
of the Red Sea. 
Article XI t The measures which shall be taloen in the 
cases provided for by Articles IX and X of the present Treaty 
shall not interfere with the ftee use of the Canal. In the same ee 
cases the erection of permanent fortifications contrary to the 
provisions of Article Till is prohibited. 
Article XII t The High Contracting Parties, by applica-
tion of the principle of equality as regards to the free use of 
the Canal, a principle which forms one of the bases of the 
present Treaty, agree that none of them shall endeavour to obtain 
with respect to the Canal territorial or commercial advantages 
20 u 
or pri-vlleges in any International arrangtoents which may be 
concluded. Moreover, the rights of Turkey as the territorial 
power are reserved. 
Article XIII t With the excepticai of the obligations 
expressly provided by the clauses of the present Treaty, the 
sovereign rights of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, and the 
rights and iinmunities of His Highness the Khedive, resulting 
from the Firmans are in no way affected. 
Article XIV t The High Contracting Parties agree that the 
engagements resulting from the present Treaty shall not be 
limited by the duration of the Act of Concessicsi of the universal 
Suez Canal Cootpany. 
Article XV : The stipulation of the present Treaty shall 
not Interfere with the sanitary measures in force in E^pt. 
Article XVI i The High Contracting Parties undertake 
to bring the present Treaty to the knowledge of the States 
which have not signed it, inviting them to acceed to it. 
Article XVII : The Present Treaty shall be ratified , and 
the ratifications shall be exchanged at Constantinople within 
20 .^ 
the apace of one month, or sooiaer i f p o s s i b l e . 
In f a i t h of which the respect ive P l en ipo t en t i a r i e s have 
Signed the present I r e a t y , and have affiled t o i t the sea l of 
t h e i r arms. 
Done at Constantinople, the 29th day of the raonth of 
October i n the year 1888, 
For Great Br i t a in 
Grermany 
Austria,Hungary 
Spain 
France 
I t a l y 
Netherlands 
Russia 
!Purkey 
($ .S . ) W.A. White 
( L . S , ) Radowitz 
(li.S.) Calice 
(1,3,) mguel P forez Y GartfAa 
(L.S.) GDE Montebello 
(li .S.) A. Blanoe 
(L.S) Gus Kevn 
(L.S) ir» Elidow 
(L.S.) M.Said. 
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